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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from the Utah Court of Appeals' affirmation of: (i) the 
trial court's reversal of its earlier decision to grant summary judgment to 
Plaintiff/Appellant Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. ("Brookside"), (ii) the trial 
court's dismissal of Brookside's claim of unlawful detainer at the conclusion of 
Brookside's case during trial, (iii) granting attorneys' fees and court costs to 
Defendants/Appellees Sam Peebles and Harold Peebles, and (iv) denial of 
Brookside's request for attorneys' fees and court costs. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(a) of the Utah Code 
Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the Court of Appeals ruled in conflict with the decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court in Sittnerv. Schrieveretal.. 2000 UT 45, 2 P.3d 442, in its 
determination that Plaintiff/Appellant Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. 
("Brookside") did not preserve its arguments for appeal regarding the bona fide 
purchaser rule during the summary judgment phase of this action because 
though Brookside fully briefed the issue in its Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment it did not mention the argument when it 
responded to the reconsideration motion of the Defendants/Appellees Sam 
Peebles and Harold Peebles (together the "Peebles")? Brookside Mobile Home 
Park. Ltd. v. Sam Peebles et al.. 2000 Utah Ct. App. 314, f l 8 n. 3,14 P.3d 105. 
The Utah Supreme Court reviews "the court of appeals' legal conclusions for 
correctness and grant[s] them no deference." Sittner at U 14,445 citing Reese 
v. Reese, 1999 UT 75,10, 984 P.2d 987. Brookside preserved this issue for 
appeal before the Court of Appeals by the arguments it made in its Appellate 
Brief (pp. 16-19), Reply Brief (pp. 8-10), Petition for Writ of Certiorari (pp. 6-7, 
10-13), and Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari (pp. 2-4). 
II. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of 
surrender when it considered evidence in its analysis of the Peebles' surrender 
of the subject premises that the previous owner of the subject mobile home park 
(the "Park"), rather than Brookside, had entered into leases with both the actual 
tenant occupying the mobile home and the mobile home owner when there was 
no evidence proffered that Brookside engaged in such practices, incorrectly 
holding that there was a dispute of material fact? The Utah Supreme Court 
reviews "the decision of the Court of Appeals, not that of the trial court." Reese v. 
Reese, 1999 UT 75,1R. 984 P.2d 987 citing Willev v. Willev. 951 P.2d 226, 230 
(Utah 1997). The Court of Appeals affirmation of the trial court's reversal of its 
grant of summary judgment to Brookside is reviewed without deference to the 
Court of Appeals conclusions of law regarding summary judgment issues, jd. at 
1[10 (citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts are 
considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. "[W]e may affirm 
a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court." Parker 
v. Dodqion, 971 P.2d, 496, 497 (Utah 1998); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Brookside preserved this issue for appeal before 
the Court of Appeals by the arguments it made in its Appellate Brief (pp. 12-16, 
19-22), Reply Brief (pp. 1-5, 9-10), Petition for Writ of Certiorari (pp. 8-13), and 
Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari (pp. 3-4). 
III. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the notice 
requirements of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act (the "Act") rather than the 
notice requirements of the Utah unlawful detainer statute regarding Brookside's 
eviction action against the Peebles when the Peebles did not produce a written 
lease as required by the Act and the jury held that any written lease with the prior 
owner of the Park was not binding upon Brookside? On certiorari, the Utah 
Supreme Court reviews "the decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness." 
Capital Assets Fin. Serv., 2000 UT 9, %8, 994 P.2d 201 (citations omitted). The 
Utah Supreme Court reviews "the court of appeals' conclusions of law for 
correctness and grant them no deference." Reese at 1J10 (citations omitted). 
Brookside preserved this issue for appeal before the Court of Appeals by the 
arguments it made in its Appellate Brief (pp. 19-22), Reply Brief (pp. 9-10), 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari (pp.8-13), and Reply Brief in Support of Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari (pp. 3-4). 
IV. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying Brookside's attorney's 
fees under the Act for successfully defending against the Peebles' counterclaims 
based on the Act? On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews "the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for correctness." Capital Assets at 1J8 (citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court reviews "the court of appeals' conclusions of law for 
correctness and grant them no deference." Reese at 1J10 (citations omitted). 
Brookside preserved this issue for appeal before the Court of Appeals by the 
arguments it made in its Appellate Brief (pp. 23-25), Reply Brief (pp. 20-21), and 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari (pp.13-14). 
V. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting the Peebles' 
attorneys' fees under the Act? On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews 
"the decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness." Capital Assets at 1J8 
(citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court reviews "the court of appeals' 
conclusions of law for correctness and grant them no deference." Reese at fl10 
(citations omitted). Brookside preserved this issue for appeal before the Court of 
Appeals by the arguments it made in its Appellate Brief (pp. 23-25), and Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari (pp. 14-15). 
VI. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the arguments of 
Brookside that Defendant/Appellee Harold Peebles should be reinstated as a 
defendant for failure to comply with Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure? On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews "the decision of the 
Court of Appeals for correctness." Capital Assets at ^ |8 (citations omitted). The 
Utah Supreme Court reviews "the court of appeals' conclusions of law for 
correctness and grant them no deference." Reese at 1[10 (citations omitted). 
Brookside preserved this issue for appeal before the Court of Appeals by the 
arguments it made in its Appellate Brief (pp. 12-22), Reply Brief (pp. 5-8, 9-13, 
16), Petition for Writ of Certiorari (pp. 10-13, 15-17), and Reply Brief in Support of 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari (pp. 3-4). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules which pertain 
to this appeal are fully set forth in the addenda hereto where not fully set forth in 
the body of this brief. The Mobile Home Park Residency Act, located at Utah 
Code Annotated Sections 57-16-1 through 57-16-15.1 , Unlawful Detainer by 
Tenant for Term Less Than Life, located at Utah Code Annotated Section 78-36-
3, and Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure are fully set forth in the 
addenda hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about May 5,1996, Plaintiff/Appellant Brookside Mobile Home Park, 
Ltd. ("Brookside") filed an Amended Complaint against the Peebles alleging 
unlawful detainer by the Peebles of space #100 of the Brookside Mobile Home 
Park (the "Park") owned by Brookside (R. 17-33). At the time of the filing of the 
Amended Complaint, the Peebles owned, but were not occupying, the mobile 
home located on space #100, nor were they residing in the Park (R. 547, 554-
55). The mobile home had been occupied by a series of tenants since the 
Peebles had vacated the mobile home located on space #100 and was vacant 
when Brookside's action was commenced (R. 19). The mobile home was in 
poor condition and required numerous repairs to be brought into compliance with 
park rules and the municipal code (R. 26). On or about January 2, 1997, the 
Peebles filed a Counterclaim against Brookside alleging that, among other 
claims, Brookside had violated the Mobile Home Park Residency Act by 
unreasonably withholding approval of prospective purchasers of the Peebles' 
mobile home (R. 149-54). On or about August 8,1997, Brookside filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment arguing that because the Peebles did not have a lease 
with Brookside, that Peebles were therefore not residents under the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act, and that the Peebles were in unlawful detainer of 
space #100 (R. 529-30). On or about October 23,1997, the Court granted 
Brookside's Motion, holding that Brookside's notice was sufficient under Utah 
law for unlawful detainer, that no written lease was offered in evidence, that the 
Peebles had surrendered any lease they had with Brookside by the subsequent 
execution of leases between Brookside and the series of buyers of the Peebles' 
mobile home, and that the Peebles' counterclaims failed as they were premised 
upon a lease with Brookside (R. 616-20). At no time did the Peebles produce a 
copy of any written lease with either Brookside or a previous owner of the Park. 
On October 28,1997, the Peebles filed a Notice of Appeal of the trial 
court's summary judgment in favor Brookside (R. 623-24). On November 17, 
1997, the Peebles filed a Motion for Reconsideration requesting that the trial 
court reconsider the summary judgment in favor of Brookside (R. 687-88). The 
Peebles filed two Affidavits of Sam Peebles dated November 17,1997 and 
November 18,1997 (the "Affidavits") simultaneously with their Motion for 
Reconsideration that contradicted Sam Peebles's previous deposition testimony 
(R. 701-07). On or about February 20,1998, with an Order dated March 18, 
1998, the trial court overturned its prior decision holding that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact raised by the Affidavits of the Peebles as to 
whether the Peebles knew there were leases between Brooks*ide and 
purchasers of the Peebles' mobile home resulting in a surrender of the Peebles' 
lease (R. 744-47). The District Court refused to strike the Affidavits when 
considering the Motion to Reconsider (R. 744). 
Commencing October 1,1998, the matter was tried before a jury. The trial 
court dismissed Brookside's claim of unlawful detainer at the conclusion of 
Brookside's case, holding that Brookside was required to give the Peebles a 15 
day notice to quit under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act as opposed to a 5 
day notice to quit for unlawful detainer under Utah law (R. 1292-94). The jury 
later found against the Peebles' on their counterclaims against Brookside (R. 
1292-94). In so doing, the jury determined that the Peebles had no lease with 
Brookside and the Peebles were therefore not entitled to relief under the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act against Brookside (R. 1292-94). On motions of both 
Brookside and the Peebles, the Court denied both parties' attorneys' fees and 
costs (R. 1285-87). 
Brookside timely appealed the trial court's February 1998 reversal of its 
previous decision granting Brookside summary judgment dated October 23, 
1997 (R. 744-47), the trial court's dismissal of Brookside's claims at trial for 
unlawful detainer (R. 1292-94), and the trial court's denial of Brookside's Motion 
for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs under the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act when Brookside prevailed against the Peebles' claims under the 
Act (R. 1285-87). The Peebles cross appealed the jury's verdict that Brookside 
did not unreasonably withhold approval of potential buyers of the Peebles' 
mobile home in violation of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act and the trial 
court's denial of the Peebles attorney fees and costs (R. 1287-93). This Court 
assigned Brookside's appeal to the Court of Appeals for review. 
On November 9, 2000, in its Opinion for official publication, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's reversal of its original summary judgment for 
Brookside, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Brookside's claims at trial for 
unlawful detainer, affirmed the trial court's denial of Brookside's request for 
attorney fees and costs, affirmed the jury's verdict for Brookside regarding 
Peebles' counterclaims, and reversed the trial court's denial of Peebles' request 
for attorney fees and costs in defending against Brookside's unlawful detainer 
claim, remanding for determination of the same. Brookside Mobile Home Park, 
Ltd. v.Sam Peebles etal., 2000 Utah Ct. App. 314, W 0 , 1 4 , 35, 38, and 42,14 
P.3d 105. 
Brookside timely petitioned for writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court 
for review of the Utah Court of Appeals' determination that Brookside failed to 
preserve its arguments for appeal regarding the bona fide purchaser rule during 
the summary judgment phase, that the doctrine of surrender could not be 
determined as a matter of law during the summary judgment phase because of 
a dispute of material fact, that the notice requirements of the Mobile Home Park 
Residence Act applied rather than the notice requirements of the Utah Unlawful 
Detainer Statute regarding Brookside's eviction action against the Peebles when 
the Peebles did not produce a written lease as required by the Act and the jury 
held that any written lease with the prior owner of the Park was not binding upon 
Brookside, that the trial court was correct in denying Brookside's attorney's fees 
under the Act for successfully defending against the Peebles' counterclaims 
brought under the Act, that the trial court erred in denying the Peebles' attorneys' 
fees under the Act, and that Brookside failed to comply with Rule 24(a)(9) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure regarding the issue of whether 
Defendant/Appellee Harold Peebles should be reinstated as a defendant 
(Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Appellant). On February 7, 2001, the Utah 
Supreme Court granted Brookside's petition, issuing a writ of certiorari to 
Brookside for review of the judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendants/Appellees Sam Peebles and Harold Peebles (together the 
"Peebles") purchased the mobile home occupying space #100 of the Brookside 
Mobile Home Park (the "Park") in or around December of 1983 and Sam 
Peebles thereafter entered into a Lease with Brookside Associates ("Assignor"), 
a predecessor in interest of Plaintiff/Appellant Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. 
("Brookside") regarding the Park (T. 325-27,400-02). In or around November of 
1986, the Peebles sold their mobile home to Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock 
(T. 175,177). 
After selling their mobile home to Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock, Sam 
Peebles moved out of the mobile home (T. 175, 177). Bud Jones and Barbara 
Peacock then entered into a lease agreement directly with Assignor for the lease 
of space #100 (T. 178). Upon selling the mobile home to Bud Jones and 
Barbara Peacock, the Peebles became purchase money lenders and Bud Jones 
and Barbara Peacock became the residents of space #100 (T. 456-57). After 
about six months, Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock defaulted on their purchase 
contract with the Peebles and the Peebles retook possession of the mobile 
home (T. 178,449-50). 
Thereafter Kathy Burgess rented the mobile home from the Peebles (T. 
188, 403-06). Kathy Burgess entered into a lease with Assignor (T. 181-83). 
The Peebles then rented the mobile home to Yolanda Gonzales (T. 181-83,186-
88). Yolanda Gonzales entered into a lease with Assignor (T. 181-83). Sam 
Peebles lent money to Yolanda Gonzales for her rental payments to Assignor (T. 
187-88). The Peebles then sold the home to Richard Rowley (T. 181-84). 
Richard Rowley entered into a lease with Assignor (T. 183). On one occasion, 
the Peebles lent Richard Rowley approximately $1,500 to have a sheriffs lock 
removed from the mobile home because of eviction proceedings commenced by 
Assignor (T. 183-84,413). 
In or around August of 1994, Brookside's immediate predecessor in 
interest, the Alan H. Glover & Bonnie A. Glover Revocable Trust (the "Trust") 
entered into a contract to purchase the Park from Assignor (T. 32-33). In 
connection with the purchase of the Park, the Trust entered into an Assignment 
of Leases and Deposits dated December 9, 1994 whereby the Trust acquired 
from Assignor all of Assignor's right, title and interest to the leases described on 
a Rent Roll attached to the Assignment of Leases and Deposits (T. 34-35). The 
Rent Roll attached to the Assignment of Leases and Deposits listed Richard 
Rowley as the Resident occupying space #100 (T. 36, 60-62). Richard Rowley 
in fact occupied space #100 at the time of the Trust's purchase of the Park (T. 
81-83). The Peebles were not listed on the Rent Roll (T. 81-83). 
Brookside acquired its interest in the Park from the Trust by deed dated on 
or about January 4,1995, and acquired its interest in the lease with Rowley by 
virtue of an Assignment of Leases dated January 4,1995 (T. 40-41). The leases 
acquired by Brookside were identical to those acquired by the Trust from 
Assignor (T. 41-42). Again, the Peebles were not identified as residents under 
any lease and Brookside had no knowledge of Peebles' claimed interest in a 
mobile home or any claim of a lease within the Park (T. 41-42). 
As noted above, on or about May 1,1994, prior to Brookside's purchase of 
the Park, Richard Rowley had entered into a Mobile Home Space Lease 
Agreement for space #100 of the Park with Assignor, the prior owner of the Park 
(T. 82). 
Subsequent to Brookside's purchase of the Park, Richard Rowley entered 
into a Rental Agreement with Brookside on or about April 1, 1995 (T. 46-47). 
The April 1995 Rental Agreement listed only Richard Rowley and Dawn Rowley 
as Residents and further prohibited assignments or subleases (T. 48). Richard 
Rowley abandoned the mobile home on or about November of 1995 (T. 496, 
507). Thereafter, on or about the 29th of November, 1995, Brookside served the 
Peebles as lenders, by registered mail, a Notice pursuant to Section 57-16-9, 
Utah Code Annotated, specifying Sam Peebles as the lienholder of the mobile 
home and indicating that as the lienholder of record, they were primarily liable to 
Brookside for all rents accruing after ten (10) days following receipt of the notice 
(T. 504). Subsequent to receiving notice as lender, the Peebles began paying 
the rent for space #100 which Brookside accepted as it would from any other 
lender (T. 508). 
On or about December 27, 1995, Sam Peebles was advised that certain 
repairs would need to be made to the trailer for it to remain in the Park if sold to 
a new homeowner (T. 50-54, 507-08). In March of 1996, the Park manager, Jim 
Prentice, informed Sam Peebles that Sam Peebles would need to come by the 
manager's office and sign a new lease with the current owner of the Park (T. 
458-59). Sam Peebles refused to come to the manager's office to sign a new 
lease (T. 458-59). 
Brookside served upon the Peebles by posting upon the mobile home a 
Notice to Quit on April 13,1996 (R. 31-32).1 Such notice required the Peebles to 
remove their mobile home from the Park within five (5) days pursuant to the 
statutory requirements of unlawful detainer under Utah law (R. 31-32). 
On or about May 5, 1996, Brookside filed an Amended Complaint alleging 
unlawful detainer by the Peebles. (R. 17-33) At the time of filing of the 
Amended Complaint, the mobile home was in a state of disrepair to the point 
that it did not satisfy municipal code requirements of the City of West Jordan (T. 
145-46,214-19). 
On or about January 2,1997, the Peebles filed a Counterclaim against 
Brookside alleging that, among other claims, Brookside had violated the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act by unreasonably withholding approval of prospective 
purchasers of the Peebles' mobile home (R. 149-54). 
On August 8,1997, Brookside filed its Motion for Summary Judgment 
arguing that because the Peebles did not have a lease with Brookside, that the 
Peebles were lenders, not residents under the Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act, and that the Peebles were in unlawful detainer (R. 529-30). By Decision 
dated October 23,1997, the Court granted Brookside's Motion, holding that 
Brookside's notice was sufficient for unlawful detainer under Utah law, that the 
Peebles had no lease with Brookside by virtue of the surrender of any lease 
1Such 5 day notice was served after Brookside received a "note" from the 
court that the notice was required as a prerequisite to the action. Brookside served 
the notice and then filed its Amended Complaint. 
caused by execution of leases between the Park and the series of purchasers of 
the Peebles' mobile home, the Peebles' refusal to enter into a written lease as 
required by the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, and that the Peebles' 
counterclaims failed as they were premised upon a lease with Brookside (R. 
616-20). 
The Peebles filed a Notice of Appeal dated October 28, 1997 and also 
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 17,1997 (R. 623-24). The 
Peebles filed two Affidavits of Sam Peebles dated November 17, 1997 and 
November 18, 1997 simultaneously with their Motion for Reconsideration that 
contradicted Sam Peebles' earlier deposition testimony. (R. 701-707) By Notice 
of Decision dated February 20, 1998, and Order dated March 18, 1998, the 
Court overturned the prior decision holding that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the Peebles knew there were leases between the 
Park and the series of purchasers of the Peebles' mobile home resulting in a 
surrender of the Peebles' lease (R. 744-47). 
Commencing October 1, 1998, the matter was tried before a jury. 
However, the trial court dismissed Brookside's claim of unlawful detainer at the 
conclusion of Brookside's case, holding that Brookside was required to give a 15 
day notice to the Peebles under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act as 
opposed to a 5 day notice for unlawful detainer (R. 1292-94). The jury later held 
no cause of action regarding the counterclaims of the Peebles (R. 1292-94). In 
special jury verdicts, the jury found that Brookside had no lease with the Peebles 
and that Brookside had not unreasonably withheld its consent to prospective 
purchasers of the Peebles' mobile home in violation of the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act (R. 1292-94). On Motion of both the Peebles and Brookside, the 
Court denied both parties' claims for attorney's fees and costs (R. 1285-87). 
Brookside timely appealed the trial court's February 1998 reversal of its 
previous Decision dated October 23, 1997 granting Brookside Summary 
Judgment (R. 744-47), the trial court's dismissal of Brookside's claims at trial for 
unlawful detainer (R. 1292-94), and the trial court's denial of Brookside's Motion 
for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Costs under the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act when Brookside prevailed against the Peebles' claims under the 
Act (R. 1285-87). This Court assigned Brookside's appeal to the Court of 
Appeals for adjudication. 
On November 9, 2000, in its Opinion for official publication, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's reversal of its original summary judgment for 
Brookside, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Brookside's claims at trial for 
unlawful detainer, affirmed the trial court's denial of Brookside's request for 
attorney fees and costs, affirmed the jury's verdict for Brookside regarding 
Peebles' counterclaims, and reversed the trial court's denial of Peebles' request 
for attorney fees and costs in defending against Brookside's unlawful detainer 
claim, remanding for determination of the same. Brookside at fflj 10,14, 35, 38, 
and 42. 
Brookside timely petitioned for writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court 
for review of the Utah Court of Appeals' determination that Brookside failed to 
preserve its arguments for appeal regarding the bona fide purchaser rule during 
the summary judgment phase, the doctrine of surrender could not be determined 
as a matter of law during the summary judgment phase holding that there was a 
dispute of material fact, that the notice requirements of the Act applied rather 
than the notice requirements of the Utah unlawful detainer statute regarding 
Brookside's eviction action against the Peebles, that the trial court was correct in 
denying Brookside's attorney's fees under the Act for successfully defending 
against the Peebles' counterclaims brought under the Act, that the trial court 
erred in denying the Peebles' attorneys' fees under the Act, and that Brookside 
failed to comply with Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
regarding the issue of whether Defendant/Appellee Harold Peebles should be 
reinstated as a defendant. (Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Appellant). 
On February 7, 2001, the Utah Supreme Court granted Brookside's 
petition, issuing a writ of certiorari to Brookside for review of the judgment of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals ruled in conflict with a decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court in its determination that Plaintiff/Appellant Brookside Mobile Home Park, 
Ltd. ("Brookside") failed to preserve for appeal its arguments regarding the bona 
fide purchaser rule. The Court of Appeals declined to address the bona fide 
purchaser rule during the summary judgment phase of this action because 
although Brookside raised this issue in support of its summary judgment motion, 
it did not mention the bona fide purchaser rule in its written response to the 
motion of Defendants/Appellees Sam Peebles and Harold Peebles (together the 
"Peebles") to reconsider the trial court's grant of summary judgment to 
Brookside. Brookside argued the bona fide purchaser rule in its Memorandum in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, in its Reply Memorandum in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, in oral argument regarding the 
Peebles' Motion for Reconsideration, and at trial. The Court of Appeals' 
decision is not consistent with a previous ruling by this Court that the appellant's 
arguments that were fully briefed in summary judgment memoranda were 
preserved for appeal. 
The Court of Appeals erred when, in applying the doctrine of surrender 
during the summary judgment phase, it considered evidence that the previous 
owner of the Brookside Mobile Home Park (the "Park") entered into leases both 
with the actual tenant and the mobile home owner when there was no evidence 
proffered that Brookside engaged in such activities. The Court of Appeals 
incorrectly concluded that surrender could not be determined as a matter of law 
in a motion for summary judgment in this case because there was a dispute of 
material fact. 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that a written lease between 
Brookside and the Peebles is not necessary for an action governed by the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act (the "Act"). Though the Court of Appeals 
acknowledges that the Act requires that each agreement for the lease of mobile 
home space shall be written and signed by the parties, it deemed such an issue 
irrelevant in light of the lease termination provisions of the Act which do not 
expressly codify the bona fide purchaser rule as grounds for termination of a 
lease. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Peebles were allowed to 
defend themselves pursuant to the terms of the Act even though the Peebles 
have failed to comply with the terms of the Act that would allow them such a 
defense. Because Brookside was a bona fide purchaser who purchased the 
Park without actual or constructive notice of the Peebles' claims as residents, 
Brookside is not bound by any alleged contract entered into between the 
Peebles and a prior owner of the Park. The lack of a written lease between 
Brookside and the Peebles required that Brookside proceed under the Utah 
Unlawful Detainer Statute in evicting the Peebles rather than the Act. 
The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the award of attorney fees and 
costs under Section 57-16-8 of the Act and denying Brookside its attorney fees 
and costs in defending against the Peebles' counterclaims brought under the 
Act. Brookside is entitled to attorneys' fees in this action because the Peebles 
alleged in their Counterclaim, causes of action for violation of Section 57-16-4(4) 
of the Act. Because Brookside successfully defended against the Peebles's 
counterclaim founded on the Act, Brookside is entitled to its attorney's fees 
incurred in this action pursuant to Section 57-16-8 of the Act. 
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The Court of Appeals erred in granting the Peebles' attorney fees because 
it improperly ruled that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act governed 
Brookside's eviction proceeding instead of unlawful detainer. Furthermore, even 
if this Court were to determine that the Court of Appeals is correct regarding 
Brookside's eviction action being governed by the Act, both Brookside and 
Peebles failed to prevail on their actions arising under the Act. Neither party 
should then recover attorney fees as provided by the Act. 
The Court of Appeals erred in its decision to disregard Brookside's 
arguments that Harold Peebles should be reinstated as a defendant for failure to 
comply with Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In its initial 
brief and reply brief, Brookside fully briefed and cited authority in its arguments 
that Harold Peebles is liable to Brookside for unlawful detainer as a 
lienholder/owner of the mobile home in question. The trial court provided no 
legal basis for its dismissal of Harold Peebles as a defendant. Furthermore, the 
Judgment gave no mention of the dismissal of Harold Peebles or its legal basis. 
Due to the lack of legal reasoning given by the trial court for its dismissal of 
Harold Peebles, Brookside was not able to cite authority countering such 
reasoning. Brookside also raised additional issues in its initial brief that Harold 
Peebles never raised the affirmative defense of "nominal defendant" in his 
answer and instead brought numerous counterclaims against Brookside. 
Brookside has met its burden under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure in arguing that Harold Peebles is liable to Brookside and the Court of 
Appeals erred in disregarding Brookside's arguments. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED IN CONFLICT WITH THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT BROOKSIDE 
FAILED TO PRESERVE ITS ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE BONA 
FIDE PURCHASER RULE. 
The Court of Appeals ruled in conflict with a decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court in its determination that Plaintiff/Appellant Brookside Mobile Home Park, 
Ltd. ("Brookside") failed to preserve for appeal its arguments regarding the bona 
fide purchaser rule. The Court of Appeals ruled that because Brookside failed to 
raise the issue in its written memorandum opposing the Motion for 
Reconsideration of Defendants/Appellees Sam Peebles and Harold Peebles 
(together the "Peebles") regarding the trial court's grant of summary judgment to 
Brookside, Brookside had failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Brookside at 
1J18 n. 3. However, Brookside argued the bona fide purchaser rule in support of 
its Motion for Summary Judgment that the Peebles asked the trial court to 
reconsider (R. 594-96), in its Reply Memorandum in support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 594-96), in oral argument regarding the Peebles' Motion 
for Reconsideration, and at trial (T. 9-12). 
This Court has stated that the general rule regarding preservation of 
issues for appeal is "that failure to raise an argument before the trial court 
precludes a party from raising that argument on appeal." Sittner v. Schriever et 
aL, 2000 UT 45,1J16, 2 P.3d 442 (citations omitted). In Sittner, the appellant 
fully briefed in his own summary judgment memorandum and his memorandum 
in opposition to the appellees' motions for summary judgment the issues for 
which he sought appellate review, Jd. at ^ 17. This Court held that by doing so, 
the appellant had preserved the issues for appeal. ]dL The Court of Appeals 
ruling in this matter is not consistent with this Court's ruling in Sittner. 
In this matter, Brookside argued in support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment that under the bona fide purchaser rule, Brookside purchased the 
Brookside Mobile Home Park (the "Park") with no actual or constructive notice of 
a lease with Defendant Sam Peebles ("Sam Peebles") and is therefore a bona 
fide purchaser not subject to any lease Sam Peebles may have entered into with 
a previous owner of the Park. The bona fide purchaser rule alone is a sufficient 
basis to determine there was no contract between Brookside and the Peebles 
and to uphold the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Brookside. The trial 
court granted the Peebles' Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that 
Brookside's notice was sufficient under Utah law for unlawful detainer, that no 
written lease was offered in evidence, that the Peebles had surrendered any 
lease they had with Brookside by the subsequent execution of leases between 
Brookside and the series of buyers of the Peebles' mobile home, and that the 
Peebles' counterclaims failed as they were premised upon a lease with 
Brookside (R. 616-20). The Peebles subsequently filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration regarding the trial court's granting of summary judgment to 
Brookside (R. 623-24). The Peebles Memorandum in Support of their Motion for 
Reconsideration dealt primarily with the issue of surrender and whether Sam 
Peebles knowledge of the subsequent leases for the same space lead to a 
surrender of his lease with a previous owner (R.694-98). The Peebles filed two 
Affidavits of Sam Peebles dated November 17,1997 and November 18, 1997 
(the "Affidavits") simultaneously with their Motion for Reconsideration that 
contradicted Sam Peebles's previous deposition testimony (R. 701-07). In its 
memorandum opposing Peebles' Motion for Reconsideration, Brookside argued 
that the Affidavits contradicted Sam Peebles' earlier deposition testimony and 
were therefore inadmissible (R. 717-22). The trial court found the Affidavits 
admissible and reversed its earlier decision granting Brookside summary 
judgment (R. 744-47). In its brief before the Court of Appeals, Brookside 
reasserted its arguments that the Affidavits were inadmissible and that any lease 
Sam Peebles had with a previous owner of the Park is not binding on Brookside 
under either the surrender doctrine or the bona fide purchaser rule (Brief of 
Appellant before the Utah Court of Appeals, pp. 12-18). 
The Court of Appeals declined to address the bona fide purchaser rule 
stating that "Brookside has not property preserved the bona fide purchaser issue 
for appeal." Brookside at ^ |18 n. 3. The Court of Appeals reasoned that 
"[although Brookside raised this argument in the original summary judgment 
motion, it did not mention the argument when it responded to Peebles' 
reconsideration motion." \± The Court of Appeals further reasoned that the 
resolution being appealed is that of the Peebles' Motion for Reconsideration and 
that "[a]t that crucial point, Brookside did not give the trial court the opportunity to 
consider an alternative basis for awarding summary judgment for Brookside." jd. 
The Court of Appeals ignores the fact that Peebles' Motion to Reconsider 
is just that, a motion to reconsider Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment 
that the trial court had already granted. By its very nature, a Motion to 
Reconsider includes a review of all the pleadings, affidavits, and arguments 
made in the initial motion which the moving party is asking the trial court to 
reconsider. Furthermore, "Utah courts have consistently held that our rules of 
civil procedure do not provide for a motion for reconsideration of a trial court's 
order or judgment." Bonneville Billings & Collection v. Torres. 2000 Utah Ct. 
App. 338,1f4, 15 P.3d 112. As noted by this Court: 
If the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond the rules, 
make a motion for reconsideration, and persuade the judge to 
reverse himself, the question arises, why should not the other party 
who is now ruled against be permitted to make a motion for re-
reconsideration, asking the court to again reverse himself? 
Tenacious litigants and lawyers might persist in motions, arguments 
and pressures and theoretically a judge could go on reversing 
himself periodically at the entreaties of one or the other of the 
parties ad infinitum. 
Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son. 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1991) citing 
Drurv v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966) (emphasis in 
original). To require that all arguments raised in a motion for summary judgment 
to be addressed again in the pleadings involving a motion for reconsideration of 
the summary judgment, a motion not even recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in order to preserve an argument for appeal is as "absurd" as 
requiring a party to file a post-judgment motion objecting to the granting of 
summary judgment in order to preserve issues for appeal as noted in Sittner. \± 
at I117. 
The Court of Appeals cites Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 
(Utah 1998) to support its refusal to address the bona fide purchaser rule in the 
summary judgment phase of this action. Brookside at 1J18 n. 3. In Badger, this 
Court determined that parties seeking a review of an administrative agency's 
action must raise "an issue before that agency to preserve the issue for further 
review." Badger at 847. In dicta this Court stated that in order to preserve an 
issue for appellate review before a trial court, a party must raise the issue by 
meeting the following three requirements: "(1) the issue must be raised in a 
timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must 
introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Id (citations omitted). 
In this matter, Brookside has met these three requirements by specifically raising 
the bona fide purchaser rule during the summary judgment phase including 
supporting evidence and relevant legal authority in both its supporting 
memorandum (R. 451-52), reply memorandum regarding its motion for summary 
judgment (R. 594-96), and in oral argument regarding the Peebles' Motion for 
Reconsideration. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Brookside has 
met the standard set forth in Badger regarding preserving an issue before a trial 
court. 
The trial court also specifically granted the Peebles Motion for 
Reconsideration and denied Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment in its 
order regarding the Motion for Reconsideration (R. 749 and 752). The Court of 
Appeals' decision in this matter is not consistent with Sittner where this Court 
held that arguments briefed in summary judgment memoranda were preserved 
for appeal. Sittner at 1f 17. A motion for reconsideration of summary judgment 
raising new issues is not sufficient to nullify all arguments previously raised in 
support of the original motion for summary judgment. 
A. Brookside is Entitled to Summary Judgment Based on the Bona 
Fide Purchaser Rule. 
Under the bona fide purchaser rule alone, Brookside should be granted 
summary judgment. The trial court's original grant of summary judgment to 
Brookside should be reinstated. "A bona fide purchaser is one who takes 
without actual or constructive notice of facts sufficient to put him on notice of the 
complainant's equity." Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 328 (Utah App. 1990) 
(quoting Blodgett v. Marser, 590 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978). Brookside had no 
knowledge at the time it purchased the Park that the Peebles were the owners of 
the mobile home located at space #100 or that they might claim the existence of 
a lease. 
"The essential time to measure knowledge is at the time of the actual 
sale." Grahn v. Gregory. 800 P.2d 320, at 328. At the time of the sale, Richard 
Rowley was the occupant of the subject mobile home. Richard Rowley had 
signed a lease with Plaintiffs predecessor as the resident (T. 82). Richard 
Rowley was listed as the resident of the subject mobile home on the Rent Roll 
attached to the Assignment of Leases and Deposits (T. 36, 60-62). Because 
Brookside was a bona fide purchaser who took the Park without actual or 
constructive notice of the Peebles' claims as residents, Brookside is not bound 
by any alleged contract entered into between the Peebles and a prior owner of 
the Park. jd. This issue alone is sufficient basis to determine there was no 
contract between Brookside and the Peebles and to uphold the trial court's 
summary judgment in favor of Brookside. The original summary judgment 
should be reinstated and this matter remanded for calculation of treble damages 
recoverable by Brookside under Utah law for unlawful detainer. 
II. BROOKSIDE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON 
THE DOCTRINE OF SURRENDER. 
Under the doctrine of surrender alone, Brookside should be granted 
summary judgment. The trial court's original grant of summary judgment to 
Brookside should be reinstated. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the 
doctrine of surrender cannot be determined as a matter of law in a motion for 
summary judgment in this case. Though the Court of Appeals states that the 
"Peebles's knowledge that the park was 'reletting' the space to his renters does 
not inevitably lead to the conclusion that he intended to surrender his lease," it 
does when Sam Peebles conceded such knowledge and there is no other 
dispute of material fact. Brookside at 1J25. 
As this Court has noted "a surrender will not be implied against the intent 
of the parties as manifested by their acts." Belanger v. Rice, 2 Utah 2d 250, 
252, 272 P.2d 173, 174 (1954) (citing 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant § 905). 
As noted in 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 252 (1995) regarding the 
doctrine of surrender and subsequent third-party leases: 
There is a presumption that acceptance by the tenant of a new 
lease of the premises during the term of an old lease operates as a 
surrender of the old lease by the act of the parties; that is a 
surrender of a lease is implied by law when another estate is 
created by the reversioner or remainderman, with the assent of the 
tenant, that is incompatible with the existing term. Thus, as a 
general rule, when a new lease of the premises is taken by the 
lessee from the lessor for the whole or a part of the term embraced 
in the former one, there is said to be a surrender in law because the 
giving of a new lease necessarily implies a surrender of the old one. 
It is not necessary that the second lease be given to the first lessee; 
if it is given to a third person with the consent of the first lessee, 
accompanied with the possession, it is equally operative as a 
surrender, (emphasis added) 
The only material facts in this matter are that Sam Peebles consented to 
the subsequent leases of space #100 by the people to which he sold/rented the 
mobile home and the possession of space #100 by those same people (R. 718-
19). In this situation, Sam Peebles' actions in selling and leasing the subject 
mobile home to several individuals and his awareness of their leasing space 
#100 of the Park manifests intent in his surrender of any lease he may have had 
regarding space #100 of the Park (R. 549-52). In fact, Sam Peebles refused to 
enter into a new lease with Brookside that would have created a new 
landlord/tenant relationship (R. 445-554). 
The Court of Appeals' affirmation of the trial court's reversal of its decision 
to grant Brookside summary judgment is reviewed without deference to the 
Court of Appeals' determination because summary judgment deals only with 
questions of law. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue 
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts are considered in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. "[W]e may affirm a grant of 
summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court." Parker v. 
Dodgion. 971 P.2d, 496, 497 (Utah 1998); Hiqgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
The doctrine of surrender requires only that Sam Peebles assented to the 
creation of an estate between Rowley and Brookside. The Peebles assented 
when they permitted Rowley to occupy their mobile home knowing that 
Brookside would enter into a lease agreement from Rowley. "[W]hen a tenant 
surrenders the premises to a landlord before a lease term expires and the 
landlord accepts that surrender, the tenant is no longer in privity of estate with 
the Landlord." Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 
1989). This "rule of surrender implied by law is so well established as to be 
without dispute." Automatic Gas Distributors. Inc. v. State Bank of Green River, 
817 P.2d 441,443 (Wyo. 1991). It is wholly immaterial that Sam Peebles did not 
realize that by permitting Rowley to occupy the mobile home and enter into a 
lease agreement with Brookside, Sam Peebles would be surrendering his lease. 
Moreover, the doctrine of surrender simply does not require that Sam Peebles, 
to the extent he actually was a tenant, "knowingly or consentualy [sic] 
surrendered [his] lease" in order for the surrender to be effective (R. 702). 
A lease agreement between a landlord and a tenant creates an estate in 
land. It is impossible to convey an estate which is incompatible with a pre-
existing estate. The creation of the second relationship with the assent of the 
prior tenant necessarily terminates the relationship between the landlord and the 
prior tenant. Here, where there is no dispute that Sam Peebles permitted 
Rowley to occupy the mobile home fully knowing that Brookside would require a 
lease agreement from Rowley, there was, as a matter of law, a surrender of any 
preexisting interest and estate of Sam Peebles. 
The original decision of the trial court granting Brookside's Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be reinstated and this matter remanded for 
calculation of treble damages recoverable by Brookside under Utah law for 
unlawful detainer. 
A. The Court of Appeals Erred in its Analysis of the Doctrine of 
Surrender When it Considered Evidence That the Previous 
Owner, Rather than Brookside, Entered into Leases with Both 
the Actual Tenant Occupant and the Mobile Home Owner, 
Incorrectly Concluding That There Was a Dispute of Material 
Fact. 
The Court of Appeals erred when, in applying the doctrine of surrender 
during the summary judgment phase of this action, it considered evidence that 
the previous owner of the Park entered into leases both with the actual tenant 
and the mobile home owner when there was no evidence proffered that 
Brookside engaged in such activities. The Court of Appeals incorrectly 
concluded that there was a dispute of material fact and that surrender could not 
be determined as a matter of law during the summary judgment phase in this 
matter. 
In its analysis of the doctrine of surrender in the trial court's reversal of 
summary judgment for Brookside, the Court of Appeals directed its discussion of 
the application of the surrender doctrine to the practice of the previous park 
owner to enter into leases with both the actual tenant of the mobile home and 
the mobile home owner. Brookside at ffl|22 and 25. However, the affidavit 
produced by the Peebles refers to the conduct of the previous park owner, not 
Brookside (R. 702). There was no proffer of evidence to the trial court that 
Brookside ever entered into two leases regarding a single space in the park. 
The only lease Brookside had was one entered into directly with the then mobile 
home tenant in May of 1994 (R. 497-99). The Court of Appeals has relied on 
there being a dispute of facts regarding Brookside entering into multiple leases 
for a single space when no such factual dispute existed.2 
Though this Court has held that "there is no arbitrary standard to be 
invariably applied" in determining "whether a reletting will terminate the 
obligations of a lease," the Court of Appeals has created an issue of fact at the 
2The Court of Appeals also has ignored evidence from the previous owner of 
the park who testified that no such procedure ever existed at the Park (T. 83-84). 
summary judgment stage of this action where none existed. John C. Cutler 
Ass'n v. De Jay Stores, 3 Utah 2d 107,111, 279 P.2d 700, 702-03 (1955). 
B. The Sam Peebles' Affidavits Submitted in Opposition to 
Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment Should Not Have 
Been Considered by the Trial Court. 
The Court of Appeals did not specifically rule on whether the trial court 
properly considered the Affidavits of Sam Peebles during the summary judgment 
phase of the action, stating that "regardless of the supplemental affidavits' 
contents-the trial court was correct in determining that a disputed issue of 
material fact existed" regarding the doctrine of surrender. Brookside at ][19. 
The trial court should not have considered the supplemental affidavits of Sam 
Peebles nor should this Court on appeal. 
A party cannot take a clear position in a deposition, that is not modified on 
cross-examination, and then raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which 
contradicts his deposition. See Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230,1237 (10th Cir. 
1986); Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170,1172-73 (Utah 1983). Though a court 
should not weigh evidence in a summary judgment proceeding, "when a party 
takes a clear position in a deposition that is not modified on cross-examination, 
he may not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts 
his deposition." jd. The only exception to this rule mandates that the party must 
"provide an explanation of the discrepancy." jd. at 1173. "A contrary rule would 
undermine the utility of summary judgment as a means of screening out sham 
issues of fact." Id. 
In the Peebles' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, 
the Peebles first attempt to raise an issue of whether Sam Peebles knew of the 
existence of a lease between Brookside and Rowley, the most recent purchaser 
of the Peebles mobile home (R. 694-700). The Peebles argued that because 
Sam Peebles was allegedly not aware of the Rowley lease, the Rowley lease did 
not operate as a surrender of any previously existing Peebles lease (R. 694-
700). 
In support of the argument that Sam Peebles had no knowledge of the 
Rowley lease, the Peebles offer a Supplemental Affidavit of Sam Peebles 
wherein he claims that he had no knowledge of a lease between Brookside and 
Richard Rowley (R. 701-07). This affidavit is inconsistent with deposition 
testimony offered by Sam Peebles, and was therefore inadmissible and 
inappropriately considered by the trial court. 
During the deposition of Sam Peebles taken May 1, 1997, the following 
colloquy transpired between Brookside's counsel and Sam Peebles referring 
specifically to the Peebles' "renters" including Rowley: 
Q. Okay. Each time these people leased the trailer from you, 
do you know if they made an application with the park to lease this? 
A. Yes, they did. They were supposed to. 
Q. Okay. And they would have gone through an application 
process? 
A. Yep. 
Q. They would have to sign a lease agreement? 
A. Yep. 
(Deposition of Sam Peebles at 21-22). In his deposition, Sam Peebles clearly 
testified that he is aware that his renters entered into lease agreements with 
Brookside. Therefore, his affidavit testimony that he had no knowledge of 
Rowley's lease is inadmissible and should be stricken. 
Due to the inadmissibility of the Supplemental Affidavits of Sam Peebles, 
the original decision by the trial court to grant Brookside summary judgment 
should be reinstated and this matter remanded for calculation of treble damages 
recoverable by Brookside under Utah law for unlawful detainer. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WRITTEN 
LEASE BETWEEN A LANDLORD AND AN OWNER RESIDENT NEED 
NOT BE IN EVIDENCE TO REQUIRE THAT AN EVICTION PROCEED 
PURSUANT TO THE MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY ACT. 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that a written lease between 
Brookside and the Peebles is not necessary for Brookside's unlawful detainer 
action to be governed by the Mobile Home Park Residency Act (the "Act"). This 
issue is raised in the context of Brookside's appeal of the trial court's directed 
verdict in favor of the Peebles that Brookside had incorrectly complied with the 
five-day notice of Utah's unlawful detainer statute rather than the fifteen-day 
notice required by the Act. 
Though the Court of Appeals acknowledges that Section 57-16-4(2) of the 
Act requires that "[ejach agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall be 
written and signed by the parties," (emphasis added) it deems such an issue 
irrelevant. Brookside at 1HT27-29. The Court of Appeals held that because Sam 
Peebles had a lease with a previous owner of the Park and the "Act provides no 
way for a buyer of a mobile home park to deem terminated any lease it does not 
specifically assume[,]... the lease remained in existence at the time Brookside 
brought its unlawful detainer action." Brookside at 1J29-30. 
The Court of Appeals decision stands for the proposition that a mobile 
home park purchaser must treat all parties who allegedly ever had any type of 
lease with any previous owner of the subject park as if they have a lease with the 
park purchaser. kL The mobile home park purchaser must then also abide by 
the terms of such a written lease though, as in this matter, the lease or a copy of 
it no longer exists. IdL at TJ30. The bona fide purchaser rule exists to eliminate 
such an unreasonable and impractical burden on a purchaser of real property. 
To allow the Court of Appeals' ruling to stand will have a chilling effect on sales 
of mobile home parks because the Court of Appeals has ruled that the bona fide 
purchaser rule is "irrelevant" regarding mobile home parks and neither a written 
lease nor a lease with the owner of the park is required to claim the benefits of a 
tenant under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals logic in this matter makes even less 
sense when dealing with Harold Peebles. It is undisputed that Harold Peebles 
never entered into a lease with anyone regarding space #100 of the Park. There 
is therefore no "un-terminated" lease that would give Harold Peebles tenant 
status under the Act. Harold Peebles was merely a part owner of a mobile home 
that occupied space #100 of the Park (R. 699 and 715). It may be for this 
reason that the Court of Appeals declined to address Harold Peebles liability in 
this matter rather than a failure of Brookside to comply with Rule 24(a)(9) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as it claimed. Brookside at 1J1 n.1. 
(Brookside's arguments regarding the reinstatement of Harold Peebles as a 
defendant are located below in Section VI of this Brief.) 
The jury findings in this matter are somewhat inconsistent with each other 
in that the jury found that the Peebles entered into a written lease with the 
previous owner of the Park (although no such document was ever produced), 
the Peebles did not surrender such lease, but Brookside did not assume the 
Peebles' lease with the previous owner (T. 716). The Court of Appeals states 
that the jury finding that Brookside did not assume the lease "irrelevant" and 
applies the notice requirement of the Act even though the Peebles refused to 
enter into a written lease with Brookside as required by the Act (T. 458-59), 
Harold Peebles never entered into a lease with any owner of the Park (R. 699 
and 715), the jury found that Brookside never assumed the lease Peebles 
entered into with the previous owner of the Park (T. 716), Peebles never 
introduced into evidence a written lease with any owner of the Park, and the 
Peebles had in fact refused to enter into a new lease with Brookside (T. 184). 
Brookside at 1J29. 
The Mobile Home Park Residency Act was enacted by the Utah 
legislature with the intent to "provide protection for both the owners of mobile 
homes located in mobile home parks and for the owners of mobile home parks." 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-2. The legislature sought to provide "speedy and 
adequate" remedies for park owners while protecting tenants from actual or 
constructive eviction due to the "high cost of moving mobile homes." Id 
Under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, a resident is defined as "an 
individual who leases or rents space in a mobile home park." Utah Code Ann. § 
57-16-3(3). The Act further requires that "the lease of mobile home space shall 
be written and signed by the parties." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(2). The Act 
further includes language limiting the language contained in mobile home 
leases, limiting the causes for termination of such leases, and providing for a 
unique eviction procedure that is different than the eviction procedure for other 
forms of real property interests. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-16-4, -5, -6, -7.5, and -8. 
The Court of Appeals' interpretation of statute is a question of statutory 
construction which is reviewed under a '"correction of error'" standard. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals' legal conclusions are given no deference but are 
reviewed for correctness Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n. 947 
P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997); C. T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d. 479, 480 (Utah 1999); 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d. 1201,1203 (Utah 1999). 
Brookside did not have a lease agreement with the Peebles. (R. 1292-94) 
Harold Peebles never entered into a lease with any owner of the Park. (R. 699 
and 715) The Peebles had previously surrendered any lease that previously 
existed. The Peebles were therefore not residents of the Park. As 
nonresidents, the Peebles refusal to vacate space #100 of the Park was not 
governed by the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. Without a written lease 
agreement between Brookside and the Peebles, Brookside was not obligated to 
evict the Peebles under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act but compelled to 
pursue an action for unlawful detainer against the Peebles. In fact, the trial court 
instructed Brookside to serve a five day notice to quit under unlawful detainer 
when Brookside commenced this action against the Peebles. (See Footnote 
No. 1 at page 12.) 
The elements of unlawful detainer are located in Section 78-36-3 of the 
Utah Code Annotated which provides: 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an 
unlawful detainer: 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with 
monthly or other periodic rent reserved; 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in 
possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice 
of not less than five days; 
Absent a valid residency lease with Brookside, the Peebles are tenants at 
will. In the present case, as a tenant at will, the Peebles' right to possession 
was subject to termination by Brookside upon five days' notice, Section 78-36-
3(11)(b). Brookside served the Peebles with a Notice to Quit on April 13,1996; 
however, the Peebles refused to vacate space #100. Consequently, Brookside 
is entitled to treble damages for the Peebles' unlawful detainer for periods 
subsequent to April 13,1996. 
This Court has previously held that in order for a party to have the benefits 
of a statutory scheme, that party must substantially comply with the terms of the 
statute creating the statutory benefit. See, e.g. First Security Mortgage Co. v. 
Hansen etal.. 631 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981) ("[S]ince a mechanic's lien is 
statutory and not contractual, a lien cannot be acquired unless the claimant 
complies with the statutory provisions . . . Where the statute fails, courts cannot 
create rights, and should not do so by unnatural and forced construction.") (citing 
Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713, 716 (1906)). Furthermore, 
portions of the Act do not make sense unless there is a written lease. For 
example, the Act contains numerous provisions regarding terms required in 
written leases and terms that are deemed void and unenforceable in a written 
lease. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4 (2)-(7) (1997). The Court of Appeals has 
allowed the Peebles to defend themselves pursuant to the terms of the Act even 
though the Peebles have failed to comply with other terms of the Act that would 
allow them such a defense. 
This Court should rule that the Peebles are not entitled to any defense 
contained in the Mobile Home Park Residency Act for their failure to enter into a 
written lease with Brookside. Harold Peebles never entered into a lease with 
any owner of the Park and Sam Peebles either surrendered his lease with a 
previous owner as a matter of law and/or that Brookside is a bona fide purchaser 
of the Park not subject to a lease Sam Peebles may have had with a previous 
owner because Brookside had no constructive or actual notice of such a lease 
when it purchased the Park. 
The lack of a written lease between Brookside and either of the Peebles 
required that Brookside proceed under Utah unlawful detainer statute in evicting 
the Peebles rather than the Act. 
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING BROOKSIDE'S 
ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER THE MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY 
ACTTOR SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING AGAINST THE PEEBLES' 
COUNTERCLAIMS. 
The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the award of attorney fees and 
costs under Section 57-16-8 of the Act and denying Brookside its attorney fees 
and costs in defending against the Peebles' counterclaims brought under the 
Brookside is entitled to attorneys' fees in this action because the Peebles 
alleged in their Counterclaim, causes of action for violation of Section 57-16-4(4) 
of the Act. Because Brookside successfully defended against the Peebles' 
counterclaim founded on the Act, Brookside is entitled to its attorney's fees 
incurred in this action pursuant to Section 57-16-8 of the Act. 
If a resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding, all rents, 
fees, and service charges due and incurred during the pendency of 
the action shall be paid into the court according to the current 
mobile home park payment schedule. Failure of the resident to pay 
such amounts may, in the discretion of the court, constitute grounds 
for granting summary judgment in favor of the mobile home park. 
Upon final termination of the issues between the parties, the court 
shall order all amounts paid into court paid to the mobile home park. 
The prevailing party is also entitled to court costs and 
oo 
reasonable attorney's fees. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-8 (1994) 
(emphasis added). 
Brookside is entitled to its court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
this action because, the Peebles asserted at trial that Brookside breached its 
contract with the Peebles by failing to reasonably approve a prospective 
purchaser of the Peebles' mobile home (R. 149-54). 
The Peebles' Counterclaim was raised pursuant to the Act. Brookside's 
Complaint constituted an eviction proceeding. The Peebles' Counterclaim 
constituted a compulsory counterclaim. As a compulsory counterclaim, the 
Peebles' Counterclaim was part of the eviction proceeding. Moreover, the 
language of Section 57-16-8 clearly accounts for the presence of more than one 
claim in an eviction proceeding. The phrase, "[u]pon final termination of the 
issues between the parties," assumes that more than one claim can arise in the 
context of an eviction proceeding, as occurred in this instance. In this case, 
there was a "termination of the issues between the parties." In that termination, 
Brookside prevailed on the claims raised by the Peebles' Counterclaim. The 
Peebles' claims arose in the context of an eviction proceeding and therefore 
mandate recovery of attorney's fees and court costs by Brookside. 
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRANTING THE PEEBLES' 
ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER THE MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY 
ACT. 
The Court of Appeals erred in granting the Peebles' attorney fees because 
it improperly ruled that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act governed 
Brookside's eviction proceeding instead of unlawful detainer. For the reasons 
set forth above, Brookside was a bona fide purchaser without notice of the 
Peebles' lease with the previous owner, there was no written lease between 
Brookside and the Peebles, and Brookside's eviction of the Peebles was 
governed by unlawful detainer. The Peebles are therefore not entitled to 
attorney fees and costs. 
Furthermore, even if this Court were to determine that the Court of 
Appeals is correct regarding Brookside's eviction action being governed by the 
Act, both Brookside and Peebles failed to prevail on their actions arising under 
the Act. Neither party should then recover attorney fees as provided by the Act. 
VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING BROOKSIDE'S 
ARGUMENTS THAT HAROLD PEEBLES SHOULD BE REINSTATED 
AS A DEFENDANT. 
The Court of Appeals erred in its decision to disregard Brookside's 
arguments that Harold Peebles should be reinstated as a defendant for failure to 
comply with Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Brookside 
at If 1 n. 1. A significant portion of Brookside's briefs, with cited authority, dealt 
with Harold Peebles' liability for unlawful detainer as a co-owner of the mobile 
home occupying space #100 of the Park (Appellate Brief of Appellant, pp. 12-22; 
Reply Brief, pp. 5-8, 9-13,16; and Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari pp. 3-4). 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
argument of an appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
_/H_ 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." In interpreting this rule, 
this court has held that "failure to cite pertinent authority may not always render 
an issue inadequately briefed." State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 
1998). An appellant, however, may not "dump the burden of argument and 
research" on this Court. Id. (citations omitted). An appellant has violated this 
rule "when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of 
research and argument to the reviewing court." Id. 
In its initial brief and reply brief, Brookside fully briefed and cited authority 
in its arguments that Harold Peebles is liable to Brookside for unlawful detainer 
as a co-owner of the mobile home in question (Appellate Brief of Appellant, pp. 
12-22; Reply Brief, pp. 5-8, 9-13,16; and Reply Brief in Support of Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari pp. 3-4). The Court of Appeals reluctance to deal with this 
issue may be due to the fact that Harold Peebles never entered into a lease with 
any owner of the Park and it would be impossible to grant him resident status 
under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act as it did through convoluted logic 
regarding Sam Peebles. Brookside at 1J19 et seq. Furthermore, the trial court 
provided no legal basis for its dismissal of Harold Peebles as a defendant stating 
upon the Peebles' motion for a directed verdict: 
Mr. Harold Peebles was some sort of guarantor in this matter... 
None of the witnesses, as I recall, identified him as having been 
involved in the lease or the subsequent sale, or contact in terms of 
dealing with the mobile home park in some way, or — in other 
words, I haven't heard anything about Harold Peebles . . . [a]nd so I 
dismiss the two causes of action that pertain to Mr. Harold Boyd 
Peebles (T. 260-61). 
Furthermore, the Judgment gave no mention of the dismissal of Harold 
Peebles or the legal basis for the dismissal in the Judgment (R. 1293). Due to 
the lack of legal reasoning given by the trial court for its dismissal of Harold 
Peebles, Brookside was not able to cite authority countering such reasoning. 
Brookside also raised additional issues in its initial brief that Harold Peebles 
never raised the affirmative defense of "nominal defendant" in his answer and, 
instead, brought numerous counterclaims against Brookside (R. 149-54). In 
fact, Harold Peebles first raised the defense of "nominal defendant" after the trial 
court had granted Brookside summary judgment during the Peebles' Motion for 
Reconsideration (R. 699). Brookside has met its burden under Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in arguing that Harold Peebles is liable to 
Brookside for unlawful detainer and the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding 
Brookside's arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reinstate the summary judgment of the trial court, determine Brookside has 
prevailed on its cause of action against the Peebles for unlawful detainer, 
reinstate Howard Peebles as a defendant, remand this matter to the trial court 
for calculation of appropriate treble damages under the applicable statute, and 
award Brookside Attorneys' fees and costs due under the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act due to Brookside prevailing against the Peebles regarding the 
Peebles' claims under the act. 
DATED this g_ day of June, 2001. 
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57-16-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act." 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, AU 1. 
Meaning of "this act". - The term "This act" in this section 
means L. 1981, ch. 178, AUAU 1 through 12, which enacted AUAU 
57-16-1 through 57-16-12. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 54 Am. Jur. 2d Mobile Homes, Trailer Parks, and 
Tourist Camps AU 1 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 39A C.J.S. Health and Environment AU 31; 60 C.J.S. Motor 
Vehicles AU 43. 
Key Numbers. - Health and Environment <key> 32. 
57-16-2. Purpose of chapter. 
The fundamental right to own and protect land and to establish 
conditions for its use by others necessitate that the owner of a 
mobile home park be provided with speedy and adequate remedies 
against those who abuse the terms of a tenancy. The high cost of 
moving mobile homes, the requirements of mobile home parks relating 
to their installation, and the cost of landscaping and lot prepar-
ation necessitate that the owners of mobile homes occupied within 
MOPM«iM.I.A* 1RCJ 
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mobile home parks be provided with protection from actual or con-
structive eviction. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide 
protection for both the owners of mobile homes located in mobile 
home parks and for the owners of mobile home parks. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, *u 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Validity of zoning or building regulations restricting 
mobile homes or trailers to established mobile home or trailer 
parks, 17 A.L.R.4th 106. 
Validity and construction of restrictive covenant prohibiting or 
governing outside storage or parking of house trailers, motor 
homes, campers, vans, and the like, in residential neighborhoods, 
32 A.L.R.4th 651. 
57-16-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Mobile home" means a transportable structure in one or 
more sections with the plumbing, heating, and electrical systems 
contained within the unit, which when erected on a site, may be 
used with or without a permanent foundation as a family dwelling. 
(2) "Mobile home park" means any tract of land on which two 
or more mobile home spaces are leased, or offered for lease or 
rent, to accommodate mobile homes for residential purposes. -
(3) "Resident" means an individual who leases or rents space 
in a mobile home park. 
(4) "Mobile home space" means a specific area of land within 
a mobile home park designed to accommodate one mobile home. 
(5) "Rent" means charges paid for the privilege of occupying 
a mobile home space, and may include service charges and fees. 
(6) "Service charges" means separate charges paid for the use 
of electrical and gas service improvements which exist at a mobile 
home space, or for trash removal, sewage and water, or any combin-
ation of the above. 
(7) "Fees" means other charges incidental to a resident's 
tenancy including, but not limited to, late fees, charges for pets, 
charges for storage of recreational vehicles, charges for the use 
of park facilities, and security deposits. 
(8) "Change of use" means a change of the use of a mobile 
home park, or any part of it, for a purpose other than the rental 
of mobile home spaces. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, AU 3. 
57-16-4. Termination of lease or rental agreement - Required 
contents of lease - Increases in rents or fees - Sale of 
homes• 
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(1) A mobile home park or its agents may not terminate a lease 
or rental agreement upon any ground other than as specified in this 
chapter, 
(2) Each agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall be 
written and signed by the parties. Each lease shall contain at 
least the following information: 
(a) the name and address of the mobile home park owner 
and any persons authorized to act for the owner, upon whom 
notice and service of process may be served; 
(b) the type of the leasehold, and whether it be term or 
periodic; 
(c) a full disclosure of all rent, service charges, and 
other fees presently being charged on a periodic basis; 
(d) the date or dates on which the payment of rent, fees, 
and service charges are due; and 
(e) all rules that pertain to the mobile home park which, 
if broken, may constitute grounds for eviction, 
(3) Increases in rent or fees for periodic tenancies shall be 
unenforceable until 60 days after notice of the increase is mailed 
to the resident. If service charges are not included in the rent, 
service charges may be increased during the leasehold period after 
notice to the resident is given, and increases or decreases in 
electricity rates shall be passed through to the resident. Increas-
es or decreases in the total cost of other service charges shall be 
passed through to the resident. 
The mobile home park may not alter the date or dates on which 
rent, fees, and service charges are due unless a 60-day written 
notice precedes the alteration. 
(4) Any rule or condition of a lease purporting to prevent or 
unreasonably limit the sale of a mobile home belonging to a resi-
dent is void and unenforceable. The mobile home park may, however, 
reserve the right to approve the prospective purchaser of a mobile 
home who intends to become a resident, but such approval may not be 
unreasonably withheld. The mobile home park may require proof of 
ownership as a condition of approval. The mobile home park may un-
conditionally refuse to approve any purchaser of a mobile home who 
does not register prior to purchase. 
(5) A mobile home park may not restrict a resident's right to 
advertise for sale or sell his mobile home. However, the park may 
limit the size of a "for sale" sign affixed to the mobile home to 
not more than 144 square inches. 
(6) A mobile home park may not compel a resident who desires 
to sell his mobile home, either directly or indirectly, to sell it 
through an agent designated by the mobile home park. 
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(7) In order to upgrade the quality of a mobile home park, it 
may require that a mobile home be removed from the park upon sale 
if: 
(a) the mobile home does not meet minimum size specifica-
tions ; or 
(b) the mobile home is in rundown condition or in 
disrepair. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, *u 4; 1989, ch. 110, AU 1. 
57-16-5. Grounds for terminating lease. 
An agreement for the lease of mobile home space in a mobile 
home park may be terminated during its term by mutual agreement or 
for any one or more of the following causes: 
(1) failure of a resident to comply with a mobile home park 
rule for a period of 15 days after receipt of notice of noncompli-
ance from the mobile home park; 
(2) repeated failure of a resident to abide by a mobile home 
park rule, if the original notice of noncompliance states that 
another violation of the same or a different rule might result in 
forfeiture without any further period of cure; 
(3) behavior by a resident which substantially endangers the 
security and health of the other residents or threatens the prop-
erty in the park; 
(4) nonpayment of rent, fees, or service charges; 
(5) a change in the land use or condemnation of the mobile 
home park or any part of it. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, AU 5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Retaliatory eviction of tenant for reporting landlord's 
violation of law, 23 A.L.R.5th 140. 
57-16-6. Action for lease termination - Prerequisite procedure. 
A legal action to terminate a lease based upon a cause set 
forth in Section 57-16-5 may not be commenced except in accordance 
with the following procedure: 
(1) Before issuance of any summons and complaint, the mobile 
home park shall send or serve written notice to the resident or 
subtenant: 
(a) by delivering a copy of the notice personally; 
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(b) by sending a copy of the notice through registered or 
certified mail addressed to the resident or subtenant at his 
place of residence; 
(c) if the resident or subtenant is absent from his place 
of residence, by leaving a copy of the notice with some person 
of suitable age and discretion at his residence and sending a 
copy through the mail addressed to the resident or subtenant 
at his place of residence; or 
(d) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be 
found, by affixing a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place 
on the resident's or subtenant's mobile home and also sending 
a copy through the mail addressed to the resident or subtenant 
at his place of residence. 
(2) The notice shall set forth the cause for the notice and, 
if the cause is one which can be cured, the time within which the 
resident has to cure. The notice shall also set forth the time 
after which the mobile home park may commence legal action against 
the resident if cure is not effected, as follows: 
(a) In the event of failure to abide by a mobile home 
park rule, the notice shall provide for a 15-day cure period 
except in the^ case of repeated violations and, shall state 
that if a cure is not timely effected, or a written agreement 
made between the mobile home park and the resident allowing 
for a variation in the rule or cure period, eviction proceed-
ings may be initiated immediately. 
(b) If the resident commits repeated violations .of a 
rule, a summons and complaint may be issued three days after 
a notice is served. 
(c) If a resident behaves in a manner that substantially 
endangers the well-being or property of other residents, evic-
tion proceedings may commence immediately. 
(d) If a resident does not pay rent, fees, or service 
charges, the notice shall provided three -day cure period and, 
that if.cure is not timely effected, or a written agreement 
made between the mobile home park and the resident allowing 
for a variation in the rule or cure period, eviction proceed-
ings may be initiated immediately. 
(e) If there is a planned change in land use or condemna-
tion of the park, the notice shall provide that the resident 
has 90 days after receipt of the notice to vacate the mobile 
home park if no governmental approval or permits incident to 
the planned change are required, and if governmental approval 
and permits are required, that the resident has 90 days to 
vacate the mobile home park after all permits or approvals 
incident to the planned change are obtained. 
(3) If the planned change in land use or condemnation requir-
es the approval of a governmental agency, the mobile home park, in 
addition to the notice required by Subsection (2) (e) , shall send 
written notice of the date set for the initial hearing to each 
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resident at least seven days before the date scheduled for the 
initial hearing. 
(4) Regardless of whether the change of use requires the ap-
proval of any governmental agency, if the resident was not a resi-
dent of the mobile home park at the time the initial change of use 
notice was issued to residents the owner shall give notice of the 
change of use to the resident before he occupies the mobile home 
space. 
(5) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and 
based on causes set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(1), (2), and (5) 
shall be brought in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and shall not be treated as unlawful detainer actions under 
Title 78, Chapter 36. Eviction proceedings commenced under this 
chapter and based on causes of action set forth in Subsections 
57:-16.-_5 (3) and (4) may, at the election of the mobile home park, be 
Jtreated as actions brought under" this - chapter and the unlawful 
"detainer provisions of Title 78, Chapter 36, except, if unlawful 
detainer is- charged, the court shall endorse on the summons the 
number of days within which the defendant is required to appear and 
defend the action, which shall not be less than five days or more 
than 20 days from the date of service. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, *u 6; 1987, ch. 92, AU 81; 1989, ch. 
110, AU 2. 
57-16-7. Rules of parks. 
(1) A mobile home park may promulgate rules related to the 
health, safety, and appropriate conduct of residents and to the 
maintenance and upkeep of such park. No change in rule that is 
unconscionable is valid. No new or amended rule shall take effect, 
nor provide the basis for an eviction notice, until the expiration 
of at least 60 days after its promulgation. Each resident, as a 
condition precedent to such rule being in effect, shall be provided 
with a copy of each new or amended rule that does not appear in 
their lease agreement. 
(2) A mobile home park may specify the type of material used, 
and the methods used in the installation of, underskirting, awn-
ings, porches, fences, or other additions or alterations to the 
exterior of a mobile home, and may also specify the tie-down equip-
ment used in a mobile home space, in order to insure the safety and 
good appearance of the park; but under no circumstances may it 
require a resident to purchase such material or equipment from a 
supplier designated by the mobile home park. 
(3) No mobile home park may charge an entrance fee, exit fee, 
nor installation fee, but reasonable landscaping and maintenance 
requirements may be included in the mobile home park rules. The 
resident is responsible for all costs incident to connection of the 
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mobile home to existing mobile home park facilities and for the 
installation and maintenance of the mobile home on the mobile home 
space. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a 
mobile home park from requiring a reasonable initial security 
deposit. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, AU 7. 
57-16-8. Payment of rent and fees during pendency of eviction 
proceeding. 
If a resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding, all 
rents, fees, and service charges due and incurred during the pen-
dency of the action shall be paid into court according to the cur-
rent mobile home park payment schedule. Failure of the resident to 
pay such amounts may, in the discretion of the court, constitute 
grounds for granting summary judgment in favor of the mobile home 
park. Upon final termination of the issues between the parties, the 
court shall order all amounts paid into court paid to the mobile 
home park. The prevailing party is also entitled to court costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, AU 8. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. - Attorney's Fees in Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 
553. 
57-16-9. Lienholder's liability for rent and fees. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 38-3-2 and Section 
70A-9-317, the lienholder of record of a mobile home is primarily 
liable to the mobile home park owner or operator for rent and ser-
vice charges if a mobile home is not removed within 10 days after 
receipt of written notice that a mobile home has been abandoned or 
that a writ of restitution has been issued. The lienholder, how-
ever, is only liable for rent that accrues after receipt of such 
notice. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, AU 9. 
57-16-10. Utility service to mobile home parks - Limitation on 
provi ders' charges. 
Local water, sewer, and sanitation entities, including those 
administered by municipalities and counties which provide water, 
sewer, or garbage collection services shall not receive a greater 
percentage net return from supplying a mobile home park than said 
entity receives from other residential customers. The net return is 
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determined by taking into consideration the costs of maintenance 
and depreciation of the mobile home park facilities and all savings 
on administrative costs, including cost of billing residents. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, AU 10. 
57-16-11. Rights and remedies not exclusive. 
The rights and remedies granted by this chapter are cumulative 
and not exclusive. 
History: L. 1981, ch 178, AU 11. 
57-16-12. Waiver of rights and duties prohibited. 
No park or resident may agree to waive any right, duty, or 
privilege conferred by this chapter. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, AU 12. 
57-16-15.1. Eviction proceeding. 
(1) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and 
based on causes of action set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(1) , (2) , 
and (5), and eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter 
based on causes of action set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(3) and 
(4), where a landlord elects to bring an action under this chapter 
and not under the unlawful detainer provisions of Title 78, Chapter 
36, Forcible Entry and Detainer, shall comply with the following: 
(a) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon 
default. A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff may: 
(i) include an order of restitution of the premises; 
and 
(ii) declare the forfeiture of the lease or agree-
ment. 
(b) The jury, or the court if the proceedings are tried 
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall assess 
the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the 
following: 
(i) waste of the premises during the resident's 
tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved; 
and 
(ii) the amount of rent due. 
(c) If the lease or agreement provides for reasonable attor-
neys' fees, the court shall order reasonable attorneys' fees 
to the prevailing party. 
(d) Whether or not the lease or agreement provides for 
court costs and attorneys' fees, if the proceeding is contest-
ed, the court shall order court costs and attorneys' fees to 
the prevailing party. 
(e) Except as provided in Subsection (1)(f), after judg-
ment has been entered under this section, judgment and resti-
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tutio^g^^be^en-foirced^TiO'-s-ooner- than 15 days from the date 
tlTe^uS^ent^is^entered^The person who commences the action 
shall mail the judgment to the lease premises by registered 
mail within five days of the date the judgment is entered. 
(f) If a resident tenders to the mobile home park post-
judgment rent, in the form of cash, cashier's check, or certi-
fied funds, then restitution may be delayed for the period of 
time covered by the post judgment rent, which time period shall 
not exceed 15 days from the date of the judgment unless a 
longer period is agreed to in writing by the mobile home park, 
(2) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and bas-
ed on causes of action set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(3) and (4), 
in which the mobile home park has elected to treat as actions also 
brought under the unlawful detainer provisions of Title 78, Chapter 
36, Forcible Entry and Detainer, shall be governed by Sections 
78-36-10 and 78-36-10-5 with respect to judgment for restitution, 
damages, rent, enforcement of the judgment and restitution. 
(3) The provisions in Section 78-36-10.5 shall apply to this 
section except the enforcement time limits in Subsections (1) (e) 
and (f) shall govern. 
History: C. 1953, 57-16-15.1, enacted by L. 1989, ch. 110, AU 3; 
1994, ch. 92, AU 1; 1994, ch. 225, AUAU 1, 4. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment by ch. 92, effective May 2, 
1994, added the (i) and (ii) designations in Subsection (1) (a) , 
making related grammatical changes; rewrote Subsections (1) (c) and 
(1) (d) ; divided former Subsection (1) (e) into Subsections (1) (e) 
and (1) (f) , rewriting the provisions of present Subsection (1) (e) ; 
and made stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 225, AU 1, effective May 2, 1994, 
deleted "immediately" from the end of the first sentence in 
Subsection (1) (e) , added the reference to AU 78-36-10.5 in 
Subsection (2), and made stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 225, AU 4, effective May 2, 1994, which 
was contingent upon passage of ch. 92, added Subsection (3). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legisla-
tive Research and General Counsel. 
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78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life. 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is 
guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by 
subtenant, of the property or any part of it, after the expi-
ration of the specified term or period for which it is let to 
him, which specified term or period, whether established by 
express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, 
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the 
specified term or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite 
time with monthly or other periodic rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by 
subtenant after the end of any month or period, in cases 
where the owner, his designated agent, or any successor 
in estate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to the end 
of that month or period, has served notice requiring him 
to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or 
period; or 
_—-— ' (ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains 
in possession of the premises after the expiration of a 
notice of not less than five days; ^^__^__ 
^ (c) when he continues in possession, in person or by"*sub-
tenant, after default in the payment of any rent and after a 
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of 
the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, has re-
mained uncomplied with for a period of three days after ser-
vice, which notice may be served at any time after the rent 
becomes due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises con-
trary to the covenants of the lease, or commits or permits 
waste on the premises, or when he sets up or carries on any 
unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he suffers, 
permits, or maintains on or about the premises any nuisance, 
including nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains 
in possession after service upon him of a three days' notice 
to quit; or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by sub-
tenant, after a neglect or failure to perform any condition or 
covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property is 
held, other than those previously mentioned, and after notice 
in writing requiring in the alternative the performance of the 
conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, ser-
ved upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of 
the premises remains uncomplied with for three days after ser-
vice. Within three days after the service of the notice, the 
tenant, any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, 
any mortgagee of the term, or other person interested in its 
continuance may perform the condition or covenant and thereby 
save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the covenants 
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and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot 
afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given. 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is 
determined under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act. 
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 
78-36-3 (1) (d) are not applicable to nuisance actions provided in 
Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16 only. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, AU 1; c. 1943, Supp. , 104-36-3; L. 
1981, ch. 160, AU 1; 1986, ch. 137, AU 1; 1989, ch. 101, AU 1; 
1992, ch. 141, AU 2. 
Amendment Notes. - The 19 89 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, 
inserted the subsection designation (1) at the beginning of the 
section; designated former Subsections (1) and (2) as Subsections 
(1) (a) and (1) (b) ; designated former Subsections (2) (a) and (2) (b) 
as Subsection (1) (b) (i) and Subsection (1) (b) (ii) ; designated 
former Subsections (3) to (5) as Subsections (1) (c) to (1) (e) ; 
added Subsection (2); and made minor stylistic changes. 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, inserted "including 
nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9," in Subsection (1)(d) and 
added Subsection (3). 
Cross-References. - Nuisances, Title 47. 
Right to recover treble damages from tenants committing waste, Au 
78-38-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
In general. 
Cause of action. 






- Modification of state remedies. 
Notice to quit. 
Administrative claim. 
Liability of tenant. 
Prerequisites. 
Sufficiency-
Tenancy at will. 
Persons liable. 
Pleadings. 
Tenancy at will. 
Right of re-entry. 
Contractual provisions. 




Strict statutory compliance. 
Not required. 
Required. 
Termination of lease. 
Treble damages. 




This chapter takes away the landlord's common law right to use 
self-help to remove a tenant, grants the landlord a summary court 
proceeding to evict a tenant who has violated some express or 
.implied provision of the lease, and provides five instances in 
which the tenant is in unlawful detainer. The remedy for a success-
ful landlord is restitution of the premises, treble damages, and 
recovery for waste or rent due. If the unlawful detainer action is 
based on default in payment of rent, the judgment will also mandate 
forfeiture of the lease. P. H. Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018 (Utah 
1991). 
Cause of action. 
- Default in rent. 
No cause of action for unlawful detainer based on default in pay-
ment of rent survived where tenant tendered rent due within three 
days after service of unlawful detainer action, regardless of 
defects in such notice. Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah 
1982) . 
- Prerequisites. 
Notice to quit is necessary to give rise to cause of action. 
Carstensen v. Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944). 
Service of the statutory notice and the tenant's noncompliance 
are prerequisites to the tenant's being in unlawful detainer. 
Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. , Ltd. v. Landes, 821 P.2d 451 (Utah 
1991) . 
- Presumptions. 
Action of unlawful detainer presupposes absence of fraud and 
force, as well as existence of relation of landlord and tenant. 
Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882 (1899). 
- When determined. 
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Whether a cause of action exists under this section is to be 
determined at the time the action is commenced. Van Zyverden v. 
Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964). 
- When exists. 
Upon expiration of tenant's lease, the tenant is subject to 
ouster by an unlawful detainer action (not forcible detainer) under 
and pursuant to this section. Woodbury v. Bunker, 98 Utah 216, 98 
P.2d 948 (1940); American Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 Utah 
318, 117 P.2d 293 (1941), rehearing denied, 102 Utah 328, 133 P.2d 
332 (1943). 
Unless tenant has retained the right to refuse inspection by 
prospective purchasers of premises, unreasonable refusal to permit 
entry of premises for that purpose constitutes unlawful detainer. 
Glenn v. Keyes, 107 Utah 415, 154 P.2d 642 (1944). 
Federal regulations. 
- Modification of state remedies. 
OPA rental and housing regulations, under Federal Price Control 
Act, were binding upon Utah courts and modified any state remedy to 
extent that such remedy was in conflict with that act. Callister v. 
Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196 P.2d 714 (1948). 
Notice to quit. 
- Administrative claim. 
Notice to quit or pay rent served on government as required by 
this section was not an administrative claim sufficient to satisfy 
28 U.S.C. AU 2675(a), and federal court therefore had no jurisdic-
tion over forcible entry and detainer action brought under Federal 
Tort Claims Act. Three-M Enters., Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 
293 (10th Cir. 1977) . 
- Liability of tenant. 
Action by lessor, after end of fixed term of lease, to terminate 
lease and require lessee to vacate premises did not terminate pro-
vision obliging tenant to pay attorney fees, where parties entered 
stipulation, while matter was pending, that lessee considered lease 
in effect and held under it after end of fixed tema. Milliner v. 
Farmer, 24 Utah 2d 326, 471 P.2d 151 (1970). 
- Prerequisites. 
Notice in accordance with Subsection (1) (e) should precede notice 
to quit, and must be uncomplied with for five days after the ser-
vice before a notice to quit is in order. Fireman's Ins. Co. v. 




A notice to quit is sufficient under Subsection (1)(b) in the 
case of a tenancy at will, as provided in contract of sale in case 
of default, where it merely declares a forfeiture, and is not 
insufficient under Subsection (1) (e) because not giving purchasers 
alternative of performing conditions of the agreement. Forrester v. 
Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930); American Holding Co. v. 
Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970). 
Notice to quit which notified tenant that he was violating 
substantial obligations of tenancy by conducting certain businesses 
on premises, and which plainly informed tenant that he must desist 
from such objectionable practices by certain date and that, if on 
or before that date he failed to desist therefrom and had not 
surrendered premises, action would be commenced for restitution of 
premises, was not defective because notice was not expressed in the 
alternative as required by Subsection (1) (e) of former *u 104-60-3, 
i.e., that violation must cease or tenancy be vacated, since such 
was plain intent of notice without use of word "or." Callister v. 
Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196 P.2d 714 (1948). 
Notice by landlord stating that tenants had failed to make 
payments of rent due under lease, had failed to pay utility bills, 
and further providing that tenants were to quit premises and 
deliver up possession to landlord within fifteen days did not 
comply with statutory requirements under this section; in absence 
of compliance, landlord was not entitled to maintain action for 
restitution of premises. American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 
432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970). 
Notice of forfeiture, while sufficient to terminate a lease for 
breach of covenant, is not sufficient to put lessee in unlawful 
detainer; the notice to quit must be in the alternative, i.e., 
either perform or quit, before lessee becomes subject to the 
provisions of this chapter. Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, 
Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976). 
Lessee was not in unlawful detainer and lessor was not entitled 
to maintain an action under this section where lessor's notice to 
vacate premises was defective in that it did not state that lessee 
had the alternative of paying the delinquent rent or surrendering 
the premises. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (Utah 1979). 
A notice to a month-to-month tenant to quit the premises need not 
contain the alternative of paying rent. Ute-Cal Land Dev. v. 
Intermountain Stock Exch., 628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981). 
The critical distinction between a notice of unlawful detainer 
and a notice of forfeiture is that the notice of forfeiture simply 
declares a termination of the lease without giving the lessee the 
alternative of making up the deficiency. Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 
P.2d 658 (Utah 1982). 
Letter stating that ,f[i]n the event that [lessee] does not 
immediately re-open and continuously conduct normal business 
operations in the premises, [lessor] will terminate the Lease ... 
as well as seek damages and all other available legal relief for 
the breach" met the requirements of Subsection (1) (e) . Olympus 
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Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 255 
Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
- Tenancy at will. 
At common law a tenant at will was not entitled to notice to quit 
possession. Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P. 2d 100, 154 
A.L.R. 167 (1944). 
It is only after buyer is in the status of a tenant at will that 
he is amenable to the notice provided by this section, which 
requires him to vacate within five days or be guilty of an unlawful 
detainer. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 
(1964). 
Where lease was terminated by failure of tenant to pay rent and 
taxes, the tenant became a tenant at will and landlord properly 
proceeded to regain possession by the procedure set forth in 
Subsection (1)(b) by giving notice to vacate. Shoemaker v. Pioneer 
Invs., 14 Utah 2d 250, 381 P.2d 735 (1963). 
Notice to purchaser who had become tenant at will for failure to 
make payment was sufficient under Subsection (1)(e) even though 
several months had elapsed between first and final notice. 
Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Dennett, 24 Utah 2d 310, 470 P.2d 406 
(1970). 
Persons liable. 
No one but tenant of real property for term less than life can be 
guilty of unlawful detainer. Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 
192, 57 P. 882 (1899). 
Pleadings. 
- Tenancy at will. 
Since on month-to-month tenancy owner could recover property on 
fifteen-day notice, allegation in complaint that such tenant had 
violated substantial obligations of rental agreement was not 
necessary in unlawful detainer action. Callister v. Spencer, 113 
Utah 497, 196 P.2d 714 (1948). 
Right of re-entry. 
- Contractual provisions. 
Under contract for sale and exchange of real estate, providing 
that seller at his option could re-enter premises and be released 
from his obligations upon default of buyer, seller was bound to 
give buyer notice of his intention to take advantage of forfeiture 
provision of contract, since such provision was not self-executing. 
Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P.2d 699, 94 A.L.R. 1232 (1934). 
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St r i c t performance. 
- Waiver. 
Acceptance by vendor of purchaser's past-due payments under 
uniform real estate contract, and other conduct leading latter to 
believe that strict performance would not be required by vendor/ 
imposes duty on vendor to give purchaser reasonable notice before 
vendor may insist on strict performance by purchaser. Pacific Dev. 
Co, v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748 (1948). 
Strict statutory compliance. 
- Not required. 
There is no reason for the strict rule that landlord must demand 
the precise or exact amount of rent due or lose his right to 
recover possession of the premises. A tenant is guilty of unlawful 
detainer when he continues in possession after default in payment 
of any rent, and after notice in writing requiring in the alterna-
tive the payment of the rent or the surrender of the premises, etc. 
Commercial Block Realty Co. v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71 Utah 
505, 267 P. 1009 (1928). 
- Required. 
This section, which provides a severe remedy, must be strictly 
complied with before the cause of action thereon may be maintained. 
Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964). 
Termination of lease. 
A lease may be terminated pursuant to an unlawful detainer 
action. Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982). 
Treble damages. 
- Contract of sale. 
In a suit for amounts due under a contract of sale of real 
estate, where the vendors gave notice of forfeiture of the contract 
only and did not give the purchaser an alternative to pay up or 
quit, as is required under this section, the vendors were not 
entitled to treble damages for unlawful detainer. Erisman v. 
Overman, 11 Utah 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85 (1961). 
- Intervenor. 
A person not actually occupying the premises who intervenes in an 
action to obtain possession and for damages for unlawful detainer', 
and who asserts ownership and the right to possession by the 
occupier as his tenant, may be guilty of unlawful detainer and 
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liable for treble damages where the court finds this intervener's 
claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, 
modified on another point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957). 
- Lease. 
Under a lease contract for a period of years, in which the lessee 
defaulted, notice by the lessor for the lessees to quit the prem-
ises was not sufficient for treble damages. Under such a lease the 
statutes require an alternative notice that the tenant either per-
form or quit before he becomes an unlawful detainer and subject to 
treble damages. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P. 2d 294 
(1954) . 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant MJ 1115 et 
seq.; 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord-and Tenant AU 1205 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 52A C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant *U 758. 
A.L.R. - Right of landlord legally entitled to possession to 
dispossess tenant without legal process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177. 
Grazing or pasturage agreement as violation of covenant in lease 
or provision of statute against assigning or subletting without 
lessor's consent, 71 A.L.R.3d 780. 
Express or implied restriction on lessee's use of residential 
property for business purposes, 46 A.L.R.4th 496. 
Landlord's permitting third party to occupy premises rent-free as 
acceptance of tenant's surrender of premises, 18 A.L.R.5th 437. 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Copr. ® West Group 2000. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 10-1-2000. 
RULE 24. BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the Appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be 
set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with 
references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, 
and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review 
shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below 
shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, 
shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of 
the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
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reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall 
contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal 
but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter 
service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to 
the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript 
of the court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to 
construction. 
(b) Brief of the Appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is 
dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of 
the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply Brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief 
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in Briefs to Parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the 
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person," "the taxpayer,"etc. 
(e) References in Briefs to the Record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant 
to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. 
If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
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UT R RAP Rule 24 Page 3 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of Briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs 
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, 
exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and 
any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record 
as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, 
paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in Cases Involving Cross-Appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in 
length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of 
the appellant and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then 
file a brief which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the 
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues 
raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not 
exceed 25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second 
brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the 
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-
appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of 
table of contents, table of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only 
by permission of the court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good 
cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in Cases Involving Multiple Appellants or Appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of 
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of Supplemental Authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An 
original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An 
original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There 
shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued 
orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument 
state the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made 
within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and Sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from 
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not 
in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the 
court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
(k) Brief Covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
[Amended effective July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; November 1, 
1999.] 
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Advisory Committee Note 
Rule 24 (a) (9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. 
See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial 
court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 
[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the 
[marshaling] duty ..., the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists." ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA 
Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) 
(alteration in original)(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 
818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). See also State ex rel. M.S. v. 
Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 
547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 
1990) . 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, ei statement of the 
applicable standard of review and citation of supporting authority. 
Rules App. Proc, Rule 24 
UT R RAP Rule 24 
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Advisory Committee Note. -- The brief must now contain for each issue raised 
appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of review and citation of 
>porting authority. 
Amendment Notes. -- The 1995 amendment added the provision for cases reviewed 
certiorari in Subdivision (a) (11) ; added the second sentence in Subdivision 
; and, in Subdivision (g), added the 50-page limit, substituted "apellee/ 
)ss-appellant" for "appellee" in the third sentence, and all the language 
finning with the fourth sentence. 
The 1998 amendment added the second sentence in Subdivision (e) concerning 
)lished depositions or transcripts. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutional arguments. 
Contents. 
• - Argument. 
-- Inappropriate language. 
-- Standard of review. 
•- Statement of facts with citation to record. 
failure to file. 
•- Defective appeal. 
Issues not raised at trial. 




In order to make an argument for an innovative interpretation of a state 
istitutional provision textually similar to a federal provision, the following 
mts should be developed and supported with authority and analysis. First, 
msel should offer analysis of the unique context in which Utah's constitution 
reloped with regard to the issue at hand. Second, counsel should demonstrate 
it state appellate courts regularly interpret even textually similar state 
istitutional provisions in a manner different from federal interpretations of 
> United States Constitution and that it is entirely proper to do so in our 
leral system. Third, citation should be made to authority from other states 
sporting the particular construction urged by counsel. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 
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68 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Contents 
A brief must contain some support for each contention. State v. Wareham, 772 
2d 960 (Utah 1989); State v. Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Extensive quotations from numerous case authorities and treatises, while 
lpful, cannot substitute for the development of appellate arguments explicitly 
ed to the record. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah 
. App. 1991) . 
Appellant's brief was clearly deficient under the provisions of this rule 
cause it failed to set forth a coherent statement of issues and the appropriate 
andard of review for each issue with supporting authority, the "issues" where 
sted did not correlate with the substance of the brief, the statement of the 
se not only omitted reference to the course of proceedings and disposition in 
e trial court, but failed to provide a statement of the relevant facts properly 
cumented by citations to the record, and defendant's "argument" did not 
entify any error by the trial court, refer to the facts or the record, or cite 
plicable authority, much less provide any meaningful factual or legal analysis, 
ate v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
It is improper to use an addendum to incorporate argument by reference that 
ould be included in the body of the brief. State v. Jiron, 866 P.2d 1249 (Utah 
. App. 1993). 
Appellate brief that set forth little legal analysis on issue presented, did 
t specifically discuss how trial court erred, did not attempt to marshal the 
idence, and presented no citations to record failed to conform to requirements 
this rule. Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
-- Argument 
Appellants' brief, containing less than a single page of assertions and no 
tations to the record, no legal authorities, and no analysis whatsoever, was 
t in compliance with this rule, which requires the brief of an appellant to 
itain an argument. Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Court declined to consider argument that was not adequately briefed. See 
ate ex rel C.Y. v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Defendant's failure to brief the applicability of a common law construction 
le good faith exception to the warrant requirement) under the Utah Constitution 
the trial court level and his subsequent failure to develop any meaningful 
jument thereunder did not permit higher appellate review of these state 
istitutional claims, but left the analysis to proceed solely under federal 
istitutional law. State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
7 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
Where appellant failed to provide adequate legal analysis and legal authority 
support of his claims, his assertions did not permit appellate review. Burns 
Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Because the state failed to meet its briefing duty under Subdivision (a) (9) 
to the search-incident-to-arrest argument regarding circumstances involving 
fendant convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the Court 
Appeals declined to address the argument. State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145 (Utah 
. App. 1997). 
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Implicitly, Subdivision (a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority 
: development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority, 
ite v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998). 
While failure to cite to pertinent authority may not always render an issue 
idequately briefed, it does so when the overall analysis of the issue is so 
:king as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court, 
ite v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998). 
•- Inappropriate language 
Derogatory references to others or inappropriate language of any kind has no 
ice in an appellate brief and is of no assistance in attempting to resolve any 
jitimate issues presented on appeal. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986). 
-- Standard of review 
The standard of review requirement in Subdivision (a)(5) should not be 
lored. The purpose of the requirement is to focus the briefs, thus promoting 
:e accuracy and efficiency in the processing of appeals. Christensen v. Munns, 
> P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
-- Statement of facts with citation to record 
The Supreme Court need not, and will not, consider any facts not properly 
;ed to, or supported by, the record. Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat' 1 Life Ins. Co., 
$ P.2d 142 (Utah 1978). 
The Supreme Court will assume the correctness of the judgment in a criminal 
.al if counsel on appeal does not comply with the requirements as to making a 
icise statement of facts and citation of the pages in the record where they are 
)ported. State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). 
If a party fails to make a concise statement of the facts and citation of the 
jes in the record where those facts are supported, the court will assume the 
rrectness of the judgment below. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 
;ah Ct. App. 1987); Steele v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 960 
;ah Ct. App. 1993) . 
failure to file 
•- Defective appeal 
Where defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle without insurance, 
1 attempted to file his appeal pro se, but failed to file a brief or submit a 
mscript of the record, there was no reversible error presented which would 
:mit the appellate court to reverse the judgment. State v. Hansen, 540 P.2d 935 
:ah 1975). 
Essues not raised at trial 
An appellate court may address an issue raised for the first time on appeal 
appellant establishes that the trial court committed plain error, if there are 
:eptional circumstances, or, in some situations, if a claim of ineffective 
sistance of counsel is raised on appeal. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. 
}. 1996) . 
The exceptional circumstances concept serves to assure that manifest 
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justice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal. State 
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The fact that liberty is at stake is not sufficient basis for deviating from 
e general rule requiring the appellant to raise the issue at trial in order to 
gue it on appeal. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecution's apparently 
proper remarks at sentencing, even in conjunction with the expiration of the 
nne within which to make a timely motion to withdraw the plea, is not a 
bstantial enough procedural anomaly to invoke the exceptional circumstances 
ncept which would allow appellant to raise an issue on appeal for the first 
[Tie. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Properly documented argument 
Brief that was filled with burdensome, emotional, immaterial and inaccurate 
guments did not set forth a properly documented argument as required by this 
le; therefore the court disregarded it. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 
82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Reply brief 
As a general rule, "an issue raised initially in a reply brief will not be 
isidered on appeal, although the court, in its discretion, may decided a case 
on any points that its proper disposition may require, even if first raised in 
reply brief. Romrell v. Zions First Nat'1 Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980). 
Cited in Weber v. Snyderville West, 800 P.2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State 
Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 
2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d 604 (Utah Ct. App. 
91); English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
nckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Larson v. Overland 
rift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v, Davis, 821 P.2d 9 
tah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct:. App. 1991); Johnson-
tfles Co. v. Department of Commerce, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah Ct:. App. 1991); 
idlestadt v. Indus. Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Baker v. Baker, 
5 P.2d 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Barney v. Utah Dep"t of Commerce, 885 P.2d 809 
tah Ct. App. 1994); Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); 
ate v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. -- 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 54 0 et seq. 
C.J.S. -- 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 605 et seq. 
Les App. Proc, Rule 24 
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK 
Plaintiff NOTICE OF DECISION 
vs. 
CIVIL NO. 960003616 
SAM PEEBLES Judge: FRATTO 
Defendant 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
having been submitted for decision without oral argument 
pursuant to rule 4-501, Rules of Practice, and the court being 
now fully advised in the premises: 
4/? 
OCTOBER 23, 1997 




The matter is before the court on plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The action 
was commenced for the eviction of defendant from plaintiffs property, a mobile home park. The 
claim is that because there is no lease between the parties and defendant has failed to maintain the 
home in compliance with park rules, sufficient notice has been given for a tenant at will and, 
failing to leave with such notice, defendant is in unlawful detainer. 
Defendant's response is that there is a lease and therefore the notice is deficient, pursuant 
to the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, Title 57, Chapter 16, Section 1 et seq.\JCA^ 
Additionally, defendant counterclaims alleging, in several causes of action, that plaintiff has 
interfered with the sale of the mobile home to potential buyers. Because of this interference, 
plaintiff has been unable to sell the home and has sustained damages. 
This motion was previously entertained and denied by Judge Barrett. The first issue is 
whether I am in a position to revisit the motion? A reconsideration should be avoided unless the 
situation dictates to the contrary. There is no need to recite all the reasons why this should be so. 
In this case there are two bases upon which such a reconsideration is appropriate. First, 
because of rescheduling, there is a different judge assigned to the matter. Consideration of pre-
trial motions should fall within the purview of the trial judge, especially where those motions are 
dispositive of the case. Otherwise, the case has the potential of being handled inconsistently. 
1 
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Secondly, there has been discovery conducted by the parties since the motion was 
considered by Judge Barrett. Although there is no recitation of specific facts or law that are now 
different, that discovery has assisted in clarifying the issues that need to be considered in 
connection with the motion. Consequently, such a reconsideration is appropriate. 
The fact upon which the matter turns is whether there is a lease between the parties? 
I have come to the conclusion that there is no factual or legal dispute concerning this issue. 
The parties had no written lease directly between them. Defendant alleges that he signed, 
on two occasions, leases with the prior owner of the mobile home park. Plaintiff assumes those 
leases with their purchase of the property. However the undisputed fact is that a lease for the 
mobile home space was signed, after plaintiff purchased the property, with at least one of the 
purchasers of the mobile home from defendant. There is no dispute raised that these leases were 
entered into with defendant's knowledge and consent. The effect of the arrangement was to 
terminate any lease agreement that existed between plaintiff and defendant to that time. 
Defendant urges that it was the custom of the prior owner of the park to maintain leases 
with both the owner of a mobile home and, if a different person, the resident. That alleged fact, 
even though in dispute, is not material. Plaintiff was not a party to such arrangements and, in any 
event as indicated above, such leases were terminated. 
Defendant urges that there was a constructive lease by verbal agreement between the 
parties and several facts, in dispute, are cited in confirmation of this proposition. However, this 
also is immaterial. UCA 57-16-4 requires that the lease of mobile home space be in writing. 
The opinion given in Rainbow Terrance, Inc. v. Hutchens, 557 N.W.2d 618 (Minn.App. 
1997) is cited for the proposition that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act should be read to not 
2 
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necessarily require that the lease be in writing. This opinion must be read in conjunction with Lea 
v. Pieper, 345 N.W.2d 267 (Mnn.App. 1984). 
I, however, am not persuaded that the plain language of the Act can be ignored. Beyond 
this plain language, it is clear that the statute is premised on the requirement that the lease be in 
writing. Otherwise, several sections within the statute would make no sense. 
Defendant's counterclaim is likewise premised on whether there is a lease between the 
parties. There is no indication that defendant was hampered in any way in selling the home per se. 
The problem is in subleasing or having plaintiff enter into a lease of the space with the new 
owners in order that the home could remain in the park. If you do not have a lease, you can 
neither sublease nor require the park owner to enter into a lease with the new owners of the 
mobile home. 
For these reasons, there is no dispute concerning the law or the facts and plaintiff's notion 
is granted. 
3 
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
BROOKSIDE 
vs. 
Plaintiff NOTICE OF DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 960003616 
SAM PEEBLES Judge: FRATTO 
Defendant 
SEE ATTACHED DECISION OF JUDGE FRATTO 
having been submitted for decision without oral argument 
pursuant to rule 4-501, Rules of Practice, and the court being 
now fully advised in the premises: 
Motion is hereby 
ae Dunn 
. . Depyr% dburt Clerk 
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Matter is before the court on defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Objection to Form of 
Order. Having re-examined the matter, I am still convinced that the factual and legal issue upon 
which the case turns is whether there was a lease between the parties? 
Plaintiff contends, even if defendant had a lease with a prior owner to which plaintiff is 
subject, that lease has been surrendered. Defendant was aware of and, at least tacitly, agreed to 
lease arrangements between plaintiff and subsequent occupants of the mobile home. As a 
consequence of this knowledge and approval, defendant has surrendered the lease aind is not 
afforded the right to notice of a lessee. 
Defendant asserts that in granting summary judgment I failed to comprehend defendant's 
position on the issue and was in error when I concluded in a written opinion, "There is no dispute 
raised that these leases were entered into with defendant's knowledge and consent". 
There is no dispute about the legal proposition concerning surrender. However, defendant 
does dispute that there was a surrender alleging he had no knowledge that there were lease 
agreements with occupants of the mobile home with whom he dealt with as subtenants. Defendant 
further asserts facts that could be interpreted to demonstrate that he was dealt with by plaintiff in a 
maimer reflective of his perceived position as tenant Most notably, that the notice to vacate refers 
to defendant as a tenant 
1 
- ) . 
The effect of these assertions is that there is a dispute of a material fact and my previous 
conclusion to the contrary is erroneous. 
Accordingly, the Motion to Reconsider is granted and the matter will be set for trial. The 
Objection to Form of Order is moot and, therefore, denied without prejudice. Counsel for 
defendant should submit an appropriate order memorializing this decision. 
-11/' 
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The matter is before the court on both parties application for an award of attorney fees 
and costs. This issue was reserved to be determined by the court following trial. During the 
course of the jury trial, plaintiffs First Amended Complaint and the claims made therein were 
dismissed on the grounds that the notice of eviction was inadequate. The jury, empaneled to hear 
the case, determined that defendant's counterclaims presented no cause of action against plaintiff. 
Plaintiff asserts that it is entitled to attorney fees and costs for the successful defense of 
the counterclaims. Defendant claims attorney fees based on the dismissal of plaintiffs complaint. 
Both maintain that attorney fees and costs should be awarded pursuant to Title 57 Chapter 16 
Section 8 Utah Code Ann (1953 as amended). Plaintiff should get the fees because the statute 
incorporates a successful defense of any claim made during the course of litigation initiated under 
the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. Defendant should get the fees because the complaint was 
dismissed. 
In considering plaintiffs request, I see no appropriate basis to make such an award. The 
statute only allows reasonable attorney fees and costs for successful prosecution or defense of 
claims involving and arising from eviction under the act. Other tortious or breach of contract 
claims that may be raised, as compulsory or permissive counterclaims, are not covered by the 
attorney fee provision of the statute. 
1 
"Upon final termination of the issues between the parties,...." language can only be 
interpreted to relate to the, "...contest an eviction proceeding" predicate and, thus, limit fees to 
the prevailing party on only that issue. 
This analysis is part of the basis in denying defendant's request. Although plaintiffs claims 
were dismissed because of insufficient notice, defendant did not prevail on the issue for which the 
statute would permit the award of fees. The issue presented by plaintiffs First Amended 
Complaint was, whether defendant should be required to quit the premises and move the mobile 
home? That issue was rendered moot when defendant voluntarily quit the property, moved the 
home prior to trial and paid arrears on rent. 
Although it may be that plaintiff cannot be a prevailing party when a claim for eviction is 
dismissed, defendant does not automatically became the prevailing party because of the dismissal. 
The reasons for and the results of the dismissal must be analyzed. Defendant avoided an award of 
treble damages as a result of the dismissal. Plaintiff recovered the property and rents. 
Accordingly, the requests for award of attorney fees and costs are denied. 
With this determination, counsel for plaintiff should prepare and submit proposed findings, 
conclusions and a judgment. 
2 
TabG 
DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)263-3344 
Telecopier: (801) 263-1010 
MAY 2 6 1999 
THIRi, DiSTRICl C ^ ?~-~ 
MURRAY DEPARTM&W ' 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK, 
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership, dba 
BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAM PEEBLES aka SAMUEL B. 
PEEBLES, an Individual; and HAROLD 
BOYD PEEBLES, an Individual, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 960003616CV 
JUDGE J. C. FRATTO 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial before a jury on the 1s t, 2nd 
and 5th days of October, 1998, and the Plaintiff being represented by its attorney, 
Dennis K. Poole, and the Defendants being represented by their attorney, Russell A. 
Cline, and the Court having subsequently considered motions of both the Plaintiff and 
the Defendants for attorneys' fees, and having entered its Notice of Decision dated 
March 1, 1999, and for good cause appearing, 
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JUDGMENT IS HEREBY GRANTED AS FOLLOWS: 
1 . Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims of the Plaintiff, which motion 
was made at the conclusion of Plaintiff's case, was granted for and on the grounds 
that Plaintiff failed to provide a 15-day notice to quit in accordance wi th the 
requirements of the Utah Mobile Home Residency Act. 
2. As a result of the special verdicts of the jury which found that the Plaintiff 
assumed no lease with the Defendants Sam Peebles and/or Harold Peebles and did not 
unreasonably withhold its consent to one or more prospective purchasers of the Sam 
Peebles mobile home, all claims of the Defendants against the Plaintiff are dismissed, 
no cause of action. 
3. With respect to the respective motions of the Plaintiff and Defendants for 
attorneys' fees and costs in this matter, and based upon the decisions of the Court 
dated March 1,1999, neither party is a prevailing party and, as a consequence thereof, 
both motions for attorneys' fees and costs are denied. 
JUDGMENT DATED this / 3 day o f ^ ^ 7 ^ 9 9 9 . 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
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Mail, the 'day of April, 1999, to the following: 
Russell A. Cline, Esq. 
CRIPPEN & CLINE 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UfaTT8W)1 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from the Third District Court's reversal of its decision 
granting summary judgment to Plaintiff Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. 
("Brookside"), dismissal of Brookside's claim of unlawful detainer at the conclusion 
of Brookside's case during trial, and denial of Brookside's Motion for Allowance of 
Attorney's Fees and Court Costs. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in overturning its Decision dated October 
23, 1997, granting Brookside Summary Judgment because (a) the trial was 
precluded from considering the Affidavits of Defendant Samuel B. Peebles ("Sam 
Peebles") dated November 17, 1997 and November 18, 1997 due to their 
contradiction of earlier deposition testimony of Sam Peebles; and (b) because 
Plaintiff had no actual or constructive notive of any alleged Peebles' lease? (R. 
744-747) The trial court's overturn of its decision is reviewed without deference to 
the trial court's determination because summary judgment deals only with questions 
of law. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material 
fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts are considered in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. "[W]e may affirm a grant of summary judgment 
on any ground available to the trial court." Parker v. Dodgion. 971 P.2d, 496,497 
(Utah 1998); Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
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Brookside preserved this issue for appeal before the trial court by the arguments 
it made in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 440-
528,593-598,717-724) 
II. Whether the trial court erred in determining that Brookside was 
required to provide Sam Peebles and his father Defendant Harold Boyd Peebles 
(together "the Peebles") a 15-day notice to quit under the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act as opposed to a 5-day notice for unlawful detainer? (R. 1292-1294) 
The trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of statutory construction 
which is reviewed under a '"correction of error'" standard. On appeal, the trial 
court's legal conclusions are given no deference but are reviewed for correctness 
Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n. 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997); 
C. T. v. Johnson. 977 P.2d. 479, 480 (Utah 1999); Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 
977 p.2d. 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). Brookside preserved this issue for appeal 
before the trial court by the arguments it made in its Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration in addition to oral argument made at trial. (R. 440-528, 593-598, 
717-724; T. 258-274) 
III. Whether the trial court erred in determining that Brookside was not the 
prevailing party upon the no cause dismissal of the Peebles' claims under the 
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Mobile Home Park Residency Act requiring an award of attorneys' fees and costs 
to Brookside? (R. 1285-1287) The trial court's interpretation of statute is a 
question of statutory construction which is reviewed under a '"correction of error'" 
standard. On appeal, the trial court's legal conclusions are given no deference but 
are reviewed for correctness Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n. 947 
P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997); C. T. v. Johnson. 977 P.2d. 479, 480 (Utah 1999); 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 977 p.2d. 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). Brookside 
preserved this issue for appeal before the trial court by the arguments it made in its 
Affidavit of Fees and Memorandum of Costs and Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs in addition to oral 
argument made at trial. (R. 1102-1160,1228-1236; T. 236, 719) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules which pertain 
to this appeal are fully set forth in the addenda hereto where not fully set forth in the 
body of this brief. The Mobile Home Park Residency Act, located at Utah Code 
Annotated Sections 57-16-1 through 57-16-15.1 , and Unlawful Detainer by Tenant 
for Term Less Than Life, located at Utah Code Annotated Section 78-36-3, are fully 
set forth in the addenda hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about May 5,1996, Brookside filed an Amended Complaint against the 
Peebles alleging unlawful detainer by the Peebles of space #100 of Brookside's 
mobile home park. (R. 17-33) On or about January 2, 1997, the Peebles filed a 
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Counterclaim against Brookside alleging that, among other claims, Brookside had 
violated the Mobile Home Park Residency Act by unreasonably withholding 
approval of prospective purchasers of the Peebles' mobile home. (R. 149-154) On 
or about August 8,1997, Brookside filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing 
that because the Peebles did not have a lease with Brookside, the Peebles were 
therefore not residents under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, and that the 
Peebles were in unlawful detainer of space #100. (R. 529-530) On or about 
October 23,1997, the Court granted Brookside's Motion, holding that Brookside's 
notice was sufficient under Utah law for unlawful detainer, that the Peebles had 
surrendered any lease they had with Brookside by the subsequent execution of 
leases between Brookside and the series of buyers of the Peebles' mobile home, 
and that the Peebles' counterclaims failed as they were premised upon a lease with 
Brookside. (R. 616-620) 
On October 28,1997, the Peebles filed a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's 
summary judgment in favor Brookside. (R. 623-624) On November 17,1997, the 
Peebles filed a Motion for Reconsideration requesting that the trial court reconsider 
the summary judgment in favor of Brookside. (R. 687-688) The Peebles filed two 
Affidavits of Sam Peebles dated November 17, 1997 and November 18, 1997 
simultaneously with their Motion for Reconsideration that contradicted Sam 
Peeble's previous deposition testimony. (R. 701-707) On or about February 20, 
1998, with an Order dated March 18, 1998, the trial court overturned its prior 
decision holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
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Peebles knew there were leases between Brookside and purchasers of the 
Peebles' mobile home resulting in a surrender of the Peebles' lease. (R. 744-747) 
Commencing October 1,1998, the matter was tried before a jury. The trial 
court dismissed Brookside's claim of unlawful detainer at the conclusion of 
Brookside's case, holding that Brookside was required to give the Peebles a 15 day 
notice to quit under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act as opposed to a 5 day 
notice to quit for unlawful detainer under Utah law. (R. 1292-1294) The jury later 
denied the Peebles' claims against Brookside. (R. 1292-1294) In so doing, the jury 
determined that the Peebles had no lease with Brookside and the Peebles were 
therefore not entitled to relief under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act against 
Brookside. (R. 1292-1294) On motions of both Brookside and the Peebles, the 
Court denied both parties' attorneys' fees and costs. (R. 1285-1287) 
This appeal stems from the trial court's February 1998 overturn of its previous 
Decision granting Brookside summary judgment dated October 23,1997 (R. 744-
747), the trial court's dismissal of Brookside's claims at trial for unlawful detainer (R. 
1292-1294), and the trial court's denial of Brookside's Motion for Allowance of 
Attorney's Fees and Court Costs under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act when 
Brookside prevailed against the Peebles' claims under the Act (R. 1285-1287). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Peebles purchased the mobile home occupying space #100 of the 
Brookside Mobile Home Park (the "Park") in or around December of 1983 and Sam 
Peebles thereafter entered into a Lease with Brookside Associates ("Assignor"), 
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a predecessor in interest of Brookside regarding the Park. (T. 325-327, 400-402) 
In or around November of 1986, the Peebles sold their mobile home to Bud Jones 
and Barbara Peacock. (T. 175,177) 
After selling their mobile home to Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock, Sam 
Peebles moved out of the mobile home. (T. 175, 177) Bud Jones and Barbara 
Peacock then entered into a lease agreement directly with Assignor for the lease 
of space #100. (T. 178) Upon selling the mobile home to Bud Jones and Barbara 
Peacock, the Peebles became purchase money lenders and Bud Jones and 
Barbara Peacock became the residents of space #100. (T. 456-457) After about 
six months, Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock defaulted on their purchase contract 
and the Peebles retook possession of the mobile home. (T. 178, 449-450) 
Thereafter Kathy Burgess rented the mobile home from the Peebles. (T. 188, 
403-406) The Peebles then rented the mobile home to Yolanda Gonzales and Sam 
Peebles lent money to Yolanda Gonzales for her rental payments to the Park. (T. 
187-188) The Peebles then sold the home to Richard Rowley and on one 
occasion loaned Richard Rowley approximately $1,500 to have a sheriffs lock 
removed from the mobile home because of eviction proceedings commenced by 
the Park. (T. 183-184,413) 
In or around August of 1994, Brookside's immediate predecessor in interest, 
the Alan H. Glover & Bonnie A. Glover Revocable Trust (the "Trust") entered into 
a contract to purchase the Park from Assignor. (T. 32-33) In connection with the 
purchase of the Park, the Trust entered into an Assignment of Leases and Deposits 
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dated December 9, 1994 whereby the Trust acquired from Assignor all of 
Assignor's right, title and interest to the leases described on a Rent Roll attached 
to the Assignment of Leases and Deposits. (T. 34-35) The Rent Roll attached to 
the Assignment of Leases and Deposits listed Richard Rowley as the Resident 
occupying space #100. (T. 36,60-62) Richard Rowley in fact occupied space #100 
at the time of the Trust's purchase of the Park. (T. 81-83) The Peebles were not 
listed on the Rent Roll. (T. 81-83) 
Brookside acquired its interest in the Park from the Trust by deed dated on 
or about January 4, 1995, and acquired its interest in the lease with Rowley by 
virtue of an Assignment of Leases dated January 4,1995. (T. 40-41) The leases 
acquired by Brookside were identical to those acquired by the Trust from Assignor. 
(T. 41-42) Again, the Peebles were not identified as residents under any lease 
and Brookside had no knowledge of Peebles' claimed interest in a mobile home or 
any claim of a lease within the Park. (T. 41-42) 
As noted above, on or about May 1,1994, prior to Brookside's purchase of 
the Park, Richard Rowley had entered into a Mobile Home Space Lease Agreement 
for space #100 of the Park with Assignor, the prior owner of the Park. (T. 82) 
Subsequent to Brookside's purchase of the Park, Richard Rowley entered 
into a second Rental Agreement with Brookside on or about April 1,1995. (T. 46-
47) The April 1995 Rental Agreement listed only Richard Rowley and Dawn 
Rowley as Residents and further prohibited assignments or subleases. (T. 48) 
Richard Rowley abandoned the mobile home on or about November of 1995. (T. 
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496, 507) Thereafter, on or about the 29th of November, 1995, Brookside served 
the Peebles as lenders, by registered mail, a Notice pursuant to Section 57-16-9, 
Utah Code Annotated, specifying Sam Peebles as the lienholder of the mobile 
home and indicating that as the lienholder of record, they were primarily liable to 
Brookside for all rents accruing after ten (10) days following receipt of the notice. 
(T. 504) Subsequent to receiving notice as lender, the Peebles began paying the 
rent for space #100 which Brookside accepted believing the Peebles were lenders. 
(T. 508) 
On or about December 27, 1995, Sam Peebles was advised that certain 
repairs would need to be made to the trailer for it to remain in the Park if sold to a 
new homeowner. (T. 50-54, 507-508) In March of 1996, the Park manager, Jim 
Prentice, informed Sam Peebles that Sam Peebles would need to come by the 
manager's office and sign a new lease with the current owner of the Park. (T. 458-
459) Sam Peebles refused to come to the manager's office to sign a new lease. 
(T. 458-459) 
Brookside served upon the Peebles by posting upon the mobile home a 
Notice to Quit on April 13,1996. (R. 31-32)1 Such notice required the Peebles to 
remove their mobile home from the Park within five (5) days pursuant to the 
statutory requirements of unlawful detainer under Utah law. (R. 31-32) 
*Such 5 day notice was served after Brookside received a "note" from the 
court that the notice was required as a prerequisite to the action. Brookside 
served the notice and then filed its Amended Complaint. 
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On or about May 5, 1996, Brookside filed an Amended Complaint alleging 
unlawful detainer by the Peebles. (R. 17-33) At the time of filing of the complaint, 
the mobile home was in a state of disrepair to the point that it did not satisfy 
municipal code requirements of the City of West Jordan. (T. 145-146, 214-219) 
On or about January 2, 1997, the Peebles filed a Counterclaim against 
Brookside alleging that, among other claims, Brookside had violated the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act by unreasonably withholding approval of prospective 
purchasers of the Peebles' mobile home. (R. 149-154) 
On August 8,1997, Brookside filed its Motion for Summary Judgment arguing 
that because the Peebles did not have a lease with Brookside, that the Peebles 
were lenders, not residents under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, and that 
the Peebles were in unlawful detainer. (R. 529-530) By Decision dated October 
23, 1997, the Court granted Brookside's Motion, holding that Brookside's notice 
was sufficient for unlawful detainer under Utah law, that the Peebles had no lease 
with Brookside by virtue of the surrender of any lease caused by execution of 
leases between the Park and the series of purchasers of the Peebles' mobile home, 
the Peebles' refusal to enter into a written lease as required by the Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act, and that the Peebles' counterclaims failed as they were 
premised upon a lease with Brookside. (R. 616-620) 
The Peebles filed a Notice of Appeal dated October 28,1997 and also filed 
a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 17, 1997. (R. 623-624) The 
Peebles filed two Affidavits of Sam Peebles dated November 17, 1997 and 
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November 18, 1997 simultaneously with their Motion for Reconsideration that 
contradicted Sam Peebles' earlier deposition testimony. (R. 701-707) By Notice 
of Decision dated February 20,1998, and Order dated March 18, 1998, the Court 
incorrectly overturned the prior decision holding that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the Peebles knew there were leases between the Park 
and the series of purchasers of the Peebles' mobile home resulting in a surrender 
ofthe Peebles'lease. (R. 744-747) 
Commencing October 1,1998, the matter was tried before a jury. However, 
the trial court dismissed Brookside's claim of unlawful detainer at the conclusion of 
Brookside's case, holding that Brookside was required to give a 15 day notice to the 
Peebles under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act as opposed to a 5 day notice 
for unlawful detainer. (R. 1292-1294) The jury later held no cause of action 
regarding the counterclaims of the Peebles. (R. 1292-1294) In special jury 
verdicts, the jury found that Brookside had no lease with the Peebles and that 
Brookside had not unreasonably withheld its consent to prospective purchasers of 
the Peebles' mobile home in violation ofthe Mobile Home Park Residency Act. (R. 
1292-1294) On Motion of both the Peebles and Brookside, the Court denied both 
parties' claims for attorney's fees and costs. (R. 1285-1287) 
This appeal stems from the trial court's February 1998 overturn of its previous 
Decision dated October 23,1997 granting Brookside Summary Judgment (R. 744-
747), the trial court's dismissal of Brookside's claims at trial for unlawful detainer (R. 
1292-1294), and the trial court's denial of Brookside's Motion for Allowance of 
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Attorney's Fees and Costs under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act when 
Brookside prevailed against the Peebles' claims under the Act (R. 1285-1287). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in overturning its Decision dated October 23, 1997, 
granting Brookside Summary Judgment because the trial court was precluded from 
considering the Affidavits of Sam Peebles dated November 17, 1997 and 
November 18,1997 due to their contradiction of the earlier deposition testimony of 
Sam Peebles. The Peebles attempted to create an issue of fact in their Motion for 
Reconsideration by filing two self-serving affidavits of Sam Peebles which 
contradicted his earlier deposition of testimony. The trial court committed reversible 
error when it overturned its decision by considering the Affidavits of Sam Peebles. 
Even if the trial court was correct in considering the affidavits, Brookside purchased 
the Park with no actual or constructive notice of a lease with Sam Peebles and is 
therefore a bona fide purchaser and not subject to any lease Sam Peebles had with 
a previous owner of the Park. 
The trial court erred in determining that Brookside was required to provide the 
Peebles 15-day notice under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act as opposed to 
5-day notice for unlawful detainer. Due to the Peebles lack of a lease with 
Brookside, the Peebles were not tenants and Brookside was compelled to pursue 
unlawful detainer against the Peebles because the Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act did not apply in evicting the Peebles. Brookside was entitled to pursue its claim 
of unlawful detainer against the Peebles pursuant to Utah law regarding unlawful 
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detac >kside's 
claim of unlawful detainer. 
The trial court erred in determining that Brookside was not the prevailing 
party upon the no cause dismissal of the Peebles' claims premised upon the Mobile 
Home Park Residenc requires ->f attorneys' fees and costs 
to the prevailing party when claims are pursued under the act. Brookside is entitled 
to attorney's fees upon prevailing against the Peebles for their claims under the Act. 
attorney's fees and costs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY OVERTURNED 
ITS DECISION GRANTING BROOKSIDE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
The trial court erroneously overturned its earlier decision granting Brookside 
Mobile Home Park, Ltd. ("Brookside") summary judgment when it considered the 
Affidavits of Defendant Samui'l 11 I'eebles ("Sam I'eebles") which contradicted 
Sam Peebles' previous deposition testimony. The Defendants Sam Peebles and 
Harold Boyd Peebles (together "the Peebles") attempted to create an issue of fact 
through self-serving affidavits that contradicted Sam Peebles' previous deposition 
testin msidered by the trial 
court was correct in considering the affidavits, Brookside purchased the Brookside 
Mobile Home Park (the "Park") with no actual or constructive notice of a lease with 
Sam Peebles and is therefore a bona fide purchaser and not subject to any lease 
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Sam Peebles had with a previous owner of the Park. The original decision of the 
trial court granting Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment should be reinstated 
and this matter remanded for calculation of treble damages recoverable by 
Brookside under Utah law for unlawful detainer. 
A. The Sam Peebles' Affidavits Submitted in Opposition to Brookside's 
Motion for Summary Judgment Should Not Have Been Considered by 
the Trial Court. 
A party cannot take a clear position in a deposition, that is not modified on 
cross-examination, and then raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which 
contradicts his deposition. See Franks v. Nimmo. 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 
1986); Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). Though a court 
should not weigh evidence in a summary judgment proceeding, "when a party takes 
a clear position in a deposition that is not modified on cross-examination, he may 
not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his 
deposition." id The only exception to this rule mandates that the party must 
"provide an explanation of the discrepancy." Jd at 1173. "A contrary rule would 
undermine the utility of summary judgment as a means of screening out sham 
issues of fact." id 
The trial court's overturn of its earlier decision granting Brookside summary 
judgment is reviewed without deference to the trial court's determination because 
summary judgment deals only with questions of law. Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing a grant of summary 
e:\EC\APPEALVP«bbl$Brf.wpd -13-
judg I 
party. "[W]e may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to 
the trial court." Parker v. Dodgion. 971 P.2d, 496,497 (Utah 1998); Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County. flj»*i I' ,'il ..'.U .' -*•• «l 
In the Peebles' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, 
Peebles first attempt to raise a genuine issue of whether Sam Peebles knew of the 
existence of a lease between Brookside and Rowley, the most recent purchaser of 
The Pet'l ill»s ,> IIIi, il because Sam 
Peebles was allegedly not aware of the Rowley lease, the Rowley lease did not 
operate as a surrender of any previously existing Peebles lease. (R. 694-700) 
The doctrine of surrender requires only that the Peebles assented to the 
creation of an estate between Rowley and Brookside.2 The Peebles assented 
when they permitted Rowley to occupy their mobile home knowing that Brookside 
would require a lease agreement from Rowley. "[W]hen a tenant surrenders the 
surrender, the tenant is no longer in privity of estate with the Landlord." Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1989). This "rule of surrender 
Automatic Gas 
2
 [A] surrender of a lease is implied by law when another estate is 
created by the reversioner or remainderman, with the assent of the 
tenant, that is incompatible with the existing term. Thus, as a general 
rule, when a new lease of the premises is taken by the lessee from the 
lessor for the whole or a part of the term embraced in the former one, 
there is said to be a surrender in law because the giving of a new lease 
necessarily implies a surrender of the old one. 
49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant at § 252 (1995). 
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Distributors. Inc. v. State Bank of Green River. 817 P.2d 441. 443 (Wyo. 1991). It 
is wholly immaterial that Sam Peebles did not realize that by permitting Rowley to 
occupy the mobile home and enter into a lease agreement with Brookside, the 
Peebles would be surrendering his lease. Moreover, the doctrine of surrender 
simply does not require that Sam Peebles, to the extent he actually was a tenant, 
"knowingly or consentually [sic] surrendered [his] lease" in order for the surrender 
to be effective (Sam Peebles Supplemental Affidavit at 1J13). 
A lease agreement between a Landlord and a Tenant creates an estate in 
land. It is impossible to convey an estate which is incompatible with a pre-existing 
estate. The creation of the second relationship with the assent of the prior tenant 
necessarily terminates the relationship between the Landlord and the prior tenant. 
Here, where there is no dispute that Sam Peebles permitted Rowley to occupy the 
mobile home fully knowing that Brookside would require a lease agreement from 
Rowley, there was as a matter of law a surrender of any preexisting interest and 
estate of Sam Peebles. 
In support of the argument that Sam Peebles had no knowledge of the 
Rowley lease, the Peebles offer a Supplemental Affidavit of Sam Peebles wherein 
he claims that he had no knowledge of a lease between Brookside and Richard 
Rowley. (R. 701-707) This affidavit is inconsistent with deposition testimony 
offered by Sam Peebles, and was therefore inadmissible and inappropriately 
considered by the trial court. 
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i Peebles taken May 1, 1997, the following 
colloquy transpired between Brookside's counsel and Sam Peebles referring 
specifically to the Peebles' "renters" including Rowley: 
Q. Okay. Each time these people leased the trailer from you, 
-ou know if they made an application with the park to lease this? 
A. Yes, they did. They were supposed to. 
Q. Okay. And they would have gone through an application 
process? 
/ Vep. 
L. They would have to sign a lease agreement? 
A. Yep. 
(Deposi • i 
testified that he is aware that his renters entered into lease agreements with 
Brookside. Therefore, his affidavit testimony that he had no knowledge of Rowley's 
lease is inadmissible and should be stricken. 
Due to the in admissibility of the Supplemental Affidavits of Sam Peebles, 
original decision by the trial court to grant Brookside summary judgment should be 
reinstated and this matter remanded for calculation of treble damages recoverable 
I »y Hi'»'i' «i<1e i n i< l( 'i I Id il i law for unlawful detainer. 
Brookside was a Bona Fide Purchaser of the Park who Purchased 
Without Actual or Constructive Notice of the Peebles' Alleged Lease. 
Even if the trial court was correct in considering the Supplemental Affidavits 
ol S mi I'pohli ' I In ml nli mi i 11 n ma le 
I::: EC" A, 1 1 IE,,* Il i •«:>IUBi f.wpd -16-
purchaser is one who takes without actual or constructive notice of facts sufficient 
to put him on notice of the complainant's equity." Grahn v. Gregory. 800 P.2d 320, 
328 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Blodgett v. Marser. 590 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978). 
Brookside had no knowledge at the time it purchased the Park that the Peebles 
were the owners of the mobile home located at space #100 or that they might claim 
the existence of a lease. 
"The essential time to measure knowledge is at the time of the actual sale." 
Grahn v. Gregory. 800 P.2d 320, at 328. At the time of the sale, Richard Rowley 
was the occupant of the subject mobile home. Richard Rowley had signed a lease 
with Plaintiffs predecessor as the resident. (T. 82). Richard Rowley was listed as 
the resident of the subject mobile home on the Rent Roll attached to the 
Assignment of Leases and Deposits. (T. 36, 60-62). Because Brookside was a 
bona fide purchaser who took the Park without actual or constructive notice of the 
Peebles' claims as residents, Brookside is not bound by any alleged contract 
entered into between the Peebles and a prior owner of the Park. Id This issue 
alone is sufficient basis to determine there was no contract between Brookside and 
the Peebles and to uphold the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Brookside. 
The original summary judgment should be reinstated and this matter remanded for 
calculation of treble damages recoverable by Brookside under Utah law for unlawful 
detainer. 
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The Trial Court's Original Decision Granting Brookside's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Should be Reinstated. 
As found in the trial court's original decision granting Brookside summary 
judgment and later held by the jury at trial, the Peebles never entered into a lease 
agreement, either written rookside ih' 1,'WJ L'tMi/Miy >ui I 
contract with Brookside's predecessor was extinguished as a matter of law when 
the Peebles entered into contracts with various individuals to sell the mobile home 
by the doctrine of surrender. At such time, the Peebles' interest in the mobile home 
bona fide purchaser of the Park and not bound by any lease the Peebles had with 
a previous owner of the Park. Without a valid lease agreement between Brookside 
and the Peebles, the Peebles were not tenants and Brookside was compelled to 
pursue unlawful detainer against the Peebles because the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act did not apply in evicting the Peebles. There are no remaining 
genuine issues of material fact to dispute that the Peebles are guilty of unlawful 
detairn i | ur,u ,i.l I i 
Brookside's summary judgment should be reinstated and this matter remanded for 
calculation of treble damages recoverable by Brookside for the Peebles' unlawful 
detainer. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE UTAH 
MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY ACT TO 
BROOKSIDE'S CAUSE OF ACTION INSTEAD OF 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 
The trial court erred in dismissing Brookside's claims after presentation of 
Brookside's case during the jury trial of this matter. The trial court dismissed 
Brookside's claim for unlawful detainer because Brookside had not served the 
Peebles with a 15-day notice to quit as required under the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act. The trial court's action is especially nonsensical in that the jury later 
found under special verdict instructions that no lease existed between Brookside 
and the Peebles. With no lease between Brookside and the Peebles, the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act does not apply in evicting the Peebles and Brookside 
is required to pursue a claim of unlawful detainer against the Peebles. (R. 1292-
1294) 
The Mobile Home Park Residency Act was enacted by the Utah legislature 
with the intent to "provide protection for both the owners of mobile homes located 
in mobile home parks and for the owners of mobile home parks." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-16-2. The legislature sought to provide "speedy and adequate" remedies for 
park owners while protecting tenants from actual or constructive eviction due to the 
"high cost of moving mobile homes." i d 
Under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, a resident is defined as "an 
individual who leases or rents space in a mobile home park." Utah Code Ann. § 57-
16-3(3). The Act further requires that "the lease of mobile home space shall be 
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written .mil sic|iieil liy IIif p.nlif' 
includes language limiting the language contained in mobile home leases, limiting 
the causes for termination of such leases, and providing for a unique eviction 
cedure Hi il i i.litleienl Hi in lln i i/iiJinii |n>u iMJiin lm nlliu hum n| n H 
property interests. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-16-4, -5, -6, -7.5, and -8. 
The trial court's interpretation of statute is a question of statutory construction 
which is reviewed under a '"correction of error'" standard. On appeal, the trial 
i i mil «• leqnl mm lir mm, in1 I|IM m m i deferem e Iml .lie if viewed lei < directness 
Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n. 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997); 
C. T. v. Johnson. 977 P.2d. 479, 480 (Utah 1999); Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 
9 
Brookside did not have a lease agreement with the Peebles. (R. 1292-1294) 
The Peebles were therefore not residents of the Park. As nonresidents, the 
Peebles refusal to vacate space #100 of the Park was not governed by the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act. Withrml .i wnlli m lease .iqreement between Brookside 
and the Peebles, Brookside was not entitled to evict the Peebles under the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act but compelled to pursue an action for unlawful detainer 
notice to quit under unlawful detainer when Brookside commenced this action 
against the Peebles. (See Footnote No. 1 at page 8.) 
The elements of unlawful detainer are located in Section 78-36-3 of the Utah 
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(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful 
detainer: 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with 
monthly or other periodic rent reserved; 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in 
possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice 
of not less than five days; 
Absent a valid residency lease with the Brookside, the Peebles are tenants 
at will. In the present case, as a tenant at will, the Peebles' right to possession was 
subject to termination by Brookside upon five days' notice, Section 78-36-3(11 )(b). 
Brookside served the Peebles with a Notice to Quit on April 13,1996; however, the 
Peebles refused to vacate space #100. Consequently, Brookside is entitled to 
treble damages for the Peebles' unlawful detainer for periods subsequent to April 
13,1996. 
After first granting Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment and then 
overturning its decision, the trial court dismissed Brookside's claim of unlawful 
detainer for failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act. Subsequently at trial in October of 1998, the jury held in a special 
jury verdict form that no lease existed between Brookside and the Peebles. 
Inconsistent with the jury ruling, the trial court had dismissed the claims of 
Brookside because it had issued a five-day notice, as required under unlawful 
detainer, rather than a fifteen-day notice required by the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act. If there is no lease, the Mobile Home Park Residency Act does not 
apply and Brookside should prevail against the Peebles regarding its claim of 
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unlawful detainer. The In il i mill i inn in i|i|il, nn| lln nulnt1 slim I inK nl lln 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act rather than unlawful detainer is error correctable 
by this Court. 
dismissed Harold Boyd Peebles as a defendant at trial. (T. 261) Harold Boyd 
Peebles should be found joint and severally liable for unlawful detainer due to his 
joint ownership of the mobile home located at space #100 of the Park and the 
failure of the Peebles to timely plead the affirmative defense nl IHIIIIIIMI ili'lfiiihul 
regarding Harold Peebles. The Peebles' Amended Answer did not contain a 
"nominal defendant" defense for Harold Peebles. (R. 121-126) The Peebles never 
filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that Harold Peebles was only a "nominal 
defendant." Instead, the Peebles admitted in their Amend* -M I AIIM/VM II MI I limlil 
Peebles was a defendant to this action (R. 121-126). Harold Peebles also brought 
numerous counterclaims against Brookside. (R. 149-154) As a co-owner of the 
ninlnl" h ' W , li" r ,il'," 'piilly "I nnl iwlul 'letamei ,iinl ii llit-T'lun- \< intly and 
severally liable with Sam Peebles for the damages incurred by Brookside. 
Pursuant to Section 78-36-10 of the Utah Code Annotated, Brookside is 
ery of treble damages fi • eebles. Brookside respectfully 
requests this court to remand this matter to the trial court for calculation of treble 
damages against the Peebles for unlawful detainer. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BROOKSIDE 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS WHEN IT 
PREVAILED AGAINST THE PEEBLES' CLAIMS 
UNDER THE UTAH MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY 
ACT. 
The trial court erred in denying Brookside's attorneys' fees and costs in this 
action. Brookside is entitled to attorneys' fees in this action because the Peebles 
alleged in their Counterclaim, causes of action for violation of section 57-16-4(4) of 
the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. Because Brookside successfully defended 
against the Peebles's counterclaim founded on the Utah Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act, Brookside is entitled to its attorney's fees incurred in this action 
pursuant to Section 57-16-8 of the Act. 
If a resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding, all rents, 
fees, and service charges due and incurred during the pendency of the 
action shall be paid into the court according to the current mobile 
home park payment schedule. Failure of the resident to pay such 
amounts may, in the discretion of the court, constitute grounds for 
granting summary judgment in favor of the mobile home park. Upon 
final termination of the issues between the parties, the court shall order 
all amounts paid into court paid to the mobile home park. The 
prevailing party is also entitled to court costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
U.C.A. 57-16-8 (1994) (emphasis added). Brookside is entitled to its court costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this action because, without, exception, 
each and every one of the claims pursued by Peebles at trial were based upon the 
Peebles' allegation that Brookside violated the Utah Mobile Home Residency Act 
(the "Act"). 
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The trial court's interpretation of statute is a question of stati ih n y sin i i 
which is reviewed under a '"correction of error'" standard. On appeal, the ...J 
court's legal conclusions are given no deference but are reviewed for correctness 
Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v hiuuji-idi Comn 
C. T. v. Johnson. 977 P.2d. 479, 480 (Utah 1999); Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 
977 p.2d. 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). 
Peebles' Counterclaim, I In,1 I'eebles asserted 
Brookside breached its contract with the Peebles by failing to reasonably approve 
a prospective purchaser of the Peebles' mobile home. (R. 149-154) In support of 
its claim at trial, the Peebles attempted to establish the existence of a contract 
between BrooKidf ,iinl lln Peebles in imlci In in lunni lln i nnli.i I illiin lln 
strictures of the Act; and (ii) to establish that the contract had been breached by 
Brookside's conduct which the Peebles argued was in violation of the Act. 
The Peebles' Counterclaim were raised pursuai brookside's 
Complaint constituted eviction proceedina Peebles' Counterclaim 
constituted a compulsory counterclair a compulsory counterclaim, the 
Peebles' Counterclaim was pai the eviction proceeding. Moreover, the 
language ol Section 'W I6-8 clearly nr counts for IIie present e nl more than 
claim in an eviction proceeding. The phrase, "[u]pon final termination of the issues 
between the parties." assumes that more than one claim can arise in the context 
of an eviction proceeding, as occurred in this instance. In this case, there was a 
"termination of the issues between the parties." In that termination, Brookside 
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prevailed on the claims raised by the Peebles' Counterclaim. The Peebles' claims 
arose in the context of an eviction proceeding and therefore mandate recovery of 
attorney's fees and court costs by Brookside. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reinstate the summary judgment of the trial court, determine Brookside has 
prevailed on its cause of action against the Peebles for unlawful detainer, remand 
this matter to the trial court for calculation of appropriate treble damages under the 
applicable statute, and award Brookside Attorneys' fees and costs due under the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act due to Brookside prevailing against the Peebles 
regarding the Peebles' claims under the act. 
DATED this /?clay of February,(2000? 
DENNISKTPOOLE 
POOLE, SULLIVAN & ADAMS, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ARGUMENT 
The arguments in this Reply Brief are limited to the new matters raised by 
Defendants Samuel B. Peebles ("Sam Peebles") and Harold Peebles (together the 
"Peebles") in their Brief. The arguments herein are numbered in response to the 
appropriate sections of the Peebles' Brief to aid the Court in reviewing the issues 
raised. 
I.A.1 Brookside's Lease With Richard Rowley, and the Peebles' 
Consent Thereto. Constituted Surrender and Acceptance of any 
Lease Between Brookside and Sam Peebles. 
(a) The Peebles Surrendered the Premises. 
In their brief the Peebles argue that because their mobile home remained on 
space #100, they did not surrender space #100 to Brookside. (Brief of Appellees 
at page 20.) This bald, conclusory assertion is not consistent with the facts that the 
Peebles sold the mobile home to several different individuals. (Deposition of Sam 
Peebles at 13, 16, and 20.) At the time of Brookside's purchase of the park, the 
Peebles had rented the mobile home to Richard Rowley with an option to purchase 
and knew that Mr. Rowley entered into a lease for space #100 directly with 
Brookside. (Deposition of Sam Peebles at 20-22; T. 183-84.) Such actions by Sam 
Peebles constitute a surrender of space #100 because tenancies superior to that 
of Sam Peebles existed regarding both the mobile home and space #100. 
(b) The Peebles Intended to Surrender the Premises. 
In their brief the Peebles argue that they had no intent to surrender space 
#100 to Brookside. (Brief of Appellees at pages 20-22.) As noted above, the 
Peebles' actions in selling their mobile home to various individuals, in renting their 
mobile home to Richard Rowley with an option to purchase, and consenting to Mr. 
Rowley and the other purchasers to enter into direct leases with Brookside for space 
#100 objectively demonstrate the Peebles' intent to surrender space #100. 
(Deposition of Sam Peebles at 13-22; T. 183-184.) The Peebles' arguments that 
they did not intend to surrender space #100 highlight the policy reasons for 
disallowing a party to contradict deposition testimony with self-serving affidavits in 
order to create an issue of fact. 
Whether the Peebles realized the full legal ramifications of surrendering 
space #100 is irrelevant as to whether the Peebles surrendered space #100. 
Though it may have been practice for Brookside's predecessor to enter into two 
leases for the same space, such a practice is irrelevant regarding Brookside given 
that it did not engage in such a practice. (R. at 771.) A subsequent lease would 
replace the initial lease under the doctrine of surrender as a matter of law. Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). 
The Peebles' actions in selling the mobile home, renting it to Richard Rowley 
with an option to purchase, consenting to Mr. Rowley and other purchasers to enter 
into direct leases with Brookside for space #100, and Sam Peebles' refusal to enter 
into leases with Brookside objectively demonstrate their intent to surrender space 
#100 and bald statements to the contrary are not sufficient to counter such a 
conclusion. (Deposition of Sam Peebles at 20-22; T. 183-184.) 
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(c) Brookside Accepted the Peebles' Surrender of the Premises 
In their brief the Peebles argue that Brookside did not accept the Peebles' 
surrender of space #100. (Brief of Appellees at pages 22-24.) However, Brookside 
accepted the Peebles's surrender of space #100 when it entered into a new lease 
with Richard Rowley. (R. at 414-15.) Brookside looked to the Peebles as 
lienholders for payment of rent when Mr. Rowley defaulted on his lease with 
Brookside because the Peebles' mobile home remained on the property. (R. at 
415.) 
Pursuant to the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, the Peebles became 
lienholders regarding the trailer located on space #100 rather than residents. Utah 
Code Annotated § 57-16-9. "[T]he lienholder of record of a mobile home is primarily 
liable to the mobile home park owner or operator for rent." ig\ The Peebles had to 
either remove the mobile home or commence paying rent for space #100. (R. at 
415.) Brookside did not seek payment of rent from Sam Peebles under a previous 
lease with Brookside. (R. at 415-16.) Brookside's notices to the Peebles indicated 
that Brookside considered the mobile home abandoned and Peebles lienholders 
that "are primarily liable to the Brookside Mobile Home Park for all rent." (R. at 432.) 
The right to tenancy of Mr. Rowley in space #100 was inconsistent with the Peebles 
having a right to tenancy and Brookside's execution of the Rowley lease was an 
acceptance of Sam Peebles' surrender of space #100. 
In their brief, the Peebles claim that Brookside miscited 49 Am. Jur. 2d 
Landlord and Tenant Section 252 (1995) for the proposition that Sam Peebles' 
assent to the Rowley lease is sufficient to create a surrender and acceptance of 
space #100. The Peebles included an initial line to the quote used by Brookside to 
support their interpretation of the passage that such an assent is only a surrender 
upon the execution of a lease between the same tenant and landlord. However, the 
line following the original quote used by Brookside further clarifies the statement and 
demonstrates that the quote fully supports Brookside's proposition. The original 
quote along with both the previous and following lines reads as follows: 
There is a presumption that acceptance by the tenant of a new lease 
of the premises during the term of an old lease operates as a surrender 
of the old lease by the act of the parties; that is a surrender of a lease 
is implied by law when another estate is created by the reversioner or 
remainderman, with the assent of the tenant, that is incompatible with 
the existing term. Thus, as a general rule, when a new lease of the 
premises is taken by the lessee from the lessor for the whole or a part 
of the term embraced in the former one, there is said to be a surrender 
in law because the giving of a new lease necessarily implies a 
surrender of the old one. It is not necessary that the second lease be 
given to the first lessee: if it is given to a third person with the consent 
of the first lessee, accompanied with the possession, it is equally 
operative as a surrender. 
49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 252 (1995) (emphasis added). 
I.A.2 Jury Verdict is Irrelevant for Purposes of Reviewing Granting of 
Motion to Reconsider 
In their brief, the Peebles argue that Sam Peebles's Affidavit does not conflict 
with his prior sworn statement and that such argument was validated by the jury 
verdict that Sam Peebles' had not surrendered his lease. (Brief of Appellees at 
page 24.) The jury verdict regarding Sam Peebles' surrender of his lease is 
irrelevant because Brookside's appeal concerns the trial court's granting of the 
Peebles Motion for Reconsideration overturning its previous grant of summary 
judgment to Brookside. The issue of whether Sam Peebles surrendered his lease 
is a mixed fact and legal question in which this court must determine whether the 
"given set of facts come within the reach of a given rule of law." State v. Pena. 869 
P.2d 932, 936-37 (Utah 1994). In reviewing the summary judgment portion of this 
action, this court may "determine the legal effect of specific facts." IcL at 937. 
I.A.3 Brookside Made a Prima Facie Case for Unlawful Detainer 
In their brief, the Peebles raise the argument that Brookside failed to make 
a prima facie case of Unlawful Detainer at the summary judgment stage of this 
action without providing any detail and blending the argument with issues occurring 
at the trial stage of the proceedings. (Brief of Appellees at 25 and 33-39.) 
The Peebles have failed to preserve this issue for review on appeal. "When 
there is no indication in the record on appeal that the trial court reached or ruled on 
an issue, this court will not undertake to consider the issue on appeal." Estate of 
Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015,1018 (Utah App. 1997). The Peebles failed to raise this 
issue at the summary judgment or trial phase of the proceedings and therefore 
have not preserved this issue and it cannot be heard at this time. In order to 
reserve an issue on appeal, the trial court must have an "opportunity to consider" 
the arguments raised on appeal. JcL The Peebles failed to raise this issue at the 
motion summary judgment phase of this matter and it is therefore barred on appeal. 
Even if the Peebles have preserved the issue of proper service under 
Unlawful Detainer, the record at the summary judgment phase indicates that 
Brookside complied with the requirements of the Utah Code regarding unlawful 
_*_ 
detainer. Pursuant to the Unlawful Detainer Act, a tenant of real property is guilty 
of unlawful detainer "when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with 
monthly or other period rent reserved . . . [ , ] in case of tenancies at will, where he 
remains in possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice not less than 
five days." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(b). If a person of suitable age or discretion 
cannot be found at the place of residence, then notice may be served "by affixing 
a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-
6(2)(b). 
The Peebles liability for rent to Brookside arose from the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act which states "the lienholder of record of a mobile home is primarily 
liable to the mobile home park owner or operator for rent." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-
9. Because the Peebles' liability is created by statute, such a tenancy should be 
deemed a tenancy at will, rather than a month to month tenancy, because there was 
no agreement between the parties, either verbal or written, creating the tenancy. 
After service on the Peebles of notice of their duty to pay rent as lienholders, the 
Peebles made sporadic payments and were in default at the time Brookside served 
notice of unlawful detainer. (R. at 415-418.) The Peebles sporadic payment of rent 
was in compliance with a statutory mandate and should not be deemed to create 
a tenancy beyond a tenancy at will. 
Brookside served the Peebles with a five-day notice by posting the same on 
the trailer pursuant to the affidavit of service executed by Constable William L. Mciff. 
(R. at 65-66.) The Peebles themselves indicate that the mobile home was vacant 
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at the time of the posting. (Appellees' Brief at page 37.) Such service by posting 
was therefore proper because there would not have been "a person of suitable are 
or discretion" at the mobile home with whom to leave a copy. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
36-3. 
The Peebles argue that Brookside should have attempted to serve the 
Peebles at their places of residence and, if no person of suitable age or discretion 
was available, then posting at the mobile home. Given the intent of the statute and 
wording of the entire statute, it is clear that "the place of residence" to be served is 
the same location as "the leased property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-6(2). It should 
also be noted that Constable Mciff also indicated in his affidavit that he mailed 
copies of the notices to the Peebles at the addresses "12067 South 2240 West 
Riverton, Utah 84065, and also 12668 So, 2360 West Riverston 84065." (R. at 66.) 
At trial, the trial court did not allow the admission of the affidavit of service 
because Constable Mciff was deceased before this matter went to trial and was 
therefore unavailable for cross examination. (T. at 138.) However, under Utah law 
a "constable's Affidavit of Service is prima facie evidence of proper service of 
process and is deemed presumptively correct." Classic Cabinets. Inc. v. All 
American Life Ins. Co.. 978 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1999). The burden shifts to the 
party opposing the affidavit to show the "invalidity or absence of service of process 
. . . by clear and convincing evidence." jd. (citations omitted) Because the trial 
court erroneously refused to admit into evidence the affidavit of service of process, 
the record at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings was different than the 
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record at trial. Such ruling by the trial court was incorrect pursuant to Classic 
Cabinet, and reversible by this Court. 
I.B.1 Brookside was a Bona Fide Purchaser 
In their brief, the Peebles argue that due to their mobile home being located 
on space #100 at the time of Brookside's purchase of the park, Brookside had 
constructive notice of Sam Peebles interest in space #100. (Brief of Appellees at 
page 26.) However, on the rent roll attached to the Purchase Agreement, Richard 
Rowley was noted as the tenant of space #100. (R. 298.) Given that a lease with 
Rowley did exist, Brookside did not have constructive notice that the mobile home 
was owned by the Peebles. (R. 302.) The Peebles also cite Latses v. Nick Floor. 
Inc.. 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (Utah 1940) for the proposition that a grantee's 
position is no stronger than the grantor's. In Latses. the grantee did not meet its 
burden to investigate the tenants of the premises and the terms of such contractual 
relations. ]a\ at 622. In this matter, Brookside has met its duty to inquire, by 
obtaining a rent roll which lists Rowley as the lessee of space #100, reviewing the 
terms of the actual lease the park had with Rowley, and confirming that Rowley 
occupied space #100. (R. at 409, 414-15.) 
I.B.2 Brookside did not Assume the Sam Peebles Lease 
In their brief the Peebles argue that Brookside assumed all leases and 
agreements appurtenant to the Park when it purchased the Park pursuant to the 
terms of the Assignment. (Brief of Appellees at page 26.) The Peebles thus argue 
that Brookside therefore assumed the Sam Peebles lease though it is not listed on 
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the rent roll attachment to the Assignment. (Brief of Appellees at 26.) In making 
this argument, Peebles have mischaracterized the language of the Assignment by 
quoting only a portion of it out of context. The language of the Assignment limits 
the leases being assumed to those listed on the rent roll. The relevant language of 
the Assignment states that Brookside was assigned: 
right, title, and interest in and to those certain leases, rental 
agreements, security or other deposits from tenants, and rentals with 
respect to such leases and agreements appurtenant to the Property, 
except as provided herein (hereinafter collectively referred to the 
'Leases'), which Leases, rents, and security deposits are more 
particularly described on Exhibit 'B' attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
(R. 293.) The rent roll limits the leases being assumed by Brookside which listed 
only "Rowley" as the tenant of space #100. (R. 298.) 
I.B.3 The Bona Fide Purchaser Rule is not Preempted by the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act 
In their brief, the Peebles argue that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act 
preempts the bona fide purchaser rule. (Brief of Appellees at pages 27-28.) In 
support of this argument, the Peebles cite Section 57-16-4(1) of the Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act which states that "a mobile home park or its agents may not 
terminate a lease or rental agreement upon any grounds other than as specified in 
this chapter." This provision however, does not address how a purchaser is to be 
placed on notice of silent leases and what effect, if any, they would have on a bona 
fide purchaser. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-2 and 57-3-3 suggests that without actual 
or constructive notice, the lease is void as to Brookside. As found by the trial court 
in granting Brookside's motion for summary judgment, and later held by the jury, 
there was no written lease between Brookside and Sam Peebles. The Act 
specifically requires that "[e]ach agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall 
be written and signed." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(2). There was no "lease or 
rental agreement" being terminated by Brookside, the Peebles had the role of a 
lender or lienholder, the Act does not apply, and Brookside was compelled to pursue 
an unlawful detainer action against the Peebles. 
Furthermore, in order for the Peebles to receive the benefits of the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act they must meet the requirements of the Act. Sam 
Peebles refused to sign a written lease with Brookside, as required by the Act. 
(Deposition of Sam Peebles at 36-37.) Because the Peebles did not comply with 
the Act by refusing to sign a written lease they have chosen to not obtain the 
benefits provided by the Act. 
I.B.4 Brookside Made a Prima Facie Case Under the Unlawful Detainer 
Act 
Please see Brookside's arguments presented in Section I.A.3 beginning on 
page 5 of this brief. 
I.B.5 Brookside's Claim of Unlawful Detainer is not Moot 
In their brief the Peebles argue that Brookside's claim of unlawful detainer is 
moot because the Peebles vacated space #100 and paid Brookside all unpaid rent 
while this action was pending. (Brief of Appellees at page 29.) However, the 
Peebles paid the rent to Brookside under a stipulation made in open court on 
December 4, 1996, that "Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks 
tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the rights of the 
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parties." (Letter from Brooksides' counsel to Peebles' counsel dated December 4, 
1996 a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Also 
attached hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C" are true and correct copies of letters dated 
January 8, 1997, and May 29, 1997, further confirming the stipulation.) Pursuant 
to the terms of the stipulation, Brookside cannot be prejudiced in this action by the 
Peebles' payment of rent. 
Even if the stipulation had not been entered into, payment of back rent after 
the commencement of an unlawful detainer and vacation are not sufficient to render 
a cause of action for unlawful detainer moot. Unlawful detainer commences upon 
service of notice of the same. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3. The property owner 
recovers damages for its lack of access to the property during the unlawful detainer 
period which is then trebled. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10. Contrary to the 
arguments of the Peebles, "rent" is not the recovery provided by unlawful detainer. 
The plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action "is entitled to recover such damages as 
are the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful detainer." Forrester v. 
Cook. 292 P. 206,214, 77 Utah 137 (1930). "While damages may not be restricted 
to the rental value and may include more, yet the rental value during the unlawful 
withholding of possession is the minimum of damages." Jd "After the tenancy has 
been terminated by the notice required by the statute, the person in unlawful 
possession is not owing rent under the contract, but must respond in damages 
pursuant to the law." JcL The Peebles tender of rent is not satisfaction of unlawful 
detainer, their continued possession of space #100 is the basis of the action. To 
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allow a party to vacate premises days before a trial regarding unlawful detainer and 
render the matter moot, as happened in this case, would defeat the purposes of 
unlawful detainer. The payment of back rent should be applied against the 
judgment amount due Brookside after calculation and trebling of Brookside's 
damages pursuant to Utah statute. 
(a) The Section 57-16-8 "Safe Harbor" is Inapplicable to Evictions 
Brought Under Unlawful Detainer 
The Peebles cite Section 57-16-8 of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act as 
creating a safe harbor from imposition of treble damages for Unlawful Detainer. 
(Brief of Appellees at pages 29-30.) Section 57-16-8 of the Act does not refer to 
Unlawful Detainer and is therefore limited to evictions brought under the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act. Also, the Peebles refused to sign a written lease, as 
required by the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, and therefore should be denied 
the benefits of the Act. (Deposition of Sam Peebles at 36-37.) 
(b) Treble Damages are Warranted in This Matter for Unlawful 
Detainer 
In their brief the Peebles argue that because they have vacated space #100 
and paid rents due while this action was pending, Brookside has not suffered 
damages under Section 78-36-10 of Utah Code Annotated regarding Unlawful 
Detainer and therefore there are no damages to be trebled for unlawful detainer. 
(Brief of Appellees at pages 30-31.) Even though the Peebles vacated the lot and 
paid rents due during the pendency of this matter, as argued above in section I.B.5 
commencing on page 10, Brookside has suffered damages caused by the Peebles 
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failure to vacate the premises. Such damages do not disappear upon payment of 
past rent. Rents paid by the Peebles should offset the damages suffered by 
Brookside once they have been determined by the court. This Court should remand 
this matter for determination of the amount of damages suffered by Brookside due 
to the Peebles unlawful detainer which would be trebled pursuant to Unlawful 
Detainer. 
I.C(a) Waiver and Estoppel is not a Basis for Granting the 
Peebles' Motion to Reconsider 
In their brief the Peebles argue that an independent basis to uphold the trial 
court's grant of their Motion to Reconsider is waiver and estoppel due to Brookside's 
acceptance of rental payments. (Brief of Appellees at page 32.) However, the 
Peebles payment of rent was as a lienholder of the mobile home who has a primary 
obligation for payment of rent to Brookside. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-9. 
Also, Brookside gave notice to the Peebles to vacate the premises as 
lienholder of the trailer. (R. at 432.) Any payment of rent was as a lienholder as 
provided under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
I.C(b) Law of the Case Does not Apply to the Trial Court's 
Granting of Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment 
In their brief the Peebles argue that the trial court was barred under the 
doctrine of the law of the case from granting Brookside's Motion for Summary 
Judgment when an earlier Motion for Summary Judgment by Brookside had been 
denied. (Brief of Appellees at page 32.) The Peebles have first brought this 
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argument on appeal. It has therefore not been preserved below and is barred. 
Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1997). 
As noted in the case cited by the Peebles in their brief, "any judge is free to 
change his or her mind on the outcome of a case until a decision is formally 
rendered." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42,45 (Utah 
App. 1988) (citations omitted). Although a trial court is not bound by its own 
precedents, "prior relevant rulings made in the same case are generally to be 
followed." i d (citations omitted). The "law of the case" doctrine is most applicable 
regarding motions for summary judgment when "a subsequent motion fails to 
present the case in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence is 
introduced." I d (citations omitted). 
In this matter, significant discovery had occurred after Brookside's initial 
motion for summary judgment. Brookside introduced new material evidence in the 
form of deposition testimony which supported its second motion for summary 
judgment and persuaded the court to grant the same. If applicable in this matter, 
the "law of the case" doctrine would bar the Peebles' Motion for Reconsideration, 
a motion not recognized under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and involving 
repetitious contentions of the issues of this case. 
II.A The Unlawful Detainer Act Applies to Brookside's 
Eviction Action Rather than the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act 
In their brief the Peebles argue that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act 
applies to Brookside's eviction proceeding because Sam Peebles was a resident 
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of the Park without addressing the fact that Sam Peebles did not reside in the Park 
and there was no written lease between the Peebles and Brookside as required by 
the Act. (Brief of Appellees at pages 34-35.) Under the Peebles' interpretation of 
the Act, a mobile home park owner would never be able to pursue an action of 
unlawful detainer if the party in unlawful detainer (lienholder or holding a status 
other than a Resident) had at some point in time made a rent payment with or 
without a written lease though the Act requires such leases to be in writing. 
In addition, the plain language of the Act allows a park owner to elect to 
pursue an eviction proceeding solely under the Act or to simultaneously pursue a 
claim for unlawful detainer. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-15.1. Section 57-16-15.1 of 
the Mobile Home Park Residency Act sets forth the procedural and remedy 
differences between proceedings "where a landlord elects to bring an action under 
this chapter and not under the unlawful detainer provisions" and proceedings "in 
which the mobile home park has elected to treat as actions also brought under the 
unlawful detainer provisions." (emphasis added). Section 57-16-15.1 allows for 
election of unlawful detainer remedies where behavior by a resident endangers the 
security of other residents and for nonpayment of rent. 
II.B Peebles Were Tenants at Will 
Please see Brookside's arguments regarding this issue in Section 1.A.3 
hereinabove commencing on page 5. 
II.C Proof of Service was Improperly Excluded from Evidence at Trial 
Please see Brookside's arguments regarding this issue in Section 1.A.3 
hereinabove commencing on page 5. 
II.D The Jury Found That no Written Lease Existed Between 
Brookside and the Peebles. 
In their brief the Peebles misrepresent the holdings of the jury claiming that 
because the jury found that Sam Peebles had a written lease with Brookside's 
predecessor and Sam Peebles had not surrendered the same, Brookside had to 
comply with the Mobile Home Park Residency Act in terminating such written lease. 
(Brief of Appellees at page 38.) However, the jury Interrogatory following those 
cited by the Peebles, indicates that the jury specifically found that Brookside had not 
assumed the Sam Peebles written lease. (R. 920.) The jury therefore found that 
no written lease existed between Brookside and the Peebles and the Peebles' 
arguments to the contrary are a misrepresentation to this Court. 
II.E.1 Harold Peebles was Properly Served 
Please see Brookside's arguments regarding this issue in Section 1.A.3 
hereinabove commencing on page 5. 
II.E.2 Harold Peebles was Wrongly Dismissed by the Trial Court 
In their brief the Peebles claim that Brookside did not dispute in its brief 
Harold Peebles dismissal by the trial court. (Brief of Appellees at page 39.) 
However, Brookside briefed this issue on page 22 of its initial brief. Please also 
note that pursuant to Section 57-16-9 of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, 
Harold Peebles' liability arises from his status as a lienholder regarding the trailer. 
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Despite the trial court's ruling to the contrary, Harold Peebles' liability arose from his 
ownership of the trailer and his refusal to vacate the premises despite demands 
from Brookside. 
III. The Jury's Verdict Should be Upheld Regarding the Peebles' 
Counterclaim of Unreasonableness Under the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act 
In their brief the Peebles argue that the jury verdict that Brookside's rejection 
of Ms. Southworth's application was reasonable under the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act was in error and should be overturned by this Court. In reviewing 
such a challenge, this Court reviews the sufficiency of all evidence "in the light most 
favorable to the verdict." Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1999) (citations 
omitted). "So long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's 
findings," the appellate court will not disturb them, i d The verdict will only be 
reversed if "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." 
k l In order to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of the 
evidence, the challenging party "must marshal all the evidence in support of the 
findings." Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 1993). In 
marshaling the evidence, the challenging party "must present, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial." Moon 
v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). If the challenging party fails to 
properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court must affirm the findings below. 
RgMat1328. 
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The Peebles in this matter have failed to marshal the evidence supporting the 
jury verdict. (Brief of Appellees at pages 39-46.) Instead, they merely reargue the 
same case made before the trial court presenting selected facts and excerpts of trial 
testimony in support of their position. The Peebles cite only two pages of the trial 
transcript regarding evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then do not present 
such testimony verbatim, as they do with testimony supporting their position, but 
summarize it in a way to give the impression such testimony supports their 
arguments. (Brief of Appellees at 43.) 
A cursory review of the trial transcript demonstrates evidence in support of the 
jury verdict that was not marshaled by the Peebles. In the testimony of Ms. 
Southworth, she acknowledged that her credit report from Western Reporting states 
that Western Reporting was unable to verify her employment though the 
employment was at a company she owned. (T. 306-07.) In so doing, Ms. 
Southworth testified as follows: 
Q. And if you look down at the employment section on page two of that, 
see the employment there? It says that you're employed at Utah 
Academy? 
A. Professional Dental Assistance, yes, I am. 
Q. It doesn't say that, does it? It just says employed Utah Academy. 
A. That's what the Western is, or Western Reporting put down, as far as 
the income. 
Q. You've answered my question. 
A. Sorry. 
Q. Let me ask you the next question. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. There's also a comment there that says unable to verify. Do you see 
that? Do you see that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Did you ever get a call from Western Reporting seeking to verify how 
you were employed or whether it was self employment? 
A. No, I did not, not that I received myself. One of my staff members may 
have. 
(T. 306-07.) 
Ms. Southworth also acknowledged that her credit report from Western 
Reporting indicate that Western Reporting was unable to verify her account at Utah 
First Credit. (T. 307-308.) In so doing, Ms. Southworth testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. Look up at the language above that where it says bank 
summary. 
A. Financial? 
Q. Un-huh. Bank — well, just above it says bank summary? 
A. Okay. 
Q. You see that whole box right there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It says bank, Utah First Credit, you see that language? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it says later, down, comment: Would not verify information over 
phone. Do you see that? 
A. Right. 
. 10 . 
Q. Did anyone ever tell you that the credit bureau was unable to verify 
information at Utah First Credit? 
A. I would not allow any of my banks, or personal to verify anything to 
anyone without okay from me. 
(T. 307-08.) 
In addition, though Ms. Southworth claims to have approached Mr. Prentice 
with her tax returns and financial information regarding her application to Brookside, 
Mr. Prentice testified that he did not see that she had tax returns or other financial 
information with her when Ms. Southworth came to the Brookside office. (T. 616.) 
The Peebles did not tender Ms. Southworth's tax returns into evidence to rebut 
Brookside's basis for denying her application and so the issues has not been 
preserved on appeal. Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1997). 
Because the Peebles have failed to properly marshal the evidence, the jury's 
findings should be affirmed. Furthermore, the evidence noted above of Ms. 
Southworth's credit report indicating that the credit agency was unable to verify her 
employment or bank account is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that 
Brookside's rejection of her application as a tenant to be reasonable. The Peebles 
did not tender Ms. Southworth's tax returns into evidence and have therefore not 
preserved on appeal the issues of whether her credit was sufficient. 
IV. and V. Brookside Should be Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
In their brief the Peebles first argue in section IV of their brief that Brookside 
is not entitled to recovery of attorney's fees in defending against the Peebles 
counterclaim under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act because Brookside's 
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eviction proceeded under the Unlawful Detainer Act. (Brief of Appellees at pages 
46-50.) The Peebles then argue the opposite in section V of their brief that even 
though Brookside proceeded to evict the Peebles under the Unlawful Detainer Act, 
dismissal of such claim by the trial court results in recovery of their attorney's fees 
under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. (Brief of Appellees at pages 51-52.) 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Brookside respectfully requests that this Court 
reinstate the summary judgment of the trial court, determine Brookside has 
prevailed on its cause of action against the Peebles for unlawful detainer, remand 
this matter to the trial court for calculation of appropriate treble damages under the 
applicable statute, and award Brookside Attorneys' fees and costs due under the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act due to Brookside prevailing against the Peebles 
regarding the Peebles' claims under the Act. 
DATED t h i s ^ d a y of June, 20 
DENNIS K>OOLE ~~^ 
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Attorneys for Appellants 
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ion, the directed verdict for Sam Peebles on 
unlawful detainer claim, and the denial of 
request for attorney fees and costs. Sam Peebles 
.s from the jury verdict and the trial court's denial 
request for attorney fees and costs.1 We affirm on 
1. Brookside argues that Harold Peebles, a named defendant whom 
the trial court dismissed from this action, should be reinstated 
as a defendant. However, Brookside has not complied with our 
(continued...) 
all issues, except that we reverse the trial court's denial of 
Peebles's request for attorney fees and costs. 
BACKGROUND 
K2 In 1983, Peebles bought a mobile home occupying Space 100 in 
Brookside Mobile Home Park (Park) located in West Jordan, Utah. 
He entered a space lease with a former owner of the Park, 
Brookside Associates (Associates). Peebles later sold the mobile 
home to a couple who entered into their own lease with 
Associates. When the couple defaulted on their purchase contract 
with Peebles, Peebles retook possession of the mobile home and 
signed a second lease. Peebles then rented the mobile home to a 
series of renters. He finally contracted to either rent or sell 
the mobile home to Richard Rowley, who entered into a lease 
agreement with Associates for Space 100. 
1(3 Associates sold the Park to a trust and entered into an 
agreement with the trust titled "Assignment of Leases and 
Deposits," dated December 9, 1994. In the agreement, Associates 
assigned to the trust 
its right, title and interest in and to those 
certain leases, rental agreements, security 
or other deposits from tenants, and rentals 
with respect to such leases and agreements 
appurtenant to the [Park] . . . (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as the "Leases"), 
which Leases, rents, and security deposits 
are more particularly described on Exhibit 
"B" attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by this reference. 
Exhibit B was the Park's rent roll, showing Rowley as the 
resident of Space 100, with no mention of Peebles. Less than one 
month later, the trust sold the Park to Brookside and assigned 
the very same set of leases to Brookside, again with no mention 
of Peebles. On April 1, 1995, Rowley entered into a new space 
lease agreement with Brookside. 
1. (•..continued) 
briefing rules requiring a proper legal argument "with citations 
to the authorities . . . relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9). 
We therefore decline to address this argument. See Smith v. 
Smith, 1999 UT App 370,1(8, 995 P. 2d 14 ("Briefs that are not in 
compliance with Rule 24 may be disregarded or stricken sua sponte 
by the court."). 
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f4 In the fall of 1995, Rowley abandoned the mobile home 
without paying some rent due Brookside. On November 29, 1995, 
Brookside sent a notice to Peebles, stating the following: 
Be advised that the above referenced mobile 
home has been abandoned. In accordance with 
Utah Code § 57-16-9, you, as lien holder of 
record and now deemed a tenant at will are 
primarily liable to the Brookside Mobile Home 
Park for all rent and service charges 
accruing after ten (10) days following your 
reciept [sic] of this notice if the mobile 
home is not moved. 
1)5 On December 11, 1995, Brookside sent Peebles a "Notice to 
Pay Rent or Quit," stating: 
Please take notice that the rent on the 
premises located at Brookside Mobile Home 
Park, No , which you now possess as a 
tenant, is past due. 
You must, within three days after 
service of this Notice upon you, pay the rent 
now due and owing on the premises, or, in the 
alternative, you must, within such period of 
three days, vacate the premises and deliver 
possession to your landlord, Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd., or its duly authorized agent 
In the event that you should cure the 
above default within the time period allowed,. 
but in the future at any time should default 
in the payment of rent when due, violate any 
of the Rules and Regulations of Brookside 
Mobile Home Park, or breach any provision of 
the Lease Agreement, such repeated default 
and/or violation will result in immediate 
termination of your lease without any further 
period to cure such default or violations and 
eviction proceedings will be initiated 
immediately. 
Peebles then began paying monthly rent, 
^6 On December 27, 1995, Brookside prepared a form listing 
several repairs that needed to be done to keep the mobile home 
"in compliance with current park standards." 
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1(7 On April 11, 1996, Brookside posted upon the mobile home a 
"Notice to Quit," addressed to Peebles at his Riverton, Utah 
address. The notice stated: 
[Y]ou must, within five (5) days after 
service of this Notice upon you, remove the 
mobile home purportedly owned by you from the 
premises . . . and deliver possession of said 
premises to its owner, Brookside Mobile Home 
Park, Ltd., or its duly authorized agent . . . . 
In the event of your failure to comply 
with the above notice to vacate the premises 
within the specified period, you will be 
unlawfully detaining the premises, and in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 78-
36-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953), you will be 
liable for treble damages for such unlawful 
detainer, and an action will be commenced 
against you to evict you from the premises 
and to take judgment against you for three 
times the damages assessed by the Court for 
unlawful detainer, together with costs of 
legal action. 
This notice is given and served in 
accordance with the provisions of Secticns 
78-36-3 and 78-36-6, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended). 
^Q Around that time, Brookside filed an unlawful detainer 
action against Peebles because Peebles allegedly had not complied 
with Park rules in maintaining his mobile home. Peebles defended 
the unlawful detainer action, asserting five days was 
insufficient notice. He contended the action should have been 
filed under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act (the Act), which 
requires fifteen days notice. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-6(2) (a) 
(1994) ("In the event of failure to abide by a mobile home park 
rule, the notice shall provide for a 15-day cure period . . . 
.") . 
1|9 On September 25, 1996, Peebles agreed to sell the mobile 
home to Jackie Southworth. However, when Brookside denied her 
application to become a tenant of the Park, the sales agreement 
fell through. Peebles then filed a counterclaim against 
Brookside, claiming, among other things, that Brookside had 
violated the Act by unreasonably withholding approval of 
Southworth!s tenancy application. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-
4(4) (Supp. 2000). 
UlO Brookside moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
undisputed facts showed that Peebles did not have a lease with 
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Brookside, and Peebles thus was not a "resident"2 of the Park 
under the Act. Therefore, Brookside contended that its claim 
fell under the unlawful detainer statute, not the Act, rendering 
sufficient the notice it had given Peebles and invalidating 
Peeblesfs counterclaims under the Act. Peebles responded that 
the Act applies to this case because he was a resident/lessee of 
the Park when Brookside brought its action. He maintained that 
the leases he had entered into with Associates were still in 
effect, having been assigned to Brookside. 
Ull The trial court ruled for Brookside, agreeing that this case 
had been properly brought as an unlawful detainer action and did 
not fall under the Act. It stated that the fact that Peebles 
knew that other buyers or renters of his mobile home had entered 
into lease agreements with Brookside and/or its predecessors 
constituted as a matter of law a surrender by Peebles of his 
earlier space lease. The trial court determined that it was 
immaterial that Peebles had presented evidence showing that it 
had been the Park's custom to keep leases for a single space with 
both the mobile home owner and the owner's renter. 
Hl2 Peebles then filed a motion asking the trial court to 
reconsider its decision. Peebles urged that an issue of material 
fact was in dispute regarding whether he knew of and/or consented 
to the leases Rowley entered into with Associates and Brookside, 
and he attached supplemental affidavits in which he asserted that 
he did not know about the Rowley leases when they were made. 
Consequently, he argued, a factual question remained as to 
whether he had surrendered his lease. 
Hl3 The trial court found Peebles's arguments persuasive, 
stating: 
There is no dispute about the legal 
proposition concerning surrender. However, 
defendant [Peebles] does dispute that there 
was a surrender alleging he had no knowledge 
that there were lease agreements with 
occupants of the mobile home with whom he 
dealt with as subtenants. Defendant further 
asserts facts that could be interpreted to 
demonstrate that he was dealt with by 
plaintiff in a manner reflective of his 
perceived position as tenant. Most notably, 
the notice to vacate refers to defendant as 
tenant. 
2. Ifl Resident1 means an individual who leases or rents space in 
a mobile home park." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-3(3) (1994). "Each 
agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall be written and 
signed by the parties." Id. § 57-16-4(2) (Supp. 2000). 
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The effect of these assertions is that 
there is a dispute of material fact and my 
previous conclusion to the contrary is 
erroneous. 
The matter was then set for trial. 
Hl4 After Brookside presented its evidence at trial, Peebles 
moved for a directed verdict. Peebles argued that, even if no 
written lease existed between Peebles and Brookside, Peebles was 
an "owner resident" of the Park and thus could be in unlawful 
detainer of the space only under the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
36-3(2) (1996) ("Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a 
mobile home is determined under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act."). The Act defines "resident" as "an 
individual who leases or rents space in a mobile home park." Id. 
§ 57-16-3(3) (1994). Peebles therefore contended that, given his 
alleged status as a resident of the Park, anything less than 
fifteen days was insufficient notice. 
Hl5 The trial court agreed with Peebles's argument and dismissed 
Brookside's unlawful detainer claim, stating the following: 
I find that the owner residence language of 
[78-36-3], where you have a circumstance in 
this case, the facts are undisputed and that 
is that Mr. Sam Peebles is the owner of the 
home and there is no one residing in the 
home, is entitled to the notice that should 
be given under Title 97 [sic], Chapter 16, 
that's the 15 days. Consequently, the notice 
which is Exhibit 42, is deficient in that 
regard. 
1|l6 Peebles went on to present evidence supporting his 
counterclaim. The jury then reached a verdict, finding the 
following: (1) Peebles had a written lease with the Park before 
January 4, 1995, when Brookside acquired the Park; (2) Peebles's 
lease was not surrendered; (3) Brookside did not assume Peebles's 
lease; and (4) Brookside did not unreasonably withhold approval 
of the residency of a prospective buyer of Peebles"s mobile home. 
Each party unsuccessfully moved for an award of attorney fees and 
costs under the Act. 
Hi7 Brookside appeals from the following trial court rulings: 
(1) the order reconsidering and reversing summary judgment for 
Brookside; (2) the grant during trial of a directed verdict for 
Peebles on Brookside's unlawful detainer claim; and (3) the 
denial of Brookside's request for attorney fees and costs. 
Peebles cross appeals, challenging the jury verdict rejecting 
Peebles's counterclaim and the trial court's denial of his 
request for attorney fees and costs. 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Brookside's Appeal 
A. Summary Judgment Reversal 
1|18 Brookside contends the trial court incorrectly reversed its 
earlier summary judgment ruling for Brookside. Specifically, 
Brookside argues that the trial court should not have taken into 
account Peebles's supplemental affidavits with his 
reconsideration motion because the affidavits allegedly 
contradict Peebles's prior deposition testimony available when 
the trial court originally ruled.3 
1|l9 However, we conclude that--regardless of the supplemental 
affidavits1 contents--the trial court was correct in determining 
that a disputed issue of material fact existed regarding whether 
the Peebles/Associates lease had been surrendered. Brookside 
contends that Peebles knew about and consented to the leases 
between his renters and the Park, and that this fact alone equals 
surrender as a matter of law. Meanwhile, Peebles has alleged 
that because he believed his Park lease co-existed with those of 
his renters he did not have the intent necessary to surrender his 
lease. 
i|20 Under the common law doctrine of surrender and acceptance, 
when a tenant surrenders the premises to a 
landlord before a lease term expires and the 
landlord accepts that surrender, the tenant 
is no longer in privity of estate with the 
landlord and therefore has no obligation to 
pay any rents accruing after the date of the 
acceptance. Phrased in contract law 
parlance, the lease is treated as having been 
rescinded or terminated by mutual agreement. 
3. Brookside also argues that, even if the supplemental 
affidavits were properly before the trial court, Brookside should 
have won summary judgment based on its bona fide purchaser 
theory. Although Brookside raised this argument in the original 
summary judgment motion, it did not mention the argument when it 
responded to Peebles's reconsideration motion--the resolution of 
which he appeals. At that crucial point, Brookside did not give 
the trial court the opportunity to consider an alternative basis 
for awarding summary judgment for Brookside. Accordingly, 
Brookside has not properly preserved the bona fide purchaser 
issue for appeal, and we decline to address it. See Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
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Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1989); 
see Willis v. Kronendonk, 58 Utah 592, 598, 200 P. 1025, 1028 
(1921). A surrender and acceptance stems from an agreement 
between the parties, whether express or implied. See Belancrer v. 
Rice, 2 Utah 2d 250, 252, 272 P.2d 173, 174 (1954). This case 
involves the latter (also known as "surrender by operation of 
law"), which "*results from acts which imply mutual consent 
independent of the expressed intent of the parties . . . ; it is 
by way of estoppel.'" Id. (citation omitted). Surrender and 
acceptance should not be inferred "'against the intent of the 
parties, as manifested by their acts,111 Id. (citation omitted). 
K21 The party who relies on the surrender of the lease has the 
burden of proving it. See Mariani Air Prods. Co. v. Gill's Tire 
Market, 29 Utah 2d 291, 293, 508 P.2d 808, 810 (1973). " [A] nd 
the proof must be clear where the surrender is to be inferred 
from circumstances inconsistent with the intention to perform. 
The question of whether the acts and circumstances constituted a 
surrender and acceptance is one for the fact finder." Id.; see 
also John C. Cutler Ass'n v. De Jay Stores, 3 Utah 2d 107, 112, 
279 P.2d 700/ 703 (1955) ("The question of surrender, being 
generally one of fact as to what was the intention of the 
parties, is to be determined from all of the attendant 
circumstances including the conduct and expressions of the 
parties."). 
1J22 Here, Brookside has tried to carry its burden of showing 
surrender and acceptance by alleging what it considers to be one 
determinative fact: that Peebles knew of and/or consented to the 
leases between his renters and Park owners. However, even if 
that fact is undisputed, Peebles introduced affidavit, 
deposition, and documentary evidence that showed that, when a 
mobile home owner rented a mobile home to another person, ^ the 
Park had a practice of keeping on file two space leases--one with 
the mobile home owner and one with the renter. This was 
allegedly "to protect [the Park's] back end." In fact, a former 
Park manager stated in his deposition that the owner's lease was 
kept in the Park's file so that "he's still obligated to the 
park" in case the renter stops paying space rent. Also, as the 
trial court noted, the December 11, 1995 "Notice to Pay Rent or 
Quit" directed to Peebles called Peebles a "tenant," Brookside 
the "landlord," and spoke of Peebles breaching a "Lease 
Agreement." 
1[23 The Cutler case is instructive regarding the effect of a 
second lease with a third party on the existence of the first 
lease. See id. at 701-03. In that case, a tenant leased a 
store, which proved unprofitable. See id. at 701. Before the 
lease period ended, the tenant returned the keys to the landlord, 
left the store, and stopped paying rent. See id. at 702. After 
the landlord unsuccessfully tried to relet the store, it sued the 
tenant for the unpaid rent. See id. The tenant raised the 
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doctrine of surrender and acceptance as a defense, arguing that 
the tenant had surrendered the lease and, by taking back the keys 
and trying to relet the store, the landlord had accepted. See 
id. at 702-03. 
f24 The supreme court stressed the fact-intensive nature of 
surrender--that it "is to be determined from all of attendant 
circumstances." Id. at 703 (emphasis added). The court embraced 
the view that reletting does not terminate the lease as a matter 
of law. See id. at 702. Further, the landlord's attempt to 
relet the store did not automatically equal acceptance of the 
tenant's purported surrender. See id. at 702-03. The court 
stated that the rule "that there is no arbitrary standard to be 
applied[] best lends itself in doing justice in such 
controversies." Id. at 703. 
f25 Likewise, here, Peebles's knowledge that the Park was 
"reletting" the space to his renters does not inevitably lead to 
the conclusion that he intended to surrender his lease. In its 
reconsideration of its earlier summary judgment ruling, the trial 
court recognized what is obvious to us here: there was a 
disputed issue of material fact regarding the intent of both 
parties in allegedly assenting to the existence of dual leases. 
The trial court therefore correctly concluded that this factual 
question could not properly be decided on summary judgment and 
granted Peebles's motion for reconsideration of the original 
summary judgment ruling for Brookside. 
B. Directed Verdict 
[^26 Brookside next attacks the trial court's directed verdict 
dismissing its unlawful detainer claim. The trial court 
determined that Peebles was an "owner resident" of the Park and 
as such could be sued for unlawful detainer only in accordance 
with the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(2) (1996) ("Unlawful 
detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined 
under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act."). 
Therefore, the trial court reasoned, because the Act required 
fifteen days notice and Brookside provided only five, notice was 
deficient, rendering Brookside's unlawful detainer claim invalid. 
1|27 Brookside contests the trial court's conclusion, arguing 
that--regardless of the "owner resident" language--the Act 
applies only to those with written leases and, because Peebles 
did not have a written lease with Brookside, the Act does not 
apply to Peebles. See id. § 57-16-4(2) (Supp. 2000) ("Each 
agreement tor the lease of mobile home space shall be written and 
signed by the parties."). Brookside thus contends it had no 
choice but to bring its unlawful detainer action under the 
forcible entry and detainer statute in chapter 36 of the Utah 
Code. See id. §§ 78-36-1 to -12.6 (1996 & Supp. 2000). 
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1(28 However, Brookside does not challenge the jury finding that 
Peebles had a written lease with the Park before Brookside bought 
the Park, nor does it challenge the finding that Peebles did not 
surrender the lease. 
H2 9 The jury also found that Brookside did not assume Peebles's 
lease. However, that finding is irrelevant here. The Act 
provides no way for a buyer of a mobile home park to deem 
terminated any lease it does not specifically assume in the 
purchase. The Act unequivocally states: "A mobile home park or 
its agents may not terminate a lease or rental agreement upon any 
ground other than as specified in this chapter." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-16-4(1) (Supp. 2000). The purchase of the mobile home park 
by a new owner who either does not assume an existing lease or 
does not know about an existing lease is not one of the grounds 
for terminating a lease. See id. § 57-16-5 (1994) .4 Mobile home 
space leases may be terminated only for cause.5 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-5 (1994) reads: 
An agreement for the lease of mobile 
home space in a mobile home park may be 
terminated during its term by mutual 
agreement or for any one or more of the 
following causes: 
(1) failure of a resident to comply with 
a mobile home park rule for a period of 15 
days after receipt of notice of noncompliance 
from the mobile home park; 
(2) repeated failure of a resident to 
abide by a mobile home park rule, if the 
original notice of noncompliance states that 
another violation of the same or a different 
rule might result in forfeiture without any 
further period of cure; 
(3) behavior by a resident which 
substantially endangers the security and 
health of the other residents or threatens 
the property in the park; 
(4) nonpayment of rent, fees, or service 
charges; 
(5) a change in the land use or 
condemnation of the mobile home park or any 
part of it. 
This section has been amended with some new language since 
1994, see Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-5 (Supp. 2000); however, this 
case arose under the version in the 1994 code volume. 
5. This analysis comports with the Act's purpose of guarding the 
interests of those owning mobile homes in mobile home parks: 
"The high cost of moving mobile homes, the requirements of mobile 
(continued...) 
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1|3 0 In sum, because Peebles had a lease, which he had not 
surrendered, and that lease was not terminated under the Act, the 
lease remained in existence at the time Brookside brought its 
unlawful detainer action. The action was thus authorized only 
under the Act, which required fifteen days notice. Brookside did 
not give fifteen days notice. Therefore, although the trial 
court used a different analysis, we affirm its dismissal of 
Brookside's claim. See Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. United States 
Fid. 8c Guar. Co. , 949 P.2d 337, 342 n.3 (Utah 1997) (" ' [W] e may 
affirm a trial court's decision on any proper ground(s), despite 
the trial court's having assigned another reason for its 
ruling.'" (Citation omitted.)). 
C Attorney Fees 
H31 Finally, Brookside decries the trial court's denial of its 
motion for attorney fees and costs under Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-8 
(1994), which reads, in pertinent part: 
If a resident elects to contest an 
eviction proceeding, all rents, fees, and 
service charges due and incurred during the 
pendency of the action shall be paid into 
court according to the current mobile home 
park payment schedule. . . . Upon final 
termination of the issues between the 
parties, the court shall order all amounts 
paid into court paid to the mobile home park. 
The prevailing party is also entitled to 
court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-8 (1994). Brookside asked for the 
attorney fees and costs it incurred in successfully defending 
Peebles's counterclaim brought under the Act. However, the trial 
5 . (...continued) 
home parks relating to their installation, and the cost of 
landscaping and lot preparation necessitate that the owners of 
mobile homes occupied within mobile home parks be provided with 
protection from actual or constructive eviction." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-16-2 (1994). Said another way, "[t]he cause requirement 
prevents a park owner from terminating residents' leases at whim 
and forcing them to undergo great expense uprooting their homes, 
along with their footings, skirting, decks, and landscaping, and 
attempting to secure another lease elsewhere." Coleman v. 
Thomas, 2000 UT 53,1(19, 4 P.3d 783; cf. Yee v. City of Escondido, 
503 U.S. 519, 523, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992) ("The term 
'mobile home' is somewhat misleading. Mobile homes are largely 
immobile as a practical matter, because the cost of moving one is 
often a significant fraction of the value of the mobile home 
itself."). 
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court read section 57-16-8 as disallowing the requested attorney 
fees and costs. 
U32 "The general rule in Utah is that, subject to certain 
exceptions, a party is entitled to attorney fees only if 
authorized by statute or by contract." Meadowbrook, LLC v. 
Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1998) . Brookside does assert the 
requisite statutory basis for the award. Even so, we conclude 
that the trial court correctly interpreted the section at issue. 
1(33 "When we interpret a statute, we must look first to the 
statute's plain language to determine the legislative intent and 
we look no further if the language is unambiguous on its face." 
Dairy Prod. Serv. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81,1121, 405 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 23. The section at issue regards situations in which 
"a resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding." Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-16-8 (1994) . The "prevailing party" in the challenge 
of an eviction proceeding is entitled to attorney fees and costs. 
Id. 
1134 In this case, the portion of the case in which Brookside 
prevailed and for which it requests fees was the defense of 
Peebles's counterclaim. However, although Peebles's counterclaim 
was under the Act, it was not to "contest an eviction 
proceeding," as required by section 57-16-8 for the entitlement 
to attorney fees and costs. Peebles's counterclaim had nothing 
to do with eviction proceedings, but stood on its own set of 
facts regarding the allegedly unreasonable withholding of 
approval of a prospective buyer for Peebles's mobile home. See 
id. § 57-16-4(4) (Supp. 2000). 
U35 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of 
Brookside's request for attorney fees and costs. 
II. Peebles's Cross Appeal 
A. Unreasonable Withholding of Approval Claim 
%36 Peebles first argues that insufficient evidence existed to 
support the jury's verdict that Brookside did not unreasonably 
withhold approval of Southworth's residency in the Park. Because 
of Brookside's failure to approve Southworth, Peebles was not 
able to sell the mobile home to her. He asserts damages because 
he then had to continue making the space rent payment and 
eventually pay to move the mobile home elsewhere. 
1(37 "In reviewing a jury verdict, 'we view the evidence in the 
light most supportive of the verdict, and assume that the jury 
believed those aspects of the evidence which sustain its findings 
and judgment.1" Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 
461, 467 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). Further, "we will upset 
a jury verdict only upon a showing that the evidence so clearly 
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preponderates in favor of the [cross] appellant that reasonable 
people would not differ on the outcome of the case." Id. 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
^38 Here, the jury heard evidence that Brookside was unable to 
verify Southworth's employment and bank account. It also heard 
evidence that the mobile home remained in disrepair at that time. 
Although Southworth testified with explanation as to why she 
should not have been penalized for these circumstances, the jury 
was free to disbelieve her and to believe Brookside's witnesses 
to the contrary. We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence 
supported the jury's factual determination on the reasonableness 
of Brookside's behavior and affirm the jury's verdict. 
B. Attorney Fees 
U3 9 Peebles also asks for attorney fees and costs under section 
57-16-8 of the Act, and asserts his entitlement to them for 
defending "an eviction proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-8 
(1994). Although Brookside brought its unlawful detainer claim 
under title 78, chapter 36 of the Code, Peebles did indeed 
successfully defend "an eviction proceeding." We have already 
determined that Peebles was a lessee of the Park, which made him 
a "resident." Id. § 57-16-3(3) ("'Resident' means an individual 
who leases or rents space in a mobile home park."). 
f40 Thus, as the "prevailing party" on the eviction proceeding, 
Peebles is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs 
associated only with his defense of the eviction proceeding 
before the trial court and on appeal. See, e.g., Living 
Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
("'A party who was awarded attorney fees and costs at trial is 
also entitled to attorney fees and costs if that party prevails 
on appeal.'" (citation omitted)). We therefore remand to the 
trial court for the sole purpose of determining the amount of 
attorney fees and costs to be awarded Peebles. 
CONCLUSION 
f41 We conclude that the trial court was correct in reversing 
its original summary judgment ruling for Brookside and setting 
the case for trial. We further conclude that the trial court was 
correct in directing a verdict for Peebles on Brookside's 
unlawful detainer claim and in denying Brookside its request for 
attorney fees and costs. 
1142 We also affirm the jury's verdict for Brookside on Peebles's 
counterclaim. Finally, we reverse the trial court's denial of 
Peebles's request for attorney fees and costs and remand for the 
determination of Peebles's reasonable attorney fees and costs in 
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defending Brookside's unlawful detainer claim both in the trial 
court and on appeal.6 
Normal H. Jackson, ^r 
Associate Presiding Judge 
H43 WE CONCUR: 
^ d i t h J s L ^ B i l l i n g s , Judge * 
Z^OL^ 
6. We have thoroughly considered all other issues raised by the 
parties and determine them to be without merit; we therefore 
decline to address them further. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 
886, 888 (Utah 1989); cf. Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75,1(8, 984 P.2d 
987 (holding, to allow supreme court certiorari review, this 
court must "at the very least identif[y] the basis for refusing 
to treat an issue"). 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the Court of Appeals ruled in conflict with a decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court in its determination that Plaintiff/Appellant Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd. ("Brookside") did not preserve its arguments for appeal regarding 
the bona fide purchaser rule. 
II. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of 
surrender when it considered evidence in its analysis of the Defendants' surrender 
of the subject premises that the previous owner of the subject mobile home park 
(the "Park"), rather than Brookside, had entered into leases with both the actual 
tenant occupying the mobile home and the mobile home owner when there was no 
evidence proffered that Brookside engaged in the same practice, incorrectly holding 
that there was a dispute of material fact. 
III. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the notice requirements 
of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act (the "Act") rather than the notice 
requirements of the Utah unlawful detainer statute regarding Brookside's eviction 
action against the Defendants/Appellees Sam Peebles and Harold Peebles 
(together the "Peebles") when the Peebles did not produce a written lease as 
required by the Act and the jury held that any written lease with the prior owner of 
the Park was not binding upon Brookside. 
IV. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying Brookside's attorney's 
fees under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act for successfully defending against 
the Peebles' counterclaims based on said act. 
E:\JLA\BMHP\Paebles\petition ctrt.wpd -1 -
V. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting the Peebles' attorneys' 
fees under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
VI. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the arguments of 
Brookside that Defendant/Appellee Harold Peebles should be reinstated as a 
defendant for failure to comply with Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Opinion filed for official publication on November 9,2000 at Brookside Mobile 
Home Park. Ltd. v. Sam Peebles et al.. 2000 Utah Ct. App. 314. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This petition is taken from the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the trial court's 
decision to reverse its grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd. ("Brookside"), dismissal of Brookside's claim of unlawful detainer 
at the conclusion of Brookside's case during trial, and denial of Brookside's Motion 
for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs. This petition is also taken from 
the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's denial of Defendants Samuel B. 
Peebles and Harold Boyd Peebles' attorney fees and costs in defending against 
Brookside's unlawful detainer action. This Court has jurisdiction over this Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Section 78-2a-4 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules which pertain 
to this appeal are fully set forth in the addenda hereto where not fully set forth in the 
E:ULA\BMHP\Pe«bl«»\p«tition cert.wpd " f c " 
body of this petition. The Mobile Home Park Residency Act, located at Utah Code 
Annotated Sections 57-16-1 through 57-16-15.1 , and Unlawful Detainer by Tenant 
for Term Less Than Life, located at Utah Code Annotated Section 78-36-3, are fully 
set forth in the addenda hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about May 5,1996, Brookside filed an Amended Complaint against the 
Peebles alleging unlawful detainer by the Peebles of space #100 of Brookside's 
mobile home park. (R. 17-33) The Peebles were not occupants residing in the 
Park but rather owners of a mobile home which had been occupied by others and 
was vacant when Brookside's action was commenced. (R. 19) The mobile home 
was in poor condition and required numerous repairs to be brought into compliance 
with park rules and the municipal code. (R. 26) On or about January 2,1997, the 
Peebles filed a Counterclaim against Brookside alleging that, among other claims, 
Brookside had violated the Mobile Home Park Residency Act by unreasonably 
withholding approval of prospective purchasers of the Peebles' mobile home. (R. 
149-154) On or about August 8, 1997, Brookside filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment arguing that because the Peebles did not have a lease with Brookside, 
that Peebles were therefore not residents under the Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act, and that the Peebles were in unlawful detainer of space #100. (R. 529-530) 
On or about October 23,1997, the Court granted Brookside's Motion, holding that 
Brookside's notice was sufficient under Utah law for unlawful detainer, that no 
written lease was offered in evidence, that the Peebles had surrendered any lease 
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they had with Brookside by the subsequent execution of leases between Brookside 
and the series of buyers of the Peebles' mobile home, and that the Peebles' 
counterclaims failed as they were premised upon a lease with Brookside. (R. 616-
620) At no time did the Peebles produce a copy of any written lease with either 
Brookside or the previous owner of the Park. 
On October 28,1997, the Peebles filed a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's 
summary judgment in favor Brookside. (R. 623-624) On November 17,1997, the 
Peebles filed a Motion for Reconsideration requesting that the trial court reconsider 
the summary judgment in favor of Brookside. (R. 687-688) The Peebles filed two 
Affidavits of Sam Peebles dated November 17, 1997 and November 18, 1997 
simultaneously with their Motion for Reconsideration that contradicted Sam 
Peeble's previous deposition testimony. (R. 701-707) On or about February 20, 
1998, with an Order dated March 18, 1998, the trial court overturned its prior 
decision holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact raised by the new 
affidavits of the Peebles as to whether the Peebles knew there were leases 
between Brookside and purchasers of the Peebles' mobile home resulting in a 
surrender of the Peebles' lease. (R. 744-747) The District Court refused to strike 
the new affidavits when considering the Motion to Reconsider. (R. 744) 
Commencing October 1,1998, the matter was tried before a jury. The trial 
court dismissed Brookside's claim of unlawful detainer at the conclusion of 
Brookside's case, holding that Brookside was required to give the Peebles a 15 day 
notice to quit under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act as opposed to a 5 day 
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notice to quit for unlawful detainer under Utah law. (R. 1292-1294) The jury later 
found against the Peebles' on their counterclaims against Brookside. (R. 1292-
1294) In so doing, the jury determined that the Peebles had no lease with 
Brookside and the Peebles were therefore not entitled to relief under the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act against Brookside. (R. 1292-1294) On motions of both 
Brookside and the Peebles, the Court denied both parties' attorneys' fees and 
costs. (R. 1285-1287) 
Brookside timely appealed to the Court of Appeals the trial court's February 
1998 overturn of its previous Decision granting Brookside summary judgment dated 
October 23,1997 (R. 744-747), the trial court's dismissal of Brookside's claims at 
trial for unlawful detainer (R. 1292-1294), and the trial court's denial of Brookside's 
Motion for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs under the Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act when Brookside prevailed against the Peebles' claims under 
the Act (R. 1285-1287). The Peebles cross appealed the jury's verdict that 
Brookside did not unreasonably withhold approval of potential buyers of the 
Peebles' mobile home in violation of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act and the 
trial court's denial of the Peebles attorney fees and costs. (R. 1287-1293.) 
On November 9, 2000, in its Opinion for official publication, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's reversal of its original summary judgment for 
Brookside, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Brookside's claims at trial for 
unlawful detainer, affirmed the trial court's denial of Brookside's request for attorney 
fees and costs, affirmed the jury's verdict for Brookside regarding Peebles' 
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counterclaims, and reversed the trial court's denial of Peebles' request for attorney 
fees and costs in defending against Brookside's unlawful detainer claim, remanding 
for determination of the same. Brookside Mobile Home Park. Ltd. v. Sam Peebles 
etal.. 2000 Utah Ct. App. 314. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court of Appeals Ruled in Conflict With the Utah 
Supreme Court in its Determination That Brookside Failed to 
Preserve its Arguments Regarding the Bona Fide Purchaser Rule. 
The Court of Appeals ruled in conflict with a decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court in its determination that Brookside failed to preserve for appeal its arguments 
regarding the "Bona Fide Purchaser Rule." The Court of Appeals ruled that 
because Brookside failed to raise the argument in its Memorandum in Opposition 
to the Peebles' Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's grant of Summary 
Judgment for Brookside, Brookside had failed to preserve the issue for appeal. 
Brookside atfl18, Footnote 3. However, Brookside argued the Bona Fide Purchase 
Rule in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment that the Peebles asked the trial 
court to reconsider (R. 594-96), in its Reply Memorandum in support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R. 594-96), in oral argument regarding the Peebles' Motion 
for Reconsideration, and at trial (T. 9-12). 
This Court has stated that the general rule regarding preservation of issues 
for appeal is "that failure to raise an argument before the trial court precludes a 
party from raising that argument on appeal." Sittnerv. SchrieveretaL 2000 UT 45, 
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1J16, 2 P3d 442, 445 (citations omitted). In Sittner. this Court held that the 
appellant's arguments that were fully briefed in summary judgment memoranda 
were preserved for appeal. JoL. at 17. 
The Court of Appeals ruling in this matter is not consistent with this Court's 
ruling in Sittner. In a footnote, the Court of Appeals stated that it declined to 
address the bona fide purchaser rule because "[ajlthough Brookside raised this 
argument in the original summary judgment motion, it did not mention the argument 
when it responded to Peebles' reconsideration motion." Brookside at ^ f 18, Footnote 
3. The Court of Appeals' ignores the fact that Peebles' Motion to Reconsider is just 
that, a motion to reconsider Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment that the trial 
court had already granted. By its very nature, a Motion to Reconsider includes a 
review of all the pleadings, affidavits, and arguments made in the initial motion 
which the moving party is asking the trial court to reconsider. Furthermore, 
Brookside again raised the bona fide purchaser rule in its Reply Memorandum in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 594-96), oral argument regarding 
Peebles Motion for Reconsideration, and at trial (T. 9-12). The trial court also 
specifically granted the Peebles Motion for Reconsideration and denied Brookside's 
Motion for Summary Judgment in its order regarding the Motion for 
Reconsideration. (R. 749 and 752.) The Court of Appeals' decision is not 
consistent with Sittner where this Court held that arguments briefed in summary 
judgment memoranda were preserved for appeal. Supra. 
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II. The Court of Appeals Erred in its Analysis of the 
Doctrine of Surrender When it Considered Evidence That the 
Previous Owner, Rather Than Brookside, Entered Into Leases 
with Both the Actual Tenant Occupant and the Mobile Home 
Owner, Incorrectly Concluding That There was a Dispute of 
Material Fact. 
The Court of Appeals erred when, in applying the Doctrine of Surrender 
during the Summary Judgment phase, it considered evidence that the previous 
owner of the Park entered into leases both with the actual tenant and the mobile 
home owner when there was no evidence proffered that Brookside engaged in such 
activities. The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that there was a dispute of 
material fact and that surrender could not be determined during the summary 
judgment phase in this matter. 
In its analysis of the doctrine of surrender in the trial court's reversal of 
summary judgment for Brookside, the Court of Appeals directed its discussion of 
the application of the surrender doctrine to the practice of the previous park owner 
to enter into leases with both the actual tenant of the mobile home and the mobile 
home owner. Brookside at fflJ22 and 25. However, the affidavit produced by the 
Peebles refers to the conduct of the previous park owner, not Brookside. (R. 702) 
There was no proffer of evidence to the trial court that Brookside ever entered into 
two leases regarding a single space in the park. The only lease Brookside had was 
one entered into directly with the then mobile home tenant entered into in May of 
1994. (R. 497-99) The Court of Appeals has relied on there being a dispute of 
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facts regarding Brookside entering into multiple leases for a single space when no 
such factual dispute existed.1 
Though this Court has held that "there is no arbitrary standard to be invariably 
applied" in determining "whether a reletting will terminate the obligations of a lease," 
the Court of Appeals has created an issue of fact at the summary judgment stage 
of this action where none existed. John C. Cutler Ass'n v. De Jay Stores. 3 Utah 2d 
107, 111, 279 P.2d 700, 702-03 (1955). 
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the doctrine of surrender cannot be 
determined as a matter of law in a motion for summary judgment in this case. 
Though the Court of Appeals states that the "Peebles's knowledge that the park 
was 'reletting' the space to his renters does not inevitably lead to the conclusion 
that he intended to surrender his lease," it does when Sam Peebles conceded such 
knowledge and there is no other dispute of material fact as argued above. 
Brookside at fl25. As this Court has noted "a surrender will not be implied against 
the intent of the parties as manifested by their acts." Belanger v. Rice. 2 Utah 2d 
250,252,272 P.2d 173,174 (1954) (citing 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant § 905). 
There was no dispute of material fact regarding the issue of surrender and the 
Court of Appeals failure to reinstate the original grant of summary judgment in this 
matter should be overturned. As noted in 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 
252 (1995) regarding the doctrine of surrender and subsequent third-party leases: 
'The Court of Appeals also has ignored evidence from the previous park owner who testified that 
no such procedure ever existed at the Park. (T. 83-84) 
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There is a presumption that acceptance by the tenant of a new lease 
of the premises during the term of an old lease operates as a 
surrender of the old lease by the act of the parties; that is a surrender 
of a lease is implied by law when another estate is created by the 
reversioner or remainderman, with the assent of the tenant, that is 
incompatible with the existing term. Thus, as a general rule, when a 
new lease of the premises is taken by the lessee from the lessor for 
the whole or a part of the term embraced in the former one, there is 
said to be a surrender in law because the giving of a new lease 
necessarily implies a surrender of the old one. It is not necessary that 
the second lease be given to the first lessee: if it is given to a third 
person with the consent of the first lessee, accompanied with the 
possession, it is equally operative as a surrender, (emphasis added) 
III. The Court of Appeals Erred in Holding That a Written 
Lease Between a Landlord and an Owner Resident Need not be 
in Evidence to Require That an Eviction Proceed Pursuant to the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that a written lease between Brookside 
and the Peebles is not necessary for Brookside's unlawful detainer action to be 
governed by the Mobile Home Park Residency Act (the "Act"). This issue is raised 
in the context of Brookside's appeal of the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the 
Peebles that Brookside had incorrectly complied with the five-day notice of Utah's 
unlawful detainer statute rather than the fifteen-day notice required by the Act. 
Though the Court of Appeals acknowledges that Section 57-16-4(2) of the 
Act requires that "[e]ach agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall be 
written and signed by the parties," (emphasis added) it deems such an issue 
irrelevant. Brookside at WJ27-29. The jury findings in this matter are somewhat 
inconsistent with each other in that the jury found that the Peebles entered into a 
written lease with the previous owner of the Park (although no such document was 
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ever produced), the Peebles did not surrender such lease, but Brookside did not 
assume the Peebles' lease with the previous owner. (T. 716) The Court of Appeals 
states that the jury finding that Brookside did not assume the lease "irrelevant" and 
applies the notice requirement of the Act even though the Peebles never entered 
into a written lease with Brookside as required by the Act, the jury found that 
Brookside never assumed the lease Peebles entered into with the previous owner 
of the Park (T. 716), Peebles never introduced into evidence a written lease with 
any owner of the Park, and the Peebles had in fact refused to enter into a new 
lease with Brookside (T. 184). Brookside at ^ 29. 
This Court has previously held that in order for a party to have the benefits 
of a statutory scheme, that party must substantially comply with the terms of the 
statute creating the statutory benefit. See, e.g. First Security Mortgage Co. v. 
Hansen et al.. 631 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981) ("[Sjince a mechanic's lien is 
statutory and not contractual, a lien cannot be acquired unless the claimant 
complies with the statutory provisions . . . Where the statute fails, courts cannot 
create rights, and should not do so by unnatural and forced construction.") (citing 
Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin. 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713, 716 (1906)). Furthermore, 
portions of the Act do not make sense unless there is a written lease. For example, 
the Act contains numerous provisions regarding terms required in written leases 
and terms that are deemed void and unenforceable in a written lease. Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-16-4 (2)-(7) (1997). The Court of Appeals has allowed the Peebles to 
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defend themselves pursuant to the terms of the Act even though the Peebles have 
failed to comply with the terms of the Act that would allow them such a defense. 
The Court of Appeals has declined to apply the bona fide purchaser rule to 
Brookside, deeming such an argument irrelevant in light of the Act. Brookside at 
fl29. The Court of Appeals' also declined to address the bona fide purchaser rule 
in the context of reconsideration of Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment 
because Brookside failed to preserve the issue for appeal — a ruling that Brookside 
argues above conflicts with this Court's ruling in Sittner. This Court should clarify 
how the bona fide purchaser rule interacts with the Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act, if it applies when no written lease exists, rather than allow the Court of Appeals 
to sidestep the issue and deny the applicability of the bona fide purchaser rule in 
the context of mobile home parks without a straight-forward analysis of the issues 
involved. 
To aid this Court in understanding the arguments associated with the bona 
fide purchaser rule, following is a brief overview of Utah law on the rule and its 
application in this matter. "A bona fide purchaser is one who takes without actual 
or constructive notice of facts sufficient to put him on notice of the complainant's 
equity." Grahn v. Gregory. 800 P.2d 320, 328 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Blodgett 
v. Marser. 590 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978). "The essential time to measure 
knowledge is at the time of the actual sale." Grahn at 328. At the time of 
Brookside's purchase of the Park, Richard Rowley was the occupant of the subject 
mobile home. Richard Rowley had signed a lease with Brookside's predecessor 
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as the resident of the space. (T. 82). Richard Rowley was listed as the resident of 
the subject mobile home on the Rent Roll attached to the Assignment of Leases 
and Deposits. (T. 36, 60-62). Because Brookside was a bona fide purchaser who 
took the Park without actual or constructive notice of the Peebles' claims as 
residents, Brookside is not bound by any alleged contract entered into between the 
Peebles and a prior owner of the Park. Jd The lack of a written lease between 
Brookside and the Peebles required that Brookside proceed under Utah unlawful 
detainer statute in evicting the Peebles rather than the Act. 
IV. The Court of Appeals Erred in Denying Brookside's 
Attorney's Fees under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act for 
Successfully Defending Against the Peebles' Counterclaims. 
The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the award of attorney fees and 
costs under Section 57-16-8 of the Act and denying Brookside its attorney fees and 
costs in defending against the Peebles' counterclaims brought under the Act. 
Brookside is entitled to attorneys' fees in this action because the Peebles 
alleged in their Counterclaim, causes of action for violation of section 57-16-4(4) of 
the Act. Because Brookside successfully defended against the Peebles's 
counterclaim founded on the Act, Brookside is entitled to its attorney's fees incurred 
in this action pursuant to Section 57-16-8 of the Act. 
If a resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding, all rents, 
fees, and service charges due and incurred during the pendency of the 
action shall be paid into the court according to the current mobile 
home park payment schedule. Failure of the resident to pay such 
amounts may, in the discretion of the court, constitute grounds for 
granting summary judgment in favor of the mobile home park. Upon 
final termination of the issues between the parties, the court shall order 
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ail amounts paid into court paid to the mobile home park. The 
prevailing party is also entitled to court costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-8 (1994) (emphasis added). 
Brookside is entitled to its court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
this action because, the Peebles asserted at trial that Brookside breached its 
contract with the Peebles by failing to reasonably approve a prospective purchaser 
of the Peebles' mobile home. (R. 149-154) 
The Peebles' Counterclaim was raised pursuant to the Act. Brookside's 
Complaint constituted an eviction proceeding. The Peebles' Counterclaim 
constituted a compulsory counterclaim. As a compulsory counterclaim, the 
Peebles' Counterclaim was part of the eviction proceeding. Moreover, the 
language of Section 57-16-8 clearly accounts for the presence of more than one 
claim in an eviction proceeding. The phrase, "[u]pon final termination of the issues 
between the parties." assumes that more than one claim can arise in the context 
of an eviction proceeding, as occurred in this instance. In this case, there was a 
"termination of the issues between the parties." In that termination, Brookside 
prevailed on the claims raised by the Peebles' Counterclaim. The Peebles' claims 
arose in the context of an eviction proceeding and therefore mandate recovery of 
attorney's fees and court costs by Brookside. 
V. The Court of Appeals Erred in Granting the Peebles' 
Attorneys' Fees Under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act 
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The Court of Appeals erred in granting the Peebles' attorney fees because 
it improperly ruled that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act governed Brookside's 
eviction proceeding instead of unlawful detainer. For the reasons set forth above, 
Brookside was a bona fide purchaser without notice of the Peebles' lease with the 
previous owner, there was no written lease between Brookside and the Peebles, 
and Brookside's eviction of the Peebles was governed by unlawful detainer. The 
Peebles are therefore not entitled to attorney fees and costs. 
Furthermore, even if this Court were to determine that the Court of Appeals 
is correct regarding Brookside's eviction action being governed by the Act, both 
Brookside and Peebles failed to prevail on their actions arising under the Act. 
Neither party should then recover attorney fees as provided by the Act. 
VI. The Court of Appeals Erred in Disregarding 
Brookside's Arguments That Harold Peebles Should Be 
Reinstated as a Defendant. 
The Court of Appeals erred in its decision to disregard Brookside's 
arguments that Harold Peebles should be reinstated as a defendant for failure to 
comply with Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Brookside at 
1J1, Footnote 1. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
argument of an appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on." In interpreting this rule, this court has 
held that "failure to cite pertinent authority may not always render an issue 
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inadequately briefed." State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). An 
appellant, however, may not "dump the burden of argument and research" on this 
Court. Jd (citations omitted). An appellant has violated this rule "when the overall 
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument 
to the reviewing court." id. 
In its initial brief and reply brief, Brookside fully briefed and cited authority in 
its arguments that Harold Peebles is liable to Brookside for unlawful detainer as a 
lienholder of the mobile home in question. (Appellant's Brief at 19-22 attached as 
Addendum H; Appellant's Reply Brief at 16 attached as Addendum I) The trial court 
provided no legal basis for its dismissal of Harold Peebles as a defendant stating 
upon the Peebles' motion for a directed verdict: 
Mr. Harold Peebles was some sort of guarantor in this matter... None 
of the witnesses, as I recall, identified him as having been involved in 
the lease or the subsequent sale, or contact in terms of dealing with 
the mobile home park in some way, or — in other words, I haven't 
heard anything about Harold Peebles . . . [a]nd so I dismiss the two 
causes of action that pertain to Mr. Harold Boyd Peebles. (T. 260-61) 
Furthermore, the Judgment gave no mention of the dismissal of Harold 
Peebles or the legal basis for the dismissal in the Judgment. (R. 1293) Due to the 
lack of legal reasoning given by the trial court for its dismissal of Harold Peebles, 
Brookside was not able to cite authority countering such reasoning. Brookside also 
raised additional issues in its initial brief that Harold Peebles never raised the 
affirmative defense of "nominal defendant" in his answer and instead brought 
numerous counterclaims against Brookside. (R. 149-154) In fact Harold Peebles 
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first raised the defense of "nominal defendant" after the trial court had granted 
Brookside summary judgment during the Peebles' Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 
699) Given the circumstances, Brookside has met its burden under Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in arguing that Harold Peebles is liable to 
Brookside and the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding Brookside's arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
overturn the Court of Appeals and reinstate the summary judgment of the trial court, 
determine Brookside has prevailed on its cause of action against the Peebles for 
unlawful detainer, remand this matter to the trial court for calculation of appropriate 
treble damages under the applicable statute, and award Brookside Attorneys' fees 
and costs due under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act due to Brookside 
prevailing against the Peebles regarding the Peebles' claims under the act. 
DATED this _^>day of December, 20i 
Z~^&7?**~ r 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
POOLE, SULLIVAN & ADAMS, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ARGUMENT 
The arguments in this Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
of Appelant are limited to the new matters raised by Defendants/Appellees Samuel 
B. Peebles ("Sam Peebles") and Harold Peebles (together the "Peebles") in their 
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Appellant Brookside Mobile 
Home Park ("Brookside"). 
I. Rule 46 Does not Limit the Utah Supreme Court's 
Ability to Grant Certiorari to Only the Factors Listed in Rule 46. 
The Peebles argue in their Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of Certiorari 
of Appellant that the Utah Supreme Court can "only grant certiorari if justified under 
the factors set forth in Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure" and that 
"[t]he Utah Supreme Court is not a court of correction for the Court of Appeals." 
(Brief in Opposition at page 1.) Such arguments are not consistent with the plain 
language and spirit of Rule 46. 
Rule 46(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states in part-
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. 
The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will 
be considered, (emphasis added) 
The Rule goes on to list four scenarios that would qualify for grant of a writ of 
certiorari including subsection 46(a)(3) which states "[w]hen a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by 
a lower court as to call of the Supreme Court's power of supervision." Utah Rules 
. 1 . 
of Appellate Procedure Rule 46(a)(3). Contrary to the arguments of the Peebles, 
this section does allow the Utah Supreme Court to act as a "court of corrections" of 
the Court of Appeals when the Court of Appeals has departed from the usual course 
of judicial proceedings. 
Furthermore, Brookside has not only shown that the Court of Appeals made 
several errors in applying relevant Utah law in this matter, it has shown that the 
Court of Appeals decision is inconsistent with the a prior ruling of the Utah Supreme 
Court which is the exact scenario set forth in subsection (a)(2) of Rule 46 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Granting a Writ of Certiorari is a discretionary 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court and Brookside has presented the special and 
important reasons for granting it in this matter in its Petition of Writ of Certiorari. 
II. The Court of Appeals Ruling in This Matter Conflicts 
With the Utah Supreme Court's Decision in Sittner. 
The Peebles argue that the Court of Appeals decisions is consistent with 
Sittner v. Schriever et al„ 2000 UT 45, 2 P3d 442, because the Court of Appeals 
limited the preservation of issues for appeal to those filed regarding the Peebles' 
Motion to Reconsider rather than the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment that 
was being reconsidered. (Brief in Opposition at page 5.) Following the logic of the 
Peebles' arguments that only the Motion to Reconsider was before the trial court 
when it made its decision, the parties arguing a Motion to Reconsider would have 
to resubmit all affidavits and other pleadings presented in the original Motion for 
Summary Judgment in order for such issues to be properly before the trial court 
when a Motion for Reconsideration is before a trial court. Requiring a resubmittal 
-9 -
E-Ul/UBMHPVMOtotVaotv OMiUon wnd 
of such items so they are before the court during a Motion for Reconsideration of a 
Motion for Summary Judgment would be as "absurd" as requiring a party to file a 
post-judgment motion objecting to the granting of summary judgment in order to 
preserve issues for appeal as noted in Sittner. ]g\ at fl 17. 
III. Brookside was a Bona Fide Purchaser. 
In their brief, the Peebles argue that due to their mobile home being located 
on space #100 at the time of Brookside's purchase of the park, Brookside had 
constructive notice of Sam Peebles interest in space #100. (Brief in Opposition at 
page 10.) However, on the rent roll attached to the Purchase Agreement, Richard 
Rowley was noted as the tenant of space #100. (R. 298.) Given that a lease with 
Rowley did exist, Brookside did not have constructive notice that the mobile home 
was owned by the Peebles. (R. 302.) The Peebles also cite Latses v. Nick Floor. 
Inc ,^ 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (Utah 1940) for the proposition that a grantee's 
position is no stronger than the grantor's. In Latses. the grantee did not meet its 
burden to investigate the tenants of the premises and the terms of such contractual 
relations. JcL at 622. In this matter, Brookside has met its duty to inquire, by 
obtaining a rent roll which lists Rowley as the lessee of space #100, reviewing the 
terms of the actual lease the park had with Rowley, and confirming that Rowley 
occupied space #100. (R. at 409,414-15.) 
IV. The Court of Appeals' Application of the Utah Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act is Overly Broad. 
The Peebles argue in their brief that the Court of Appeals did not error in 
interpreting the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Actio mean that the bona fide 
purchaser rule and the fact there was no written lease between Brookside and the 
Peebles as irrelevant. (Brief in Opposition at pages 7-10.) However, if the Court of 
Appeals decision is allowed to stand in this matter regarding Utah mobile home park 
evictions, it will stand for the proposition that a mobile home park purchaser must 
treat all people who ever had any type of lease with any previous owner of the 
subject park as if they siili have a lease with the park. Brookside Mobile Home 
Park. Ltd. v. Sam Peebles et al.. 2000 Utah Ct. App. 314,fl29, 14 P3d 105. The 
mobile home park owner must then also abide by the terms of such a written lease 
though, as in this matter, a copy of such lease no longer exists. Jg\ at 1J30. The 
bona fide purchaser rule exists to eliminate such an unreasonable and impractical 
burden on a purchaser of real property. Grahn v. Gregory. 800 P.2d 320, 328 (Utah 
App. 1990) (quoting Blodgett v. Marser. 590 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978). To allow 
the Court of Appeals' ruling to stand will have a chilling effect on sales of mobile 
home parks because the Court of Appeals has ruled that the bona fide purchaser 
rule is "irrelevant" regarding mobile home parks and neither a lease with the owner 
of the park nor a written lease is required to claim the benefits of a tenant under the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
overturn the Court of Appeals and reinstate the summary judgment of the trial court, 
determine Brookside has prevailed on its cause of action against the Peebles for 
unlawful detainer, remand this matter to the trial court for calculation of appropriate 
treble damages under the applicable statute, and award Brookside attorneys' fees 
and costs due under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act due to Brookside 
prevailing against the Peebles regarding the Peebles' claims under the Act. 
DENNIS K. POOLE ^ 
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